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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has yielded more litigation and less lo-
cal competition than its supporters expected or intended. Calls for its reform
are multiplying. The article diagnoses the 1996 Act’s failings and prescribes a
framework for reform. The successful deregulations of the transportation indus-
tries and of long-distance telecommunications (precedents the 1996 Act sought
to follow) demonstrate that the Act should have taken additional steps to pro-
mote intermodal telecommunications competition. Transportation deregulation
successfully prompted competition where (as in the case of airlines and trucking)
multiple firms could compete on an intramodal basis or where (as in the case of
railroads) the single firm was subject to intermodal competition from firms using
other technologies. The 1996 Act’s reliance on the unbundling of incumbent local
telephone companies’ networks reveals that its supporters thought that portions of
the local wireline networks would remain bottlenecks. The lesson, therefore, is
that the 1996 Act should have taken additional steps to create the conditions for
intermodal competition. Based on this analysis, the article outlines a new commu-
nications law that increases the possibilities for intermodal competition. Indeed,
the glimmers of hope for local competition - cell phone substitution and voice-
over-Internet-protocol (VoIP) telephony - are intermodal competitors. Although
the 1996 Act did move in this direction and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion is vigorous on several fronts, more can be done. Spectrum reform (the most
significant missed opportunity in the 1996 Act) and other steps would decrease
legal and economic barriers to intermodal competition. The article also addresses
local and state control of telecommunications carriers, regulatory parity, univer-
sal service reform, and government funding of research and infrastructure, and
it offers a technology-neutral regulatory scheme for VoIP. The proposed deregu-
latory agenda seeks a law capable of accommodating the speed and diversity of
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Abstract 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has yielded more litigation and less 
local competition than its supporters expected or intended.  Calls for its 
reform are multiplying.  In this Article, Professor Speta diagnoses the 
1996 Act’s failings and prescribes a framework for reform.  The successful 
deregulations of the transportation industries and of long-distance 
telecommunications (precedents the 1996 Act sought to follow) 
demonstrate that the Act should have taken additional steps to promote 
intermodal telecommunications competition.  Transportation 
deregulation successfully prompted competition where (as in the case of 
airlines and trucking) multiple firms could compete on an intramodal 
basis or where (as in the case of railroads) the single firm was subject to 
intermodal competition from firms using other technologies.  The 1996 
Act’s reliance on the unbundling of incumbent local telephone 
companies’ networks reveals that its supporters thought that portions of 
the local wireline networks would remain bottlenecks.  The lesson, 
therefore, is that the 1996 Act should have taken additional steps to 
create the conditions for intermodal competition. 
Based on this analysis, Professor Speta outlines a new communications 
law that increases the possibilities for intermodal competition.  Indeed, 
the glimmers of hope for local competition—cell phone substitution and 
voice-over-Internet-protocol (VoIP) telephony—are intermodal 
competitors.  Although the 1996 Act did move in this direction and the 
Federal Communications Commission is vigorous on several fronts, more 
can be done.  Spectrum reform (the most significant missed opportunity in 
the 1996 Act) and other steps would decrease legal and economic 
barriers to intermodal competition.  The Article also addresses local and 
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state control of telecommunications carriers, regulatory parity, universal 
service reform, and government funding of research and infrastructure, 
and it offers a technology-neutral regulatory scheme for VoIP.  The 
proposed deregulatory agenda seeks a law capable of accommodating the 
speed and diversity of technological change in this "Internet time."  
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I.  Introduction 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was both intended and expected to 
usher in a new era of competition in telephony and emerging data services.  
Advertised as the "most deregulatory [law] in history,"1 the Act was designed to 
"fundamentally restructure[]"2 local telecommunications—replacing long-
monopolized markets with vigorous competition.  Unfortunately, the Act has 
largely failed on its own terms.  Its core provisions—opening the incumbent 
monopolists’ networks to lease by other providers—have yielded more legal 
battles than competition.3  Key parts of this structure have been to the Supreme 
Court twice,4 and the D.C. Circuit has just reversed the FCC’s third attempt to 
devise rules to implement the Act’s network sharing scheme, the first two 
attempts having been struck down as well.5  Indeed, in recent years, the 
percentage of local markets served by new carriers purchasing pieces of the 
incumbents’ networks has actually fallen. 
And yet, despite the poor showing of the 1996 Act’s unbundling regime, 
there are glimmers of hope for local telecommunications competition.  Increasing 
numbers of young people are "cutting the cord"—relying on their cell phones for 
                                                                                                                 
 1. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11. 
 2. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999). 
 3. This proposition needs qualification, of course, which I will provide (see infra notes 
129–46 and accompanying text), because there is substantial competition in some local markets, 
such as the large-business market.  Nevertheless, there is substantial sentiment, justified in my 
view, that local competition has failed to develop in many local markets with the robustness 
expected in 1996. 
 4. See generally Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (upholding 
FCC’s choice of pricing methodology for unbundling rules); AT&T, 525 U.S. 366 (upholding 
FCC jurisdiction to make unbundling rules under the 1996 Act but striking down central parts of 
those rules). 
 5. See generally United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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all of their voice needs.  And, with a giddiness not seen since before the Internet 
crash, cable and Internet companies—and even regulators—are touting voice-
over-Internet-protocol (VoIP) services that could provide alternative phone 
service for the increasing number of broadband users.  Finally, direct broadcast 
satellite has begun competing well against cable television companies. 
These glimmers require a reassessment and reworking of communications 
law to ensure that, now, true competition can take hold.  Although sixty-two 
years passed between the original 1934 Communications Act and its 1996 
overhaul, and only eight since, technological developments and competitive 
markets now require a regulatory structure that can accommodate the rapid and 
unpredictable advances of "Internet time."6  Indeed, the 1996 Act’s focus on 
fostering competition through the device of unbundling the incumbent’s network 
seems incomplete at best. 
This Article begins a reassessment of the 1996 Act and a comprehensive 
prescription for a new regulatory agenda.  This reassessment necessarily begins 
with the precedents upon which Congress itself relied:  deregulation of the 
transportation industries and of long-distance.  Congress thought that the 1996 
Act would prompt the same, relatively quick development of competition that 
followed these earlier deregulatory efforts.  It is indisputable that, shortly after 
deregulation of the transportation industries, those markets began to behave much 
more competitively—with the benefits and detriments that usually accompany 
competitive markets.  And long-distance markets became more competitive 
shortly following the Bell System’s demise.  This paper therefore compares these 
previous examples of deregulation to the 1996 Act’s approach to local markets 
and, by so doing, identifies the piece missing from Congress’s attempt to 
introduce competition into local telecommunications markets.  If deregulation 
could produce competition in so many other markets, the 1996 Act’s failure to 
prompt widespread local telecommunications competition demands some 
explanation. 
The answer, or at least a significant part of the answer, is that the most 
significant prior efforts at deregulation—the elimination of traditional regulation 
over transportation industries—shared a common presumption that the markets 
had become (or always were) structurally competitive.  Once deregulated, the 
                                                                                                                 
 6. There is no consensus on who coined the term "Internet time," but it is generally held 
that Internet time (for example, Internet technologies and business methods) moves four times as 
fast as real time.  See M ICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & DAVID B. YOFFIE, COMPETING ON INTERNET 
TIME:  LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS BATTLE WITH M ICROSOFT 3 (1998) (describing the 
explosion in the development of the Internet in the 1990s).  For an example of the difficulties the 
FCC faces in responding to events in Internet time, see Chairman Michael K. Powell, Remarks 
Before Cellular Telecommunications Internet Association’s CTIA Wireless 2001, at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp101.html (Mar. 20, 2001) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art17
DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1067 
markets very quickly conformed to expectations and competition developed.  In 
the case of trucking and airlines, the consensus and reality was that the markets 
were internally competitive.  The elimination of legal entry barriers and other 
regulatory burdens permitted multiple trucking firms and airlines to compete 
freely, with the familiar results of lower prices and increased quantity.  In the 
case of the railroads, a similar consensus prompted deregulation, although it was 
competition from other forms of transportation—such as trucks, air carriers, and 
water carriers—that rendered the market structurally competitive.  In economics 
short-hand, the trucking and airline markets could support adequate intramodal 
competition while railroads were subject to intermodal competition.  The 
development of competition in long-distance telecommunications was similar:  the 
Justice Department prosecuted the case against the Bell System based on the 
conviction that technological change made competition in long-distance markets 
structurally possible.7  Other deregulatory efforts in natural gas and electricity 
showed a similar consensus, albeit limited in some regards. 
What was different about the 1996 Act was Congress’s conviction that local 
telecommunications markets likely would not be structurally competitive—at least 
not for a significant period of time.  Congress assumed that certain elements of 
these local networks would remain bottlenecks that new entrants would not find 
economical to duplicate.  The 1996 Act attempted to deal with this by creating the 
network-sharing provisions of the Act, which require the incumbent local 
telecommunications companies to lease portions of their networks to new local 
carriers.8  This was an attempt to create some intramodal competition at the retail 
level of local telecommunications, even if the underlying infrastructure remained 
monopolized.  To say the least, no one has been satisfied with the implementation 
of these provisions, as almost no one is satisfied with the level of competition that 
has developed in local telecommunications markets. 
This inquiry yields more than an interesting historical comparison; it also 
demonstrates what ought to be done to promote local telecommunications now—
to maximize the possibility that local competition will take hold and flourish.  If 
Congress was right that new entrants into local telecommunications markets 
would not duplicate the incumbents’ telephone wires, then the development of 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Whether that competition is characterized as intermodal, because MCI used wireless 
long-distance technologies and AT&T used copper wires, or intramodal, because both soon 
switched to fiber optic technologies, is an interesting question, but not one relevant to this 
paper’s project.  For a discussion of the development of microwave for long-distance and its 
being the basis for the government’s antitrust case, see infra notes 92–94 and accompanying 
text.  For a discussion of the industry-wide transition to fiber optics, see generally JONATHAN 
M. KRAUSHAAR, FCC, FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE -END OF YEAR 1998 (1999), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/Fiber/fiber98.pdf. 
 8. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–56 (2000) (establishing interconnectivity requirements).  See 
generally AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–90 (1999); infra note 128. 
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complete alternatives to those wires—that is, the development of true intermodal 
competition—ought to have been recognized as the best way to develop 
competition in local markets.  To be sure, Congress made provision in the 1996 
Act for the possibility of some intermodal competition, by affirming and 
expanding the incumbents’ duties to interconnect with (many) other 
telecommunications carriers.  And Congress took the important step of 
eliminating legal barriers to entry into all telecommunications markets,9 which 
was necessary for any intermodal competition to develop.  But Congress did 
nothing further to assist the development of intermodal competition.  Rather, it 
continued the historic, but increasingly irrelevant, regulatory divisions between 
services, based on the technologies used to deliver them. 
What is needed today is a clear agenda to increase intermodal (and all other 
facilities-based) competition in local telecommunications markets.  The glimmer 
of competition in many local markets is the prospect of intermodal competition—
competition with the traditional telephone companies from wireless, cable, and 
even electric  companies and competition with the traditional cable television 
services from satellite, wireless, and (maybe) the telephone companies.  Already a 
substantial number of proposals exist that could form the core of such an agenda, 
and these ought to be the highest legislative and regulatory priorities.  The FCC is 
working on some of these fronts, confronting both new technology and old law 
with admirable results.  But much of its energy is also consumed by the failed 
experiment with compulsory access to local networks and by a series of legal 
battles foisted upon it by new services that do not neatly fit in old regulatory 
categories.  More importantly, to avoid costly litigation and uncertainty, Congress 
should embody many of these proposals in new legislation. In particular, 
Congress ought to quickly adopt proposals that decrease the barriers to entry 
faced by wireless and cable competitors.  These are the main hopes for true, 
effective local telecommunications competition. 
This Article seeks to make the case for such a new agenda:  for such 
deregulation that encourages the multiple technologies of the Internet and that is 
flexible enough for "Internet time."  Part II provides a brief overview of earlier 
deregulatory statutes in the transportation industries, establishing the essentials of 
the model just described.  Because no economic impediments existed in the 
underlying industry structure, legal deregulation quickly yielded competition.  Part 
III extends the analysis to telecommunications, noting first that deregulation 
before the 1996 Act succeeded for the same basic reason as transportation 
deregulation—all agreed that the underlying markets had competitive shape.  
Second, the Part contrasts the passage of the 1996 Act with both the experience 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000) (forbidding state and local regulation that "prohibits or has 
the effect of prohibiting" any entity from providing telecommunications services). 
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in transportation deregulation and with early telecommunications deregulation: 
despite general deregulatory rhetoric, Congress did not emphasize true facilities-
based competition, nor has such competition substantially developed in local 
telephone markets.  Part IV details how the unbundling regime itself has not 
succeeded, legally or economically, but how intermodal competition may be on 
the horizon for a variety of services. Part V provides the outlines of a 
comprehensive program to substantially increase the prospects for intermodal 
competition in local telecommunications services, the true hope for introducing 
competition.  The Part details a number of specific proposals, such as spectrum 
reform, and also discusses a number of consequences that a focus on intermodal 
competition will have, for example, on universal service policy.  Intermodal 
competition also raises the challenge of regulatory parity—ensuring that markets 
and not governments determine winning technologies and services—and this Part 
offers a framework for addressing parity arguments.  At bottom, these individual 
proposals justify a wholesale rewriting of the Communications Act, and this Part 
offers a rough framework for doing so.  Part VI concludes with some additional 
observations on the political possibilities of wholesale legislative reform, 
regulatory resources, judicial review, and codifying this "new" reform agenda. 
II.  The Market Structure of Deregulated Transportation Markets 
A wide consensus exists that the legal deregulation of the transportation 
industries was rapidly followed by the more or less competitive provision of these 
services.  This "Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law"10 began with 
the substantial deregulation of railroads, trucking, and airlines in the 1970s and 
1980s.  "Deregulation," although it differed in these industries in many regards, 
had a common core, just as the regulation that preceded it was based upon a 
similar model.  In particular, based upon common law notions of common 
carriage and the seminal Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA), the 
transportation industries (and related industries, including telecommunications) 
had long been subject to administrative agency control over entry, exit, pricing, 
and other terms of service.11  In general terms, deregulatory statutes eliminated 
entry controls and price regulation and permitted competitive markets to operate. 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998). 
 11. See generally id. at 1327–30 (providing an overview of economic regulations); 
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (discussing the need for regulation, 
possible solutions, and reform); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC 
UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 10–35 (3d ed. 1993) (examining the significance and new 
environment of public utilities). 
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 Deregulatory statutes eliminated the quality of service regulation that attempted to 
specify what the consumer received while maintaining basic safety regulation. 
Deregulation was generally followed by the rapid development of 
competition, as evidenced principally by lower prices and higher output.  This 
section briefly reviews these deregulatory successes to demonstrate that the legal 
deregulation was preceded by, and in large part driven by, a consensus that the 
markets were structurally competitive.  Because the elimination of regulation was 
premised on the view that these transportation markets were structurally 
competitive (or largely so), and because this presumption turned out to be correct 
(or largely so), the deregulation was quickly followed by competitive 
performance.12 
It is useful to divide transportation deregulation into two different categories, 
with airline and trucking deregulation in a first category and railroad deregulation 
in a second.  Trucking and airline markets were deregulated because a consensus 
emerged that these markets were internally competitive—that a significant 
number of trucking or air carriers could simultaneously operate in competition 
with one another, mimicking classically competitive markets.  Railroad was 
deregulated not because of internal competition; indeed, deregulation led to quite 
substantial consolidation of railroads and the elimination of much rail route 
competition.  But railroads faced effective competition from trucking in most 
markets, so deregulation was followed by declining prices and other indicia of 
competition. 
A.  Airline and Trucking Deregulation:  Intramodal Competition 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,13 called by one leading commentator 
"the most significant piece of legislation in the field of transport regulation in the 
[previous] forty years,"14 began the process of deregulating the previously highly 
regulated transportation industries.  Prior to its passage, air carriers were 
                                                                                                                 
 12. I do not claim to be tilling new ground with the argument that these successfully 
deregulated markets were structurally competitive; indeed, that would be inconsistent with my 
claim that substantial consensus recognized this fact even prior to the legislation’s being passed. 
I will therefore proceed to retell the story in summary fashion, principally to establish the 
contrast with the 1996 Act.  For more complete retellings, see, for example, Stephen G. Breyer, 
Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1005 (1987) 
(summarizing the risks and policy problems existing in deregulated industries); Kearney & 
Merrill, supra note 10. 
 13. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). 
 14. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Opening 
Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP . L.J. 91, 93 (1979). 
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governed by the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act15 and its controls on entry, exit, and 
rates.16  The statute borrowed its general agency-centered approach and many of 
its specific provisions from the Interstate Commerce Act’s provisions regulating 
railroads.17  But, unlike the ICA, the principal justification for which was 
controlling the monopoly power of railroads,18 the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act 
was based upon the notion that competition would be "destructive," both in the 
sense of failing to provide adequate service and in the sense of providing 
inadequate safety to the traveling public.19 
The deregulatory legislation largely eliminated barriers to entry,20 phased out 
barriers to exit,21 phased out price regulation,22 and, in fact, calendared the 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified before 
repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1952)).  For discussions of the origins of the 1938 Act, see 
generally Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revisited?  Airline Deregulation and the Public 
Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 179 (1981); ROGER NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 
(1971). 
 16. See generally SAMUEL B. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR 
TRANSPORTATION 15–20 (1961) (discussing the Act and the Board which implements the Act). 
 17. See infra Part II.B (examining railroad deregulation).  See generally Kearney & Merrill, 
supra note 10, at 1335 (comparing the 1938 Act to the Interstate Commerce Act). 
 18. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (describing the burdens the ICA placed 
on railroads). 
 19. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 75-686 (1937) (examining airline competition).  The Senate 
stated: 
The air lines . . . are engaged in intensive competition with each other and with . . . 
other carriers.  This competition is being carried to an extreme which tends to 
undermine the financial stability of the carriers and jeopardize the maintenance of 
transportation facilities and service appropriate to the needs of commerce and 
required in the public interest and the national defense. 
Id. at 2.  Academic commentary of the time (that is, influenced by the Great Depression), 
"which mostly supported airline regulation on grounds similar to those being advanced to 
support the suppression of competition elsewhere in the economy, . . . took this view into the 
1960s."  Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets:  Theory, Firm 
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 398 (1987). 
 20. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 12, 92 Stat. at 1716–18 
(1978). 
 21. Id. § 19.  As in the case of railroad deregulation, carriers’ ability to exit a market was a 
contentious and important issue.  It was contentious because the original regulatory paradigm 
maintained air service to many locations that did not generate enough traffic to justify service on 
purely economic criteria.  In the familiar story of promoting internal cross-subsidies, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) limited entry on profitable routes and required airlines to provide 
service on unprofitable routes.  See Dempsey, supra note 14, at 111–14 (examining CAB’s 
entry criteria in various markets).  The legislation therefore required service for ten years 
following enactment to every market receiving service on the date of its passage.  Nevertheless, 
after the period ended, many cities lost commercial air service, and virtually no city that was not 
previously served gained service.  For evidence that some optimism exists that the development 
of smaller but more efficient jets could increase service to small or medium communities, see 
TRANSP . RESEARCH BD., ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY  155–58 
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demise of the regulatory agency itself.23  The consensus of academic research 
finds that the Act was quickly and wildly successful in creating a more or less 
competitive market in air service:  prices fell, service improved (except where a 
city lost service entirely), and efficiency measures climbed.  One early review 
concluded that the welfare gain to travelers through lower fares and increased 
service exceeded six billion dollars per year;24 more recent work has concluded 
that the benefits from increased competition continue, even if certain 
developments (such as decreasing fuel prices and the development of more 
efficient jets) have made it more difficult to determine the magnitude of the 
benefits.25  Following deregulation, almost all served routes experienced entry by 
multiple carriers, and, although entry declined in the mid-1990s following the 
ValuJet crash, entry by so-called low-cost carriers continued to increase.26 
Deregulation of airlines was prompted by a broad consensus—shared first 
by academics and later by leading regulators and legislators—that the market for 
air carriage was structurally competitive.  (By structurally competitive, I simply 
mean that there are no important economic barriers to multiple entry and 
competition, such as economies of scale or scope or network effects.)  As one 
commentator put it, "by the mid-1970’s it was probably fair to say that no 
impartial academic observer of any standing doubted that the airline business, if 
unregulated, would reach something that more or less resembled a competitive 
equilibrium."27  This academic consensus was able to point to several significant 
pieces of evidence in the real world, most importantly the much lower prices and 
more frequent service prevailing on intrastate routes in California and Texas 
where state regulation permitted free entry.28  Additionally, in the late 1970s and 
                                                                                                                 
(1999), but no such developments have yet occurred. 
 22. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 31. 
 23. The 1978 Act required the CAB to prepare a report in 1984 describing the effects of 
deregulation, 49 U.S.C. § 1551(c), (d) (Supp. 1981), but it scheduled the CAB to terminate, with 
its residual functions being passed to the Department of Transportation, in 1985.  Id. § 1551. 
 24. See STEVEN M ORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE 
DEREGULATION 1–2 (1986) (analyzing the impact of deregulation). 
 25. See, e.g., TRANSP . RESEARCH BD., supra note 21, at 61–63 (summarizing collected 
studies). 
 26. See id. at 40–42 (analyzing trends in market entry activity). 
 27. Levine, supra note 19, at 394. 
 28. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 14, at 116 (concluding that travelers accepted more 
crowded aircraft if prices were lower); Michael E. Levine, Note, Is Regulation Necessary?  
California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416, 1430–43 
(1965) (analyzing California data).  Other evidence included the success of air charter service, 
which provided much lower fares and proved that the traveling public would tolerate more-
crowded planes in exchange for lower fares, until the CAB killed the market.  See Levine, supra 
note 19, at 402 (noting CAB’s elimination of the threatening non-scheduled carriers). 
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early 1980s, the air market became the principal example used by the new 
economics of market "contestability" to show that (under certain conditions 
argued to prevail in airline markets) even a carrier that had a natural monopoly 
over a market would price its service close to its cost.  In other words, this 
argument suggested that even if a route was served by only a single carrier, that 
carrier was likely to price at cost and not at a monopoly level.29 
Regulators, most famously Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Chairman Alfred 
Kahn (an economist), and legislators soon adopted this academic consensus and 
explicitly referred to it in the proceedings leading to the 1978 Act.  The famous 
"Kennedy hearings" in 1975 were scripted to build to the conclusion that air 
carriers should be deregulated and included testimony from a number of 
academics.30  And the committee reports as well as the floor testimony on the 
1978 Act repeatedly referred to the consensus that airline markets were 
structurally competitive.31 
                                                                                                                 
 29. On the theory of contestable markets generally, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., 
CONTESTABLE M ARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); John C. Panzar & 
Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. 1 
(1977).  On the application to the airline industry, see ELIZABETH E. BAILEY ET AL., 
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 153–72 (1985); Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The 
Contestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP . 
PROBS. 125 (1981). 
The essential argument is this:  Where market participants can enter and exit costlessly at 
efficient scale, even a natural monopolist will price at cost because any attempt to price above 
cost will invite entry at an undercutting price that would take the entire market.  Two summaries 
of the theory, reasonably accessible to lawyers, are Michael Spence, Contestable Markets and 
the Theory of Industry Structure:  A Review Article, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE  981 (1983), and 
Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 
1 YALE J. ON REG. 111 (1984). 
With respect to airline markets, the essential intuition can be seen in a grossly simplified 
example.  Imagine a route (say Peoria to Chicago) on which demand is such that only a single 
airline will serve the route, for example because 125 people a day wish to fly from Peoria to 
Chicago, and the most efficient way to serve that demand is by a single 125-seat aircraft.  That 
is, flying any bigger plane is more costly, as is flying multiple flights of smaller planes.  This is 
the definition of a natural monopoly market.  See WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF 
NATURAL M ONOPOLY 19 (1982) (determining that where market demand is most efficiently 
served by a single carrier, natural monopoly obtains).  If entry and exit from a market are 
costless, however, the single carrier serving the market cannot price above its cost, or another 
carrier will enter the market and undercut it.  Entry and exit were hypothesized to be relatively 
costless in airline markets because other airlines had many planes on multiple routes and could 
divert a plane into a market in which the incumbent was charging above-cost fares and then 
withdraw from the market and put the plane to another use.  See generally Bailey & Baumol, 
supra; Bailey & Panzar, supra. 
 30. See generally SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY , 94TH CONG., CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 
(1976).  For a description of the Kennedy hearings, see BREYER, supra note 11, at 321–39. 
 31. The most forceful statements in 1978 came from Senator Kennedy, even though he 
was not the manager of the bill. 
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The deregulation of trucking presents a case similar to that of airlines.  
Indeed, although the Motor Carrier Act of 193532 adopted "utility-type regulation," 
few argued even then that the industry had any characteristics of natural 
monopoly.33  Rather, industry stabilization, as well as the need to protect railroads 
from emergent competition, provided the bases for expanding the Interstate 
Commerce Commission’s (ICC) jurisdiction to include motor carriers.34  Between 
1935 and the mid-1970s, the ICC followed these two purposes and largely 
forbade any entry into interstate trucking.  "By protecting carriers from new 
competition and by keeping rates at a level where profits were guaranteed, the 
ICC helped assure the emergence of a trucking oligopoly."35 
Although the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not do away with the regulator, 
it did eliminate entry and exit restrictions and rate regulation.36  And, again, 
significant academic commentary had argued that trucking involved no 
economies of scale or scope and few network effects—in other words, that 
multiple firms could readily compete against one another to provide service.37  
                                                                                                                 
In my 16 years in the Senate, I have seldom come across a national economic 
problem of such apparent complexity and political sensitivity that has been studied 
by so many independent and diverse sources, yet prompted sets of 
recommendations that are so similar.  Virtually every independent study undertaken 
in the last 20 years has concluded that less regulation is the appropriate policy . . . . 
[T]he message has always been the same:  namely, it is time to revitalize the airline 
industry with competition. 
H.R. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS & TRANSP ., 96TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE 
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, at 971 (Comm. Print 1979); see also Air Service Improvement Act 
of 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1211, at 2–3 (discussing favorable experience of low-fare carriers 
permitted unrestricted entry in Texas and California).  
 32. Act of Aug. 9, 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543.  For general descriptions of the 1935 Act 
and its purposes, see, for example, Warren G. Magnuson, The Motor Carrier Act of 1935:  A 
Legislator Looks at the Law, 31 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 37 (1962); William E. Thoms, Rollin’ 
on . . . to a Free Market:  Motor Carrier Regulation 1935–1980, 13 TRANSP . L.J. 43 (1983); 
Note, Federal Regulation of Trucking:  The Emerging Critique, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 460, 461–
501 (1963). 
 33. See Thoms, supra note 32, at 47–50 (explaining the arguments for regulation). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 50 (describing why the ICC’s jurisdiction was expanded); Paul Stephen 
Dempsey, Entry Control Under the Interstate Commerce Act:  A Comparative Analysis of the 
Statutory Criteria Governing Entry in Transportation, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 730–40 
(1977). 
 35. Thoms, supra note 32, at 58. 
 36. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion—Never the 
Twain Shall Meet:  The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1981) 
(discussing traditional entry criteria from 1935 to 1977); Donald V. Harper, Entry Control and 
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 12 TRANSP . L.J. 51, 56–62 (1980) (examining entry control 
restrictions on common carriers).  It did not, curiously, eliminate tariff-filing. 
 37. See generally Dudley F. Pegrum, The Economic Basis of Public Policy for Motor 
Transport, 28 LAND ECON. 244 (1952); James Sloss, Regulation of Motor Freight 
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"By 1970, many commentators had remarked upon the inappropriateness of a 
utility model of regulation for a possibly competitive industry.  Trucking just did 
not seem to have many of the characteristics of natural monopoly."38  As was the 
case with airlines, the economists had several unregulated industry segments—
including contract carriage, private carriage, agricultural commodities, and 
various Canadian provinces—that provided evidence that the market could be 
competitive.39 
Deregulation of the trucking industry quickly resulted in more competitive 
service.  Most commentary has concluded that the decrease in prices reflected 
new competition and not merely a shift from nonprice to price competition.40  
Indeed, a comprehensive survey of the economic literature in 1992 concluded 
that consumers received significantly lower prices, a wider variety of service 
offerings, and a wider variety of companies engaged in trucking.41 
* * * 
Three caveats are in order here, half way through the historical review of 
deregulation, lest the reader accuse me of telling an overly ambitious "Just So 
Story."  First, there were, of course, causes for the deregulation of airlines and 
trucking other than the academic consensus that regulation was unnecessary in 
these markets—including the arguments that entry barriers in trucking were 
hurting minorities42 and that decreasing transportation prices would help fight the 
severe inflation of the times.43  The political and economic history of the 
                                                                                                                 
Transportation:  A Quantitative Evaluation of Policy, 1 BELL J. ECON. & M GMT. SCI. 327 (1970); 
Joseph L. Steinfeld, Jr., Regulation Versus Free Competition—The Current Battle Over 
Deregulation of Entry into the Motor Carrier Industry, 45 ICC PRAC. J. 590 (1978). 
 38. Thoms, supra note 32, at 68; see also Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of 
Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:  
M ICROECONOMICS 1, 18 (Marten Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989) (noting academic 
consensus on the benefits of deregulation). 
 39. See Sloss, supra note 37, at 330–35 (using Canadian provinces as an example); Thoms, 
supra note 32, at 61, 66–68 (discussing exemptions from Motor Carrier Act generally).  
 40. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose, The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier 
Industry, 16 RAND J. ECON. 299, 314 (1985) ("Share price data indicate that regulatory reforms 
significantly reduced the expected future profits of firms in the motor carrier industry.  The 
results are consistent with the presence of monopoly profits for trucking firms in the pre-1978 
regulatory environment."). 
 41. See JOHN RICHARD FELTON & DALE G. ANDERSON, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 
OF THE M OTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY  155–59 (1989) (evaluating the benefits of deregulation).  See 
generally Office of Economics, ICC, The U.S. Motor Carrier Industry Long After Deregulation 
(1992). 
 42. See Thoms, supra note 32, at 68 ("Minority truckers felt left out of a system where 
all of the goodies were divided up in 1935."). 
 43. See, e.g., Harold T. Johnson, Introduction to LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE 
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, supra note 31, at v ("This type of legislation can be a powerful 
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deregulatory statutes is complex, and many works have examined them in greater 
depth.44  A few more ambitious works have attempted a synthesis of the 
deregulatory movement of the past thirty years.45  The discussion both here and 
in the next subpart is designed only to show that, in cases where deregulation 
succeeded, there was reason to think that the markets were structurally 
competitive. 
Second, the debate over the benefits of deregulation is not entirely one-sided, 
with some significant minority commentary continuing to question its benefits 
and to assert the need for new regulation.46  My agenda here is not to debate the 
merits and demerits of competition.47  Rather, my essential claim is that these 
industries, when deregulated, began to behave as competitive industries.  Indeed, 
most of the criticism of the deregulatory statutes is actually criticism of the 
results of competition—that safety is inadequately provided for, that wages fall, 
and that service to small markets disappears.48  I acknowledge significant 
economic and noneconomic reasons to regulate away from the result that purely 
unfettered competition might provide, though I would prefer to utilize direct 
                                                                                                                 
weapon in the fight against inflation."); Thoms, supra note 32, at 70 (examining inflation during 
the 1970s).  Thoms writes:  
Beginning with the Ford administration and continuing through the Carter regime, 
inflation became the principal concern of the American political economy.  
Increased competition was considered to be a weapon to use against the inflationary 
forces surrounding us.  Regulated industries, because of their controlled oligopolistic 
position, could pass on increased costs of equipment, fuel and labor by going to the 
appropriate regulatory agency and gaining permission to increase rates. 
Id. 
 44. See generally BREYER, supra note 11; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10; Noll, supra 
note 15; infra notes 71–89.  My caveat, supra note 12, also notes the scope of this project. 
 45. In my view, the best is Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10; others include BREYER, 
supra note 11; M ARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK , THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985) 
(concluding that elite opinion favoring deregulation and implementation of the ideas of 
competition by an agency prior to legislation were the principal drivers of statutory change); 
Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation:  A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 155 (2001) (examining deregulation and the California energy crisis). 
 46. See generally M ICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS:  WINNERS AND LOSERS 
IN TRUCKING DEREGULATION (2000); Mark N. Cooper, Freeing Public Policy from the 
Deregulation Debate:  The Airline Industry Comes of Age (and Should Be Accountable for Its 
Anticompetitive Behavior), 13 AIR & SPACE LAW., Spring 1999, at 1; Paul Stephen Dempsey, 
Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation:  The Paradox of Market Failure, 24 
TRANSP . L.J. 73 (1996). 
 47. My view, recorded elsewhere, is that this sort of extensive economic regulation is 
justified only in very narrow circumstances.  See generally James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet 
Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1553 (2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)). 
 48. See, e.g., BELZER, supra note 46, at 175–92 (discussing the benefits and harms of 
economic competition). 
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safety regulation and explicit government subsidies to reach most of those results. 
 (I return to this issue in the context of universal service policies for 
telecommunications later in the paper.49) 
Third, I do not wish to portray any of these markets as mirrors of the 
perfectly competitive markets described in microeconomics texts.  Imperfections 
remain, most notably in air carriage due to the (largely unforeseen) development 
of hub and spoke systems and the related scarcity of gate and runway slots.50  
But the consensus evidence is that deregulation was followed by significant gains 
to competition. 
B.  Railroad Deregulation:  Intermodal Competition 
Railroads present a different case, for deregulation occurred simultaneously 
with a consolidation of the industry that left many major routes with only one rail 
carrier.  With railroads, the consensus was not that railroading itself was 
competitive, but that competition from other forms of transportation largely 
controlled any market power that the remaining railroads could exercise.  Indeed, 
such was the competition from other modes of transportation that two leading 
commentators have quipped:  "The railroad industry is perhaps the only U.S. 
industry that has been, or ever will be, deregulated because of its poor financial 
performance under regulation."51  But it is clear that the government-financed 
bailout of Penn Central, together with the prospect of further railroad 
bankruptcies, created the impetus for government to do something to help 
railroads, and that "something" was deregulation.52 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See infra notes 397–413 and accompanying text (asserting a need for a universal 
service policy). 
 50. See TRANSP . RESEARCH BD., supra note 21, at 65–67 (explaining the spread of hub 
and spoke systems); Cooper, supra note 46, at 23–25 (examining the effect of a hub and spoke 
network on regulatory concerns).  See generally Daniel R. Polsby, Airport Pricing of Aircraft 
Takeoff and Landing Slots:  An Economic Critique of Federal Regulatory Policy, 89 CAL. L. REV. 
779 (2001). 
 51. Curtis Grimm & Clifford Winston, Competition in the Deregulated Railroad Industry: 
Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES:  WHAT’S NEXT? 
41, 41 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000). 
 52. See id. at 42 (evaluating railroad deregulation); see also William E. Thoms, Clear Track 
for Deregulation:  American Railroads, 1970–1980, 12 TRANSP . L.J. 183, 212 (1982) (discussing 
the motive behind passing the Staggers Act).  Thoms states: 
The main concern for Congress in passing the Staggers Act was the financial 
condition of the railroads.  This Congress was faced with the spectre of more 
bankruptcies. . . . But this time Congress faced an electorate worried about 
government spending.  The idea of paying for another Conrail, much less buying up 
independent, solvent lines was too vexing. 
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The Interstate Commerce Act’s model of extensive economic regulation has 
already been described.53  By the 1970s, the principal feature of that regulation 
that hurt the railroads was the restriction on exit.  Under the ICA, a railroad could 
neither discontinue nor abandon service on a particular route without ICC 
approval,54 and such approval was rarely granted.  Thus, "a large fraction of the 
nation’s rail service was provided at an economic loss, with returns on 
investment for most major railroads falling below the returns of other U.S. 
nonfinancial corporations."55  To address this problem, the various statutes 
deregulating rail carriers,56 and in particular the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,57 
intended to assist the financial situation of the railroads by permitting 
consolidation and streamlining the railroads’ exit from unprofitable routes.58 
Indeed, by contrast to airline and trucking deregulation, which were 
premised on the notion that these separate markets were internally competitive, no 
one expected that deregulation would lead to entry of new railroads.  Everyone—
on all sides of the deregulation debate—expected that it would cause more 
consolidation in rail service, with more routes being served by only one railroad, 
and substantial abandonment of rail routes.59  These results were consistent with 
a competitive market because of the intermodal pressures to which railroads were 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 53. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text (describing subsequent legislation’s 
reliance on the ICA). 
 54. See Dempsey, supra note 34, at 732–34 (describing § 1(18) of the ICA). 
 55. Grimm & Winston, supra note 51, at 41; see also Richard C. Levin, Railroad Rates, 
Profitability, and Welfare Under Deregulation, 12 BELL J. ECON. 1, 3 (1981) ("attempt[ing] to 
predict the impact of rate flexibility on . . . the rail industry").  See generally THEODORE E. 
KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983). 
 56. For a summary of the progression of these statutes, which include most significantly 
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (easing rail carrier exit from passenger carriage and 
creating Amtrak), the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (the 3R Act) (creating Conrail as 
the successor to the bankrupt Penn Central system and easing route exit for Conrail), the 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4R Act) (easing rate regulation 
generally), and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, see generally FRANK J. DOOLEY & WILLIAM E. 
THOMS, RAILROAD LAW A DECADE AFTER DEREGULATION 1–13 (1994). 
 57. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980). 
 58. See Rodney D. Peterson, Entry and Exit:  An Economic Analysis of Statutory Changes 
in Rail Carrier Entry and Exit, 13 TRANSP . L.J. 189, 210–20 (1984) (analyzing three major 
railroad deregulation acts).  The Staggers Act also assisted entry, most significantly by requiring 
railroads to share trackage.  Id. at 218. 
 59. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 44, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3989 
("Restructuring would involve a consolidation and reduction of duplicate tracks and facilities, 
discontinuance of uneconomic service, rationalization of routes and terminal facilities, and 
improvement in operating efficiencies."); Christopher A. Vellturo et al., Deregulation, Mergers, 
and Cost Savings in Class I U.S. Railroads 1974–1986, 1 J. ECON. & M GMT. STRATEGY 339, 
341–47 (1992) (summarizing fifteen years of railroad mergers). 
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subject.  Somewhat ironically, the prior deregulation of air and trucking had put 
significant pressure on railroads, for, although unit costs for rail transportation 
were probably lower than those for air or trucking, the deregulated carriers were 
able to undercut rail significantly.60 
Congress recognized these competitive pressures61 and the academic work 
that had long argued that competition from other types of carriers would 
constrain the railroads’ ability to price above cost.62  And, although the examples 
were fewer than in air and trucking, a few earlier ICC actions that decreased 
constraints on railroads nevertheless provided some evidence that wholesale 
deregulation might improve performance and would not hurt consumers.63  The 
Staggers Act did not eliminate the regulator (that came in the 1990s64) nor did it 
eliminate all economic regulation.  The Act retained rate control in markets, such 
as coal, in which shippers were thought to be captive to the railroads,65 but it did 
increase the railroads’ flexibility to raise rates.66  Even in its retention of regulation 
for these markets, however, the legislation recognized intermodal competition as 
the appropriate measure of the railroads’ market power.67 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See Peterson, supra note 58, at 217 ("Results of both statutes caused further 
difficulties for railroads.  Congress, by its partial deregulation of air and motor carriers, fostered 
additional entry, lower rates and fares."). 
 61. For example, the House Report repeatedly noted that the poor financial condition of 
the railroads was due to competition from trucking and water carriers (barges) and noted that 
"[b]oth motor carrier and water carrier competition have continued to take intercity 
transportation business away from the railroads.  Today, the once dominant railroad industry 
accounts for but 36 percent of the inter-city ton miles of freight.  In 1947 railroads had twice the 
market share."  H.R. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 35, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3980. 
 62. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 35–40, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3980–85 
(discussing the history of freight rates). 
 63. See, e.g., Thoms, supra note 52, at 210 ("A definite philosophy change ranged at the 
ICC during the 1970s.  With the Ford and Carter administrations enthusiasts for deregulation, 
and with air deregulation approaching, the ICC began to change its attitude.  The Commission 
has applied in motor carrier cases a less protectionist policy, and this began to occur with 
railroads as well."). 
 64. See generally ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 65. The House Report stated that the new statute "provides the Commission with 
jurisdiction to determine rate reasonableness only when there is not effective competition."  
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3978. 
 66. See Thoms, supra note 52, at 213–15 (analyzing decreased rate regulation). 
 67. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701 (2000) (conditioning rate regulation on a finding of dominance); 
id. § 10707(a) (defining dominance with respect to competition from other railroads and from 
other modes of transportation); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 39, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3984 (discussing the impact of competition).  The committee stated: 
The test of a transportation alternative is a sound one.  If a shipper can rely on a 
transportation alternative, which could include another railroad, a barge, or a truck, 
at a transportation cost which is not substantially greater than the rail 
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All in all, railroad deregulation is considered to have resulted in a more 
competitive transportation market, notwithstanding the rail consolidation and 
route abandonment.  For some years, there was a dispute about whether the fall 
in real rates was due to deregulation,68 but later work showed that, after 1980, 
rates became more sensitive to the elasticity of demand for rail service and that 
deregulation was responsible for this result.69 
* * * 
It is probably gilding the lily to go on further, but the same point could be 
made with respect to deregulation of natural gas pipelines, wholesale electricity 
transmission, and a variety of other markets.  Deregulation succeeded because 
none was needed—intra- or intermodal competition became possible and lifting 
regulatory barriers opened the market.70 
III.  Telecommunications Deregulation:  Computer I Through the 1996 Act 
By contrast to the legislative action that deregulated the transportation 
industries in the 1970s and 1980s, those decades saw only limited deregulatory 
steps in telecommunications.  These limited steps were taken either by the 
regulators or the antitrust enforcers without significant involvement of (indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
transportation cost, then competition is present.  Competition will serve to hold 
down rates, and the railroad would not have market power. 
Id. 
 68. Compare Kenneth D. Boyer, The Costs of Price Regulation:  Lessons from Railroad 
Deregulation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 408, 411 (1987) (concluding that deregulation raised overall 
prices), with C. Barnekov & A. N. Kleit, The Efficiency Effects of Railroad Deregulation in the 
United States, 17 INT’L J. TRANSP . ECON. 21 (1990) (concluding that deregulation caused a 
relative price decline). 
 69. See CLIFFORD WINSTON ET AL., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SURFACE FREIGHT 
DEREGULATION 13 (1990) ("Deregulation appears to have changed both carrier and shipper 
behavior as policymakers intended.  Carriers have taken significant steps to improve the 
efficiency of their operations and to set rates that are more responsive to competitive market 
conditions."); Wesley W. Wilson, Market-Specific Effects of Rail Deregulation, 42 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 1, 20 (1994) ("[W]hile differences exist across commodities (especially in the early 
periods of deregulation), the effect of deregulation on prices has generally been to lower them.  
With price decreases and cost savings from deregulation, welfare gains from deregulation are 
likely positive."). 
 70. See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM:  RESTRUCTURING 
AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 61–63 (1996) (discussing Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission orders opening long-distance transmission markets); PAUL W. M ACAVOY, THE 
NATURAL GAS M ARKET 10 (2000) ("[W]ith technical limits on pipe size, at approximately 
thirty-six inches in diameter, and demands growing to levels that allowed multiple companies, 
each with lines of that diameter, to serve a metropolitan region, entry and overlap of carriers 
grew widespread."). 
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with some resistance from) Congress.  These moves in telecommunications, of 
course, were not taken in a vacuum, for the FCC and the antitrust division were 
influenced by the general change in thinking that favored deregulation and 
markets.  Importantly, this "new" thinking affected not only these two executive 
institutions, but also the courts that reviewed the FCC’s decisions and that 
prodded the agency toward competition on several important occasions.71  Given 
that the original Communications Act drew largely upon the Interstate Commerce 
Act for its regulatory principles,72 telecommunications law had long looked to 
transportation law.  Many in the communications sector were now influenced by 
deregulation in transportation.73 
The FCC’s deregulatory actions during this time and the antitrust breakup of 
the Bell System provided examples of competition in telecommunications markets 
(or in closely related markets, such as for telecommunications equipment), and 
these examples were additional precedents for the 1996 Act’s focus on 
introducing competition for local markets.  In this Part, I first briefly review these 
telecommunications precedents to show again that the successes came where 
there was strong reason to believe that the markets were structurally competitive. 
 Indeed, the FCC’s deregulation of computer and customer equipment markets, 
for example, was based upon findings that the markets were internally 
competitive (intramodal), while the impetus for the long-distance portion of the 
government’s case against AT&T was the development of a technology that 
promised intermodal competition.   
Cable television provides a useful contrast to administrative attempts at 
deregulation in telephony, confirming the importance of intermodal competition 
and of using regulation where necessary to eliminate other barriers to entry.  In 
1992, Congress provided that states and municipalities could no longer grant 
exclusive franchises to cable operators.  But, despite the lifting of that legal 
barrier, very little competition developed in cable markets until recently.  In only a 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1370 ("There can be no question that in 
some industries the courts have pried open doors to competition that legislators or regulators 
preferred to keep shut. . . . This has been especially true in . . . telecommunications."); Clifford 
Winston, Economic Deregulation:  Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists , 31 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1263, 1264–66 (1993) ("[C]ongressional action was not the sole source of the 
deregulation movement and, in fact, was often the last step in the process."); Thomas S. Ulen, 
Book Review, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1997) ("[M]ore typically, Congress keeps its 
distance from the regulators and allows the courts to hold the agencies accountable.").  See 
generally Günter Knieps & Pablo T. Spiller, Regulating by Partial Deregulation:  The Case of 
Telecommunications, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. 391 (1983). 
 72. See generally Glen O. Robinson, Title I:  The Federal Communications Act:  An Essay 
on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
OF 1934, at 3 (Max D. Paglin ed. 1989). 
 73. See PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM:  A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS 
129, 344–45 (1987) (discussing the influence of deregulation on telecommunications). 
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few areas did new cable companies install wires to provide intramodal 
competition.  The more significant competition today is intermodal—from direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS).  Even this intermodal competition, however, was 
possible only with regulation that affirmatively enabled DBS to offer a truly 
competitive multi-channel video product.  Subpart B briefly reviews these 
episodes of cable competition. 
In the final subpart of this Part, I look at the 1996 Act as a historic matter to 
show that both the economists and the legislators had significant doubt that the 
local telephone markets were structurally competitive.  Everyone was hopeful that 
new telephone companies would enter to compete with incumbent local carriers, 
and some legislative leaders did tout the possibility that wireless or satellite or 
cable companies would provide this competition.  But doubts about the viability of 
local competition were prominent, and these doubts explain both the Act’s 
reliance on provisions "unbundling" elements of the incumbent carriers’ networks 
and the Act’s more limited steps to provide a framework for intermodal 
competition. 
A.  The Pre-1996 Act Precedents 
During the 1970s, prodded by the courts, the FCC took several steps that 
introduced competition to formerly monopolized telecommunications networks. 
The most significant deregulation came when the FCC used its authority to 
essentially define certain services out of the common carrier title of the 
Communications Act and therefore out of the agency’s economic  regulation.  The 
FCC also began the process of liberalizing entry into long-distance markets, 
which was completed by the AT&T Consent Decree that settled the 
government’s antitrust case against the Bell System. 
1.  Redefining the Network 
In the 1970s, the FCC faced a variety of challenges brought about by the 
development of the computer and the integration of computer and 
telecommunications services.  In response, the Commission began the famous 
Computer Inquiries, which resulted in two significant decisions concerning the 
scope of regulation under the Communications Act.74  First, the agency held that 
                                                                                                                 
 74. The story of the Computer Inquiries is comprehensively reviewed in Robert Cannon, 
The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries , 55 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 167 (2003), and in James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet 
Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225 (2002). 
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computer processing services that employed telecommunications services would 
be considered "enhanced services" and not common carrier communications 
services.  These services would therefore be outside of the traditional regulatory 
structure provided by Title II of the Communications Act.75  Second, the 
Commission held that consumer premises equipment (CPE), such as telephones, 
fax machines, and other devices that hooked up to the telephone network, was 
also outside of the Act.76  Each of these decisions77 was based upon an explicit 
finding that the respective markets could be competitively supplied—that, apart 
from the power of the telecommunications company to control the market by 
limiting its provision of communications services, computer services and 
customer premises equipment could be provided by multiple companies in 
competition with one another.78  And each of these decisions spawned serious 
competition—with lower prices and increased diversity of service offerings to 
consumers.79  In subsequent years, both before and after the 1996 Act, the FCC 
continued to use the device of redefining the services subject to common carrier 
regulation, when it could find that these adjunct markets were competitive.80  
                                                                                                                 
 75. See Amendment of section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, Final 
Decision, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, ¶¶ 16–26 (1980) [hereinafter Final Decision] (determining issues 
related to data processing). 
 76. See id. ¶ 144 (discussing the demand for various CPE products). 
 77. The FCC’s decision to deregulate customer premises equipment was prompted by a 
series of court decisions questioning AT&T tariffs (approved by the FCC) that sought to 
prevent customers from using any but the carrier’s own equipment.  For this history, see, for 
example, Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation:  Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. 
ON REG. 325, 327 (1990). 
 78. See Final Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 109 ("There are literally thousands of unregulated 
computer service venders offering competing services connected to the interstate 
telecommunications network. . . . [W]e have concluded that the enhanced services market is 
competitive.  By removing this barrier the entire market for enhanced services should be even 
more competitive.").  The decision stated:   
The competitive potential of terminal equipment markets is reflected in the fact that 
there are hundreds of manufacturers and suppliers of modems, terminals, storage 
devices, front end processors, large and small central processing units, multiplexers, 
concentrators, and virtually innumerable related devices.  While some segments of 
the CPE market may be more competitive than others, we have been given no 
evidence that, given certain modifications in the markets, any segment is inherently 
less competitive than another. 
Id. ¶ 143. 
 79. See Cannon, supra note 74, at 175 (noting the FCC’s concerns about the pure 
communications market’s potential to become a monopoly). 
 80. See James B. Speta, Maintaining Competition in Information Platforms:  Vertical 
Restrictions in Emerging Telecommunications Markets , 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH . L. 185, 
198–99 (2002) (discussing the FCC’s decisions to take inside wiring and payphones out of the 
Act); see also 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2000) (establishing an independent regulatory system for 
commercial mobile services, based upon competition). 
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There can be little doubt that the FCC’s definitional moves followed from its 
conviction that these services could be competitively provided and therefore 
should not be regulated, rather than from some pure interpretive exercise that 
simply happened to provide the happy result that these competitive services 
would not be subject to regulation.81  Although many computer-based services 
were "new," CPE and customer-premises wiring had long been considered 
common carrier services that were subject to economic regulation.82  Moreover, 
had it chosen to do so, the FCC had ample precedents to draw upon which would 
have placed the new computer-based services inside its jurisdiction.  The ICC had 
long regulated terminals, docks, freight forwarders, and other "adjuncts" to 
railroad shipping.83  The FCC could have similarly held that retail computer 
services which depended on telecommunications services were themselves a new 
form of telecommunications service subject to regulation.  The FCC’s decision to 
invent the new regulatory category of enhanced services to exempt these from 
full economic regulation—for all of the economic benefit and regulatory 
confusion that choice has caused—was a policy choice for competition.  And, by 
all accounts, competition successfully followed deregulation in customer 
premises equipment and enhanced computer services.84 
As the FCC was deciding that the common carrier companies (read:  the Bell 
System) could not control the provision of all services and equipment related to 
the network, the courts were also prodding it to allow entry into even traditional 
communications services.  In the so-called Execunet decisions, in particular, the 
courts pushed the Commission to justify its protection of the Bell System from 
competitive entry.85  At issue was MCI’s attempt to provide regular long-distance 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See Cannon, supra note 74, at 176–77 ("The Computer Inquiries policy had as its 
explicit goal the promotion of economic growth and innovation in the computer services 
market."). 
 82. Id. at 177. 
 83. See Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers:  Continuity and Disintegration in U.S. 
Transportation Law, 13 TRANSP . L.J. 1, 21 (1983) ("The [1906] Hepburn Act widened the range 
of regulated activities performed by these carriers by extending the jurisdiction of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission . . . to terminal facilities, freight depots, and all services connected with 
receipt, delivery, transfer, or storage of goods.").  
 84. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services," 
Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System , 
16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 222 (1999) ("That approach was wildly successful in spurring 
innovation and competition in the enhanced-services marketplace."). 
 85. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter 
Execunet I]; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  The story of the 
Execunet decisions, including MCI’s entry into regular retail long-distance service without 
explicit FCC approval, the FCC’s resistance thereto, and the D.C. Circuit’s insistence that 
MCI’s authority be broadly construed (or the FCC explicitly justify AT&T’s monopoly), is 
retold in Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered:  AT&T and the Changing World of 
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 523–27 (1988). 
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services by combining certain retail services it purchased from AT&T with its 
own long-distance networks.86  The FCC was undoubtedly correct when it held 
that MCI’s operating permits had been issued solely with the idea that it would 
provide private-network services to large business customers.87  And the FCC 
was also correct that its Communications Act precedents did not contemplate 
competition in such services.  But after MCI demonstrated that it was technically 
feasible, the courts forced the agency to supply a reason—and, importantly, a 
reason grounded in economics—that MCI should not then have been permitted to 
provide these services.88 
This was the beginning of the end of AT&T’s service monopoly.  Nothing 
in the 1934 Act had changed, of course, and the courts would have been hard-
pressed under traditional administrative law doctrines to reverse an FCC that 
adopted a vigorous and consistent defense of market protectionism.  But the 
courts’ prodding was enough to cause the FCC, in partial touch with the times, to 
begin to change its course.89 
2.  The Bell Breakup 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 367–68 (describing the cause of the Execunet litigation). 
 87. See id. at 368–70 (recounting the Commission’s proceedings and findings).  Glen 
Robinson (an FCC Commissioner during some of the relevant years) denies that the FCC had 
any particular intent as to the scope of MCI’s services when it licensed MCI.  See Robinson, 
supra note 85, at 523–24 (speculating about the FCC’s motives).  Robinson stated: 
If God knew what the FCC meant in 1971, He didn’t say; neither did the FCC.  It 
seems that what the FCC originally had in mind was specialized services tailored to 
distinctive service needs of particular customers, as opposed to the homogenized 
services provided by MTS and WATS. . . . But this was never precisely stated in 
the FCC’s decision. 
Id.  On this point, compare PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 
§ 2.3.3.2 (2d ed. 1999) (disagreeing with Robinson).  Huber stated: 
MCI rushed to move far beyond private lines to a full-fledged, switched-access 
long-distance service available to all.  This was not what the FCC had in mind when 
it licensed MCI in 1969 or when it issued its Specialized Common Carriers decision 
in 1971, but it was what the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit desired in 1977, 
as it indicated in its imaginative Execunet I ruling. 
Id. 
 88. See Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 379–80 (questioning whether AT&T should be granted a 
de jure monopoly). 
 89. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1374 (summarizing the court’s 
prompting of the FCC to change course); Knieps & Spiller, supra note 71, at 399, 412 
(analyzing the impact of partial deregulation). 
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These precedents partially inspired Assistant Attorney General William 
Baxter’s prosecution of the antitrust case against the integrated Bell System.90  
Indeed, the explicit theory presented by the government throughout the litigation 
was that "new technology [had] introduced new competitive opportunities into 
telecommunications markets,"91 particularly the long-distance and manufacturing 
markets.  Thus, the government alleged that these markets were structurally 
competitive and that only AT&T’s "actions, based on its control over the local 
exchange monopolies, unreasonably imped[ed] competition that technological 
developments increasingly made possible."92  In long-distance, the well-known 
story is that the new microwave transmission technology did not exhibit the same 
severe economies of scale that traditional in-ground copper trunks suffered.93  
The conclusion, drawn by many economists as well as MCI and the government, 
was that long-distance was competitive.94  (The same conclusion did not apply to 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Although the case was filed in 1976, before Baxter came to the antitrust division, it did 
not move significantly forward until it was transferred to Judge Greene, and Baxter was then the 
lead prosecutor.  See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the 
Telecommunications Act:  Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1395, 1407–09 (1999) (discussing role of Judge Greene in moving case forward); Richard A. 
Posner, Introduction to Baxter Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1999) (discussing 
importance of Baxter in prosecution). 
 91. United States v. Western Elec. Co. & AT&T; Competitive Impact Statement in 
Connection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7172 (1982). 
 92. In its Competitive Impact Statement, filed in connection with the Consent Decree’s 
approval process, the Department summarized its positions: 
At the time of the 1956 Judgment and thereafter, new technology was developing 
that introduced new competitive opportunities into telecommunications markets. 
As a result of research conducted in World War II and increased demand for 
telecommunications products and services after the war, various firms began to 
develop new means of providing telecommunications services and equipment.  In 
the AT&T Case, the United States contended that, in response to these actual and 
potential new competitors in AT&T’s traditional markets, AT&T took actions, 
based on its control over the local exchange monopolies, unreasonably impeding 
competition that technological developments increasingly made possible.  These 
alleged actions, detailed at length in various pleadings the United States filed in the 
suit and summarized here, occurred in three relevant markets—intercity 
telecommunications services, customer-provided terminal equipment, and 
telecommunications equipment. 
Id.; see also Kearney, supra note 90, at 1405–08 (examining the events preceding and during the 
litigation). 
 93. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications 
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 843 (1997) ("Microwave transmission posed the most 
immediate threat to Bell, for its modest economies of scale invited corrosive entry onto AT&T’s 
IX turf."); Leonard Waverman, The Regulation of Intercity Telecommunications, in PROMOTING 
COMPETITION IN REGULATED M ARKETS 201, 232–33 (Almarin Phillips ed., 1975) (evaluating the 
probability of increased competition).  
 94. See, e.g., id. at 232–34 (analyzing the effect of increased competition on prices); 
Robinson, supra note 85, at 530–35 (discussing changing view of economists on need for 
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local service, both because microwave was a point-to-point service and because 
local traffic volume was too low to support multiple providers.)95 
The Bell breakup decree was not, of course, deregulation in the sense that it 
eliminated any legal barriers to entry or changed the amount of legal regulation to 
which long-distance service was subject.  Long-distance carriers were still 
required to receive certificates of operating authority from the FCC and state 
regulators,96 and the requirements of just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
rates, and of tariff-filing still applied.97  Indeed, from a purely formalistic 
perspective, the decree required additional regulation because it required the FCC 
to regulate the local carriers’ access charges and other terms of service to long-
distance carriers.98  And it added to the agency’s regulation a layer involving the 
Decree court’s interpretation of the Bell Companies’ permitted and forbidden 
activities under the Decree.99  The Decree did, however, decrease the economic 
barrier to entry into long-distance telecommunications markets by providing the 
means by which a carrier could enter that market without replicating for itself the 
local access networks controlled by the Bell Companies.100  Entry occurred, and 
economists substantially agree that divestiture dramatically increased competition 
in long-distance markets.101  
                                                                                                                 
regulation). 
 95. See Kearney, supra note 90, at 1409 (discussing this theory). 
 96. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2000) ("No carrier shall undertake the construction [or] . . . 
extension of any line, . . . unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the 
Commission a certificate."). 
 97. See id. §§ 201–03 (requiring charges to be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory); 
see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994) ("For better or worse, the 
Act establishes a rate-regulation, filed-tariff system for common-carrier communications, and the 
Commission’s desire ‘to "increase competition" cannot provide it authority to alter the well-
established statutory filed rate requirements.’").  The 1996 Act changed this, of course.  See 
infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text (illustrating the desire to provide authority to 
promote competition). 
 98. See United States v. AT&T Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131, 232 (D.D.C. 1982) (requiring 
Bell Operating Companies to provide service to other long-distance carriers that was equal to 
that provided to AT&T), aff’d Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also, e.g., 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?:  Applying the New Antitrust Learning to Foster 
Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479, 1483 (1999) (discussing FCC’s 
implementation of access regime, requiring BOCs to file access tariffs). 
 99. Judge Greene’s supervision of the Decree and of (at least a portion of) the 
telecommunications industry between 1982 and 1996 is comprehensively discussed in Kearney, 
supra note 90, at 1403–20.  Judge Greene’s superintendence has been much criticized.  See 
generally PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE :  ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET THE 
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 98–99, 150–57 (1997) (discussing Judge Greene’s role in 
implementing the Decree).  Kearney largely defends Judge Greene.  See Kearney, supra note 90, 
at 1403–20 (recounting Judge Greene’s supervision of the case). 
 100. See id. at 1403–05, 1409–16, 1420 (examining the theories behind the lawsuit). 
 101. Not all economists agree, with Paul MacAvoy notably arguing that little competition 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
1088 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004) 
B.  Cable Competition Precedents 
Until recently, cable television has been entirely apart from 
telecommunications regulation, notwithstanding that one can find FCC statements 
from the early 1970s expressing the hope that cable television systems would 
begin to compete with telephone companies.102  Nevertheless, developments in 
cable television regulation in the 1980s and 1990s confirm some of the general 
lessons from early telephone deregulation.  Cable television service, like local 
telephony, has long been considered a natural monopoly service.  Fixed costs are 
high; multiple wires to the home risks stranded investment; economies of both 
scale and density apply.103  In 1984 and again in 1992, Congress responded to 
this by imposing traditional rate regulation on cable television services; an FCC 
interpretation of the 1984 statute, however, left its provisions largely toothless.104 
 Also, various other rules applicable to cable programmers—ranging from the 
must-carry and other programming rules to vertical and horizontal ownership 
limits (some of which have been repealed)—have been based upon the view that 
cable companies exercised significant market power in both the program-
acquisition and retail video markets.105 
                                                                                                                 
existed for more than ten years after the Decree, because AT&T, MCI, and Sprint simply 
engaged in oligopolistic pricing.  See generally PAUL W. M ACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST 
AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES (1996); 
William E. Taylor & Lester D. Taylor, Postdivestiture Long-Distance Competition in the United 
States, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 185 (1993).  The weight of evidence is against them, however.  See 
Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 40 (2001) (discussing competition post-decree). 
 102. See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel 
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and 
Order , 21 F.C.C.2d 307, ¶ 47 (1970) ("[T]here is a substantial expectation that broadband 
cables, in addition to CATV services, will make economically and technically possible a wide 
variety of new and different services involving the distribution of data, information storage and 
retrieval, and visual, facsimile and telemetry transmission of all kinds."). 
 103. See STUART M INOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY  378 
(2001) (noting that cable has "long [been] regulated as a natural monopoly," and discussing 
reasons that cable systems may be natural monopolies); see also Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. 
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (same). 
 104. For a general history of these periods of rate regulation, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL & 
HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV:  REGULATION OR COMPETITION? 24–49 (1996).  The 
1984 Act required rate regulation of cable television systems unless those systems were subject 
to "effective competition."  In implementing this statute, the FCC held that cable systems 
operating in areas where there were three broadcast signals were subject to "effective 
competition."  "Since most cable systems operated in environments meeting that criterion, this 
standard effectively abolished rate regulation for all cable systems."  BENJAMIN ET AL., supra 
note 103, at 413. 
 105. See id. at 441–74 (discussing the broadcast/cable relationship). 
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Legal barriers to entry into cable television markets were lifted in stages in 
the 1990s. Because cable companies extensively use public streets to install their 
cables, the 1984 Cable Act confirmed the right of municipalities to franchise cable 
operators, although it both limited local authority to deny renewals and capped the 
local franchise fee at 5% of a cable system’s revenues.106  Under this scheme, 
most municipalities granted exclusive franchises.107  In 1992, Congress addressed 
the franchise as a legal barrier to entry and specifically provided that state and 
local governments could not grant exclusive franchises.108  Nevertheless, the 
FCC had, in 1970, forbidden telephone companies to provide cable television 
service in their local territories,109 and Congress continued this ban in the 1984 
Cable Act.  This ban continued until Bell Atlantic won a First Amendment 
challenge to this exclusion110 and the 1996 Act confirmed that telephone 
companies may offer video services.111 
Despite the absence of legal barriers to entry, only very few places in the 
United States have more than one cable television provider.  Indeed, considering 
not only cable television services but any form of facilities-based competitor, the 
FCC recently concluded that "competition from a wire-based competitor [with 
cable companies for video programming] is limited to a very few markets."112  In 
the past several years, significant competition with cable has come from DBS  (on 
which more in Part IV), providing an example of intermodal competition similar 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) (granting franchising authority); id. § 542(b) (limiting fee 
to 5%); id. § 546 (addressing renewal expectancy). 
 107. See CRANDALL & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 104, at 7 ("[C]able . . . developed as 
a municipally franchised service that was also subject to local government franchise fees, 
municipal or state regulation of rates, and various local service requirements such as free cable 
for schools and town halls."). 
 108. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000) ("[A] franchising authority may not grant an 
exclusive franchise."). 
 109. See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel 
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order , 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 752 (1970) (concluding what is in the public interest). 
 110. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 932 (E.D. 
Va. 1993) (concluding that § 533(b) violated the right to free expression), aff’d, 42 F.3d 181 (4th 
Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 111. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 
210 (repealing cable/telco entry ban, previously codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)); see also 47 
U.S.C. § 571 (2000) (establishing open video system regulations as one option for telephone 
companies offering video service); id. § 543(c)(4) (sunsetting rate regulation in 1999 for all tiers 
of cable service except for the "rebroadcast services" basic service (which no one buys 
anyway)). 
 112. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of 
Video Programming, Tenth Annual Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, ¶ 78 (2004) [hereinafter Tenth 
Annual MVPD Report]. 
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to the development of microwave in long-distance.113  But competition by DBS 
came only as a result of specific regulatory moves that made cable programming 
networks and broadcast networks available through that service.  In particular, in 
1992, Congress required that cable companies make their affiliated programming 
channels available to satellite providers, and this ensured that DBS would have the 
content, such as HBO and ESPN, necessary to offer a competing service.114  And 
in 1999, following technological developments that permitted satellite providers to 
beam signals to selective locales, Congress established rules by which satellite 
providers could carry local broadcast channels—which was necessary to put 
DBS on equal footing with cable’s content.115 
C.  The 1996 Act 
The statements made in support of the 1996 Act very much mirrored the 
deregulatory rhetoric preceding the trucking, air, and railroad statutes, and 
Congress drew explicitly on these precedents and on the earlier development of 
competition in long-distance.  The central House Report declared that the bill 
"promotes competition and reduces regulation in order to secure lower prices and 
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and 
encourage the rapid development of new telecommunications technologies."116  
Adopting the rhetoric of markets, the Report declares that "services would be 
more widely available and at lower prices if telecommunications markets were 
competitive rather than regulated monopolies."117  And so the Report talks 
generally of "open[ing] all communications services to competition" and "lifting 
the shackles of monopoly regulation."118  Indeed, many of the legislation’s 
supporters, and some of its opponents, drew an explicit comparison to the prior 
deregulatory statutes.  Representative Klug’s statement was typical of the 
supporters: 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (reviewing the lesser economies of scale 
of microwave transmission technology). 
 114. See James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 975, 1006–07 (2002) (comparing Microsoft’s attempt to restrict Netscape’s access to its 
browser market with cable companies’ attempts to restrict access to their wires). 
 115. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New 
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 228–29 (2002) (discussing the passage of the Satellite Home 
Viewer Improvement Amendments of 1999). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 47 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11. 
 117. Id. at 48. 
 118. Id. 
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This bill . . . will usher in a new era of competition where the market instead 
will pick winners and losers, and ultimately the major winner in all of this will 
be consumers.  It is the way that consumers won when we deregulated the 
airline industry in 1978, and it is the way that consumers won when we 
deregulated the trucking industry back in 1980.  Those changes have 
resulted in savings of hundreds of billions of dollars to the economy.119 
The 1996 Act removed many legal barriers to entry into communications 
markets.  As to telecommunications, it preempted any state or local law that 
would "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to 
provide ‘telecommunications services.’"120  The 1996 Act also gave the FCC the 
rather remarkable authority to completely deregulate telecommunications, by 
giving it the authority to "forbear" from any statutory provision that the agency 
found was unnecessary in light of the development of competition.121  As noted 
above, earlier federal legislation had forbidden state and local governments from 
restricting entry of multiple cable television companies, and the 1996 Act both 
repealed restrictions on telephone company entry into cable television service and 
                                                                                                                 
 119. 142 CONG. REC. 2208 (1996); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 202 (1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 95 ("Title II has its roots in the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887.  Ironically, the railroad industry whose activities were governed by that century-old law 
was largely deregulated in 1980 by the Staggers Rail Act."); 141 CONG. REC. 15,341 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. McCain) (asserting the need for deregulation).  McCain stated: 
We need to have a deregulated industry.  In the past, we have deregulated the airline 
industry, the trucking industry, the railroad industry in America, and there is very 
little doubt in my mind that world events, as well as national events, indicate very 
clearly and very strongly that the free enterprise system, unfettered by Government 
interference and regulation, not only prospers best but provides the best services 
for the citizens of any nation, including this one. 
Id.  But see 141 CONG. REC. 27,962 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (saying that the "bill is 
set up pretty much like it is for airlines," but arguing that this would result in too many 
mergers). 
 120. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).  For a more extended discussion of § 253, see James B. 
Speta, Competitive Neutrality in Right of Way Regulation:  A Case Study in the Consequences of 
Convergence, 35 CONN. L. REV. 763, 770–72 (2003). 
 121. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000) ("[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any 
regulation . . . to a telecommunications carrier or . . . service, . . . if the Commission determines 
that—(1) enforcement . . . is not necessary.").  Congress also gave the FCC a statutory push in 
that direction, by requiring that it review its telecommunications regulations every two years and 
"modify or repeal" any that were no longer necessary "as the result of meaningful economic 
competition between providers of such service."  Id. § 161.  The D.C. Circuit has made clear that 
it will hold the FCC’s feet to the fire in these biennial review proceedings, requiring it to justify 
existing regulations where evidence of competition has been presented.  See Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding FCC decisions not to 
eliminate rules in biennial review proceedings are subject to judicial review). 
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eliminated much of the remaining rate regulation under which cable companies 
had operated.122 
The market as to which the 1996 Act intended the greatest change, 
however, was the historically monopolized local telecommunications market.  
Replacing laws under which "the majority of States restrict full and fair 
competition in the local exchange, . . . [the bill] reflects the Committee’s belief 
that more competition, rather than more regulation, will benefit all consumers."123 
 Indeed, Congress acknowledged that competition had already developed in many 
telecommunications markets—the local exchange was the last bastion of 
monopoly.124  As Joseph Kearney has written, "[t]he hope underlying much of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [was] that sufficient competition will 
develop in local telecommunications that this area of the industry will witness a 
transformation similar to the one that occurred in the long-distance segment over 
the last twenty-five years."125 
Congress was not convinced, however, that the mere elimination of 
regulation would spur competition in the local markets, and this was the genesis 
of the Act’s so-called "local competition provisions."126  Uncontroversially, the 
Act strengthened the requirement that all carriers interconnect with one another—
a requirement necessary to permit a transition to a competitive market, so that 
incumbents cannot use embedded network size as a barrier to entry.127  The Act 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See supra Part III.A–B (discussing early regulations that the 1996 Act sought to 
modify or repeal). 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 50 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 14. 
 124. See id. at 49–51, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 12–14 (recounting the history of 
local competition in the local exchange). 
 125. Joseph D. Kearney, Will the FCC Go the Way of the ICC?, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153, 
1178 (2000); see also Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 91 ("The break up now is widely 
acknowledged to have unleashed powerful forces of competition in long-distance telephone 
markets; to have induced policy makers to recognize (in the Telecommunications Act of 1996) 
that not even local telephone service is subject to natural monopoly.").  See generally Alexander 
C. Larson, Reforming Telecommunications Policy in Response to Entry into Local Exchange 
Markets , 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (1995). 
 126. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–56 (establishing the local competition provisions); Jerry A. 
Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of 
Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 426–34 (2000) (discussing the history of 
network unbundling).  See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 
1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123, 138–41 (1996) (summarizing these provisions). 
 127. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, First Report and Order , 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, ¶ 10 (1996) [hereinafter Local 
Competition Provisions] ("[A]bsent interconnection between the incumbent LEC and the 
entrant, the customer of the entrant would be unable to complete calls to subscribers served by 
the incumbent LEC."), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 
366 (1999); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 426–27 (1985) (explaining that where the value of a good 
depends upon the size of the network, new entrants face a barrier to entry); James B. Speta, 
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also prohibited state and local laws that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting" 
entry into telecommunications markets.128  The Act, however, went further and 
required that incumbents unbundle their existing networks and lease those parts 
of their local networks to any requesting carrier that the new entrants would find 
economically inefficient to duplicate.129  These requirements, which were born in 
part of a compromise between the BOCs and the long-distance carriers,130 go 
substantially beyond a mere interconnection requirement.  As  implemented by the 
FCC, they require the incumbents to "cooperate, against their interests and for 
little if any profit, with those very competitors" who will seek to take away their 
local business.131 
These unbundling requirements were introduced because of the concern that 
certain parts of the local telecommunications network could never be 
economically duplicated and that sharing of the incumbent’s network was the 
only way to create a form of competition.  William Baumol, a leading 
telecommunications economist, had published a book just before passage of the 
                                                                                                                 
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?:  A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband 
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 81–82 (2000) (stating that the Act’s interconnection duties 
help overcome network effects). 
 128. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000); see Speta, supra note 120, at 776–80 (discussing state and 
local prohibitions). 
 129. For example, if it remained uneconomic for new entrants to string their own copper 
wires into individual homes to deliver the "last mile" of local phone service, then these 
provisions would require the incumbents to lease the incumbents’ own local lines to the new 
entrants at "cost."  See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2000) (imposing unbundling obligations); § 252(d) 
(setting substantive standards for unbundling prices); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 
525 U.S. 366, 387–94 (1999) (discussing the Act’s requirements concerning which elements 
must be leased); Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476 (2002) (discussing 
rules for pricing these elements). 
 130. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996:  Comment 
on Thomas G. Krattenmaker , 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 225 (1997) ("The stand-off between the 
dominant vested players in the regulatory game was, naturally, resolved by compromise."). 
 131. Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local 
Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1617, 1621 (1999).  It is quite important to note here 
that Shelanski’s comment is made against the backdrop of the FCC’s selection of a forward-
looking cost formula (TELRIC) that was designed to squeeze any monopoly profits out of the 
charges that incumbents would make for network elements.  See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 501–28 
(describing the standard).  A different pricing standard, such as some implementation of the 
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), could try to include in the charges sufficient 
monopoly profits that the incumbent would be indifferent between acting as a retailer or as a 
wholesaler.  See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks:  Economic 
and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 900–07 (2003) (advocating a full-
recovery price for access).  On the other hand, such higher access prices are likely to result in 
only "soft competition," if any, because the incumbent does become indifferent to losing 
customers, and the new entrant is squeezed by high wholesale prices.  See JEAN-JACQUES 
LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 207–09 (2000) (discussing 
"unbundling-based entry"). 
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1996 Act that advocated unbundling on just such a basis.132  His argument for 
unbundling rules was based explicitly on the presumption "that the basic network 
functions [such as loops, switches, and signaling] rather than the LEC services 
constitute remaining bottlenecks."133  Other commentators made similar 
arguments about the need for unbundling.134  And both the FCC and numerous 
commentators have explained that the unbundling rules are designed to force 
incumbents to share economies of scale, scope, and density.135  But if the local 
market is characterized by such economies, then these are the conditions of 
natural monopoly.136  In other words, the unbundling provisions were included to 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL 
TELEPHONY 122 (1994) ("[T]he LEC networks should comprehensively unbundle the [basic 
network functions], each of which should be offered separately for sale at prices based on 
costs.").  Baumol had consulted with AT&T and other telecommunications carriers on the 1996 
Act.  See William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the 
Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1037 
n.** (1997) (stating that Baumol was a consultant for AT&T). 
 133. BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 132, at 122. 
 134. See, e.g., Craig D. Dingwall, The Last Mile:  A Race for Local Telecommunications 
Competition Policy, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 105, 120–21 (1995) (reviewing nascent unbundling 
policies); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 158–59 (explaining that unbundling requirements 
were included in the law because "[i]t is most likely that running a telecommunications wire to 
the home is a natural monopoly and so one ought to concentrate on regulating that monopoly or 
mitigating its ill effects").  Schwartz and Hoagg state: 
Taken together, competition (with and without interconnection) and unbundling 
mean that the best customers are no longer captive, and that the BOCs must 
compete for them on the basis of product and services.  While the erosion of 
telephone company revenues caused by competition and network unbundling has 
been small (probably less than two percent on average), this erosion will increase in 
places where it has begun, and spread to places where it has not yet begun. 
Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture:  Structural Reform of an RHC, 
44 FED. COMM. L.J. 285, 293 (1992).   
 135. See Local Competition Provisions, supra note 127, ¶¶ 315–16 (setting forth what 
incumbent LECs must provide new carriers), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, AT&T Corp. v. 
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
 136. That is, if local markets truly are characterized by economies of scale, scope, and 
density that are so severe that it is inefficient to duplicate infrastructure, then this is the natural 
monopoly condition that market demand is most efficiently met by a single supplier.  See 
generally SHARKEY, supra note 29, at 24–30 (defining natural monopoly); W. KIP VISCUSI ET 
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 337–44 (3d ed. 2000) (same).  Some have made 
the argument that the unbundling rules are merely transitional rules that enable a competitor to 
enter an economic or advertising market while gradually building facilities, and this argument 
regards unbundling as largely a means for dissipating the incumbent’s advantage of incumbency.  
See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications:  
Iowa Utilities & Verizon, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 51–52 (examining three different formulations 
of the baseline for unbundling rules).  But the more often heard rationale about dissipating 
economies of scale, scope, and density refers not to the incumbency advantage but to the 
economics of supply in the market. 
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allow retail competition to develop, notwithstanding that the incumbents might be 
wholesaling all or some of the facilities necessary for other competitors to 
provide service. 
Needless to say, the unbundling provisions have been extraordinarily 
controversial and time-consuming to implement.  Some of the processes’ 
protraction is inherent in Congress’s design, which required new entrants and 
incumbents to individually negotiate interconnection agreements, subject to 
arbitration in front of state public utility commissions if the parties could not 
reach agreement.137  The idea was that voluntary, quasi market-based 
negotiations would provide a better starting point than an agency-centered 
administrative process.138  But much of the delay has been regulatory:  each of 
the FCC’s rulemakings has been challenged, with central aspects of the FCC’s 
rules twice going to the Supreme Court,139 and almost every carrier request for 
unbundling has resulted in a contested proceeding first before a state commission 
and then on appeal to a federal distric t court.140 
Indeed, even today, more than eight years after the Act, the FCC’s 
implementing rules are still substantially unsettled.  The basic questions of how 
much of the incumbents’ networks they must share with competitors and at what 
price have not yet come to rest.  The Supreme Court has resolved that the FCC 
has authority to set the rules as to both matters,141 but the FCC’s rules defining 
the elements to be unbundled have yet to survive judicial review.  The agency’s 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2000) (establishing "[p]rocedures for negotiation, arbitration, and 
approval of agreements"). 
 138. See generally Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479, 488, 492 
(2002) (noting how negotiation processes used in earlier deregulatory efforts were carried in to 
the 1996 Act). 
 139. See generally id. (challenging FCC’s interconnection and unbundling pricing rules); 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (challenging FCC’s first local competition 
order on FCC jurisdiction to prescribe rules and on the scope of its unbundling rules); United 
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating FCC’s local competition 
order on remand from AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.). 
 140. For a discussion of the somewhat odd system ("decidedly novel" in Justice Scalia’s 
view, AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385 n.10 (1999)) under which (a) the FCC has rulemaking power, but 
(b) the state PUCs are charged with adjudicating the controversies under this federal statute, and 
(c) the state agency decisions are appealed to a federal district court, see Philip J. Weiser, 
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1757–60 (2001).  For representative court of appeals decisions addressing 
interconnection and unbundling proceedings, see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. U.S. W. 
Communications, 204 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing arbitrated agreement, which included 
topics such as unbundling, co-location of remote switching units, and cost arrangements); AT&T 
Communications Sys. v. Pac. Bell, 203 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing arbitrated 
agreement under which competitor sought entry into ILEC market). 
 141. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 378 (concluding that the FCC’s authority encompasses §§ 251 
and 252 of the Act). 
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first rules required incumbents to provide any element that a new entrant 
requests; the Supreme Court held that this misinterpreted the statute,142 
notwithstanding that the Court itself derided the statute as, "in many important 
respects[,] a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction."143  When the 
FCC then promulgated a limited list of elements to be unbundled,144 the D.C. 
Circuit struck down the rules because they applied nationwide—that is, without 
taking account of potentially different competitive conditions in different 
locales.145  And when the FCC attempted to respond to the D.C. Circuit’s 
criticism of nationwide rules by delegating to the state utility commissions, which 
under the Act resolve disputes in interconnection and unbundling negotiations, the 
authority to also determine which elements would be unbundled, the court said, 
"Again, regrettably, much of the resulting work is unlawful."146 
IV.  The Uncertain State of Telecommunications Competition 
Having just limped through the three years of wreckage wrought by the 
Internet meltdown, making firm predictions about the future of 
telecommunications technology, markets, and competition would seem a fool’s 
errand.  In fact, a communications revolution—in which broadband will be 
ubiquitous, competition abundant, and services cheap—has been predicted in 
some quarters for more than twenty years.147  Nevertheless, an accurate 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See id. at 394–96.  Gary Lawson has called the Supreme Court’s decision in this regard 
remarkable as its first invalidation of agency rules under the very deferential second prong of 
Chevron review, in which an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute must be accepted 
by the courts if the interpretation is reasonable.  See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 643 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that this case was "the first step two loss that an agency ever 
suffered in the Supreme Court"); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (creating Chevron two-step analysis). 
 143. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 397 (recognizing the statute’s ambiguity).  The Court stated:  
It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity. 
 It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-
contradiction.  That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly 
affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of billions of dollars. 
Id. 
 144. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 
F.C.C.R. 3696, ¶¶ 162–64 (1999) (listing the network elements to be unbundled). 
 145. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422–24 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(finding problems with a national mandate). 
 146. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 147. It should be no slight to Ithiel de Sola Pool’s far-seeing work that his predictions of 
"digital and broadband, . . . pluralistic and competitive communications systems" that expand 
human culture have not yet been fully realized.  ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF 
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summary of central characteristics can be briefly stated.  On the whole, 
substantial frustration continues with the state of local competition, with editorial 
pages and prospective competitors alleging that the local telephone companies still 
"enjoy near-monopolies in their service territories."148  The recent release of a 
General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of cable rates unleashed a similar wave 
of sentiment that, in the words of Senator John McCain, due to the lack of 
competition, "consumers . . . continue to be fleeced by their cable operators."149 
To justify this Article’s call for fundamental change in the regulatory 
landscape, this Part surveys the current state of local competition.  First, except 
in relatively dense business markets, little intramodal competition has developed to 
incumbent telephone companies in their traditional markets.  Despite its 
prominence in the legislation and subsequent implementation, the 1996 Act’s 
experiment with unbundled network elements has been something of a failure, 
with relatively few markets showing effective competition.  Cable overbuilding is 
also virtually nonexistent.  On the other hand, in high-speed Internet access, 
where incumbent telephone companies and cable companies both offer service, 
these two companies are increasingly competing with one another.  Second, 
some solid prospects for intermodal competition are on the horizon.  In fact, DBS 
already provides some real competition to cable.  In telephony, competition is 
nascent, but wireless and Internet telephony look increasingly like promising 
substitutes.  Indeed, it is hard not to get caught up in the excitement over VoIP 
telephony.  Wireless and VoIP are the "glimmers of hope" that justify another 
reworking of communications policy.  Third, despite these "glimmers," some 
scenarios exist in which nascent competition might be cut off—either because of 
technological and market developments or by the strategic action of companies, 
or both. 
A.  Limited Wireline (Intramodal) Competition 
                                                                                                                 
FREEDOM 226, 229 (1983).  
 148. Call Baby Bells to Account, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at B16; see also, e.g., Reza 
Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local Telephony:  Is the 1996 Telecommunications Act to 
Blame?, 81 WASH . U. L.Q., 1, 12 (2003) (comparing the role of competition in long-distance and 
local telephony); Sanford Nowlin, Battling the Bells; Telecom Champion; Phone Company CEO 
Fights for Access to SBC’s Networks, SAN ANTONIO-EXPRESS NEWS, May 22, 2003, at 1D 
(discussing competitors’ battles with SBC). 
 149. Leon Lazaroff, Cable Rates Still Sore Subject; Report Says Competition Benefits Few, 
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 2003, at C1.  See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES 
RELATED TO COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES IN THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY, GAO-
04-8 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d048.pdf. 
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The objective data reveal that some substantial telephone competition has 
developed in big business and dense urban markets;150 notably, however, that 
competition was developing even before the 1996 Act.151  Overall, competitors 
are providing about 15% of switched local access lines.152  In residential markets, 
and especially in suburban and rural markets, the percentages are lower.153  More 
significantly, most of this service—approximately 80%—is provided by 
competitors leasing the incumbents’ local loops.154  As a result, the long-term 
viability of the service is entirely contingent on the availability and pricing of these 
incumbents’ elements.155  Reflecting this, most analysts agree that competitive 
local exchange carriers face an uncertain business future.156 
In cable markets, the FCC has stopped tracking so-called cable overbuilders 
as a separate category, reflecting that they are present in only a very few 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH . DIV., FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION:  STATUS 
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2002, at 1–2 (2003) (summarizing recent changes), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom0603.pdf; see 
also Nicholas Economides, US Telecommunications Today, in IS M ANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 19 
(Carol V. Brown & Heikki Topi eds., 2003) ("[O]ver six years after the signing of the Act by 
President Clinton, entry in the local exchange has been small."). 
 151. See Dingwall, supra note 134, at 108–12 (comparing long-distance and local 
competition). 
 152. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH . DIV., FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION:  STATUS 
AS OF JUNE 30, 2003, at 1–2 (2003) (summarizing changes in competition), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom1203.pdf. 
 153. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH . DIV., supra note 150, at 2–3 (summarizing recent data). 
 154. See id. at tbl. 3 (reporting number of end-user lines acquired from other carriers). 
 155. See, e.g., CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., COMPETITION AT THE CROSSROADS:  CAN PUBLIC 
UTILITY COMMISSION SAVE LOCAL PHONE COMPETITION 7–9 (2003) (looking at the major states 
where "the stakes for competition and consumers are huge"), available at http://www. 
consumerfed.org/unep_200310.pdf.  As Laffont and Tirole explain, the price at which the 
element is made available to the entrant entirely determines the shape of the competition 
between the entrant and the incumbent.  See LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 131, at 129–35 
(examining various aspects of access pricing). 
 156. See Donny Jackson, Reports:  FCC Votes for Interim UNE Rules , TELEPHONY 
ONLINE, at 
http://www.telephonyonline.com/microsites/newsarticle.asp?mode=print&newsarticleid=272 
7632&releaseid=&srid=11357&magazineid=7&siteid=3 (July 23, 2004) (considering the 
prospects for competitive local exchange carriers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  Jackson states:   
Some sources indicated the rates for existing CLEC customers would increase 
automatically by 15% under that scenario, while others believe special-access rates 
will apply.  Either option would have a ‘drastic’ negative impact on CLECs, 
according to a letter sent yesterday to Powell by five equity firms with investments 
in competitive carriers. 
Id.  See generally Edie Herman et al., White House Won’t Seek an Appeal of the UNE Decision, 
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, June 10, 2004, 2004 WL 60706285 (summarizing analyst reports 
suggesting that CLEC prices would significantly rise). 
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locales.157  The few local telephone companies that entered the video service 
market have largely exited.158  Nationwide, fewer than 2% of all customers of 
multi-channel video service purchase from a wireline carrier other than the 
incumbent cable operator.159  The largest cable overbuilder, RCN, recently 
announced that it is seeking bankruptcy protection.160 
The story is somewhat better (and worse) in the local high-speed Internet 
access markets.  Unlike in telephone, these markets now largely have two 
competitors—the cable companies providing cable modem service and the 
incumbents providing DSL service.161  Nonincumbent provision of DSL, which 
largely depended on leasing loops in any event, has been falling in share of the 
market, and third-provider entry has been falling and is, as noted above, 
threatened by uncertainty.162  The cable companies and the incumbent DSL 
providers seem to be competing, at least for the initial acquisition of customers, 
by offering initial discounts on installation and service.163 
Alternatives to cable and DSL are limited.  Due to their longer delays and 
more limited capacity, satellite-based services, which are provided by the DBS 
companies, are considered viable only in rural areas where DSL and cable do not 
reach.164  Several companies, in particular Sprint, deployed fixed wireless 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 78 ("Competition from a wire-
based competitor such as a BSP is limited to a very few markets."). 
 158. See id. ¶¶ 112–15 (evaluating LEC experience over the past decade). 
 159. See id. ¶¶ 11–13 (examining competition’s effects on cable television). 
 160. See Bankruptcy Filing in the Cards for RCN, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 2004, at 47 
(announcing RCN’s plan to file bankruptcy). 
 161. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH . DIV., FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET 
ACCESS:  STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2002, at 3 (2003) (finding that incumbent share of DSL 
service increased to 95% of market), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carner/ 
Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0603.pdf. 
 162. Id.  The only exception to a duopoly market is the few areas in which a second cable 
company has built its own network, but this accounts for only several percent of the market.  
See id. at 4–5 (indicating where high-speed providers are located).  Some other possibilities 
started but then faded.  In the late 1990s, Sprint introduced in some areas a wireless high-speed 
Internet access service, and there was much discussion about the possibility of using various 
wireless services for such high-speed services.  See Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17 
F.C.C.R. 26,901, ¶¶ 13–14 (2002) [hereinafter Ninth Annual MVPD Report] (evaluating 
particular distribution technologies in the video program delivery market); Speta, supra note 
127, at 58–60 (examining multichannnel and local multipoint distribution systems).  Sprint 
discontinued its service and no significant others have been deployed. 
 163. See Jim Hu, SBC Sees Surge in DSL Subscribers, CNET  NEWS.COM, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1034-5094331.html (Oct. 21, 2003) (discussing SBC’s increase in 
broadband customers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 164. See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
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platforms for Internet access in 2000 and early 2001, but those services have 
largely folded.165  There are suggestions at the FCC and in the markets of a 
reinvigoration of fixed wireless, but these offerings are only just emerging 
again.166  In other words, in the vast majority of markets, the incumbent 
telephone company and the incumbent cable company are the only providers of 
high-speed Internet access. 
B.  Intermodal Competition in Video Markets 
Although incumbent cable operators still have an overwhelming 75% share 
of the market,167 competition from direct broadcast satellite has been increasing 
in recent years, and the double-digit growth rates for DBS far surpass cable’s 
single-digit rates.168  Moreover, in areas where the satellite providers offer local 
broadcast channels, competition between cable and DBS is more vigorous.169  
The FCC reports a DirecTV claim that "approximately 70%" of their new 
customers were former cable customers, which suggests head-to-head 
competition.170  In 2002, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) declared 
that DBS had "failed" to provide "intermodal competition" to cable,171 and this 
analysis provided the basis for Professor Reza Dibadj’s proposal that cable be 
subject to unbundling and resale obligations similar to those the 1996 Act applied 
to incumbent telephone companies.172  But the data relied upon in the CFA study 
largely predates the availability of local broadcast channels on satellite, and the 
                                                                                                                 
Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, ¶ 78 (2002) (examining projections for subscribers to high-
speed satellite systems). 
 165. See supra note 162 (describing Sprint’s experience in the late 1990s). 
 166. See Paul Davidson, Inventive Wireless Providers Go Rural, USA TODAY, July 14, 
2004, (explaining how new wireless technology is using fixed wireless technology to provide 
Internet access in remote areas), available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-14-
wireless_x.htm; Nick Wingfield, Technology (A Special Report)—Tomorrow’s Wi-Fi:  It’s Called 
WiMax—and Its Promoters Say Broadband Will Never Be the Same, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004, 
at R8 (discussing the technology and potential impact of WiMax). 
 167. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 6 (finding a decline in purchasing 
cable from a franchise operator). 
 168. See id. ¶¶ 45–50 (examining the demand for video-on-demand and HDTV services).  
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. ¶ 65 (reporting on the subscribership of DBS services). 
 171. See generally M ARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE FAILURE OF 
INTERMODAL COMPETITION IN CABLE M ARKETS (2002) (asserting the shortcomings of intermodal 
competition), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/intercomp.20020423.pdf. 
 172. See Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition:  Getting Beyond the 
Monopoly Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 267–71 (2003) (surveying the national 
cable market and consumer satisfaction). 
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GAO has more recently concluded that cable companies act to improve service, 
increase channel packages, and generally respond to DBS’s offerings where local 
channels are available.173  This is competition on the service dimension instead of 
the price dimension, but the GAO has also found that incumbent cable 
companies’ prices are between 15% and 41% lower in cities in which an 
overbuilder operates.174  With the FCC poised to issue licenses for additional DBS 
providers, competition may expand further.175 
On the other hand, the DBS providers assert that they are constrained by 
their available bandwidth as to the number of markets in which they can offer 
local broadcast channels.176  Perhaps most telling, cable rates continue to rise far 
faster than the general rate of consumer inflation.177 
C.  Coming (?) Intermodal Competition in Telephony 
Competition may be increasing for voic e telephone services, coming from 
two directions—cell phone companies and Internet telephony.  Cell phone 
competition is a story of relatively gradual change, while VoIP could create a 
rapid break in the competitive landscape.  These are the types of intermodal 
competition that changes in regulation should seek to exploit.  In fact, both the 
history of telecommunications competition and current marketplace developments 
suggest that one looking to find significant competitors for traditional wireline 
services should look to intermodal services.  As noted above, it was a wireless 
service (microwave) that provided the first viable competition to AT&T’s Long 
Lines and that led the United States to seek and achieve the breakup of the 
integrated Bell System.178  That episode is concluded, as all long-distance has 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 3–4 ("Competition from wire-based and DBS 
operators leads to lower cable rates and improved quality and service among cable operators."); 
Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 11 (exploring competition’s effect on prices). 
 174. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WIRE-BASED COMPETITION BENEFITED 
CONSUMERS IN SELECTED M ARKETS, GAO-04-241, at 4 (Feb. 2004) (summarizing results of 
study), available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d04241.pdf.  The GAO study employed a 
case-study methodology, selecting six cities in which overbuilders operated, and does not 
purport to be generalizable to other areas.  Id. at 2.  Yet it is strong evidence that competition 
will occur on the price dimension as well. 
 175. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶¶ 62–64 (detailing current and 
prospective license holders). 
 176. See id. ¶ 12 (explaining developing technology ’s impact on cable offerings). 
 177. See GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 20 (providing a variety of factors that 
contributed to cable rate increases); Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 4 
(summarizing the telecommunication events of the 1993–2003 decade). 
 178. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text (discussing the Bell breakup). 
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moved to fiber optics,179 but DBS provides a current example.180  And, although 
currently limited to only 2–3% of all consumers, the number of people who will 
completely give up their wireline voice service in favor of a wireless phone is 
expected to rise as telephone number portability rules take effect.181 
Moreover, short of complete substitution, in some limited parts of the 
telephone market "[t]here is much evidence . . . that consumers are substituting 
wireless service for traditional wireline communications."182  For example, due to 
the ubiquity of wireless telephones, the payphone market is declining rapidly, the 
demand for second telephone lines is significantly depressed, and up to 20% of all 
long-distance access has migrated to wireless because of the ability to "bucket-
price" instead of charge by the minute.183  Overall, the FCC concludes that "this 
is due to the declining cost and widespread use of wireless service.  In fact, a 
number of analysts argue that wireless service is cheaper than wireline."184  
Indeed, it has been true for some time that the deployment of wireless telephone 
systems, measured on a per-line basis, has been cheaper than the creation of new 
wireline systems, as demonstrated by the worldwide deployment of those 
systems in less developed countries.185  In the Internet access markets, a variety 
of wireless solutions have become available, including Wi-Fi hotspots, higher-
speed access through cell phone companies, and DBS -based satellite services.186  
It is not clear, however, that any of these are (yet) substitutes for the high-speed 
services sold by the cable and DSL providers.187 
                                                                                                                 
 179. See LINDA BLAKE & JIM LANDEY, FCC, TRENDS IN THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY , tbls. 3–5 (2001) (showing that satellite use is largely 
restricted to a limited amount of international service and some services that are not sensitive to 
the greater delays in satellite transmissions), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ 
Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/Intl/itltrd97.pdf. 
 180. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (describing DBS’s competition with 
cable). 
 181. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Commercial Mobile Services, Eighth Report, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,783, ¶¶ 101–06 (2003) [hereinafter 
Eighth Report]. 
 182. Id. ¶ 102. 
 183. See id. ¶¶ 103–04 (discussing the trend towards wireless phones); see also Speta, 
supra note 120, at 794 (analyzing data from 2000 and 2001). 
 184. Eighth Report, supra note 181, ¶ 104. 
 185. See, e.g., Peter Haynes, The End of the Line:  A Survey of Telecommunications, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993, at 1, 7 (examining the possibilities for expansion in places like China, 
Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union).  
 186. See Eighth Report, supra note 181, ¶¶ 124–84 (evaluating mobile service data). 
 187. Indeed, it is unlikely that they are because the technical characteristics are not 
comparable.  Wi-Fi hotspots are currently quite localized, and even the fastest cell phone data 
services are a small fraction of the speed of cable and DSL broadband.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 180–84 
(explaining Wi-Fi technology).  These services are focused on the mobile markets and not on the 
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Perhaps because the news has been so bad for so long in the 
telecommunications industry, a significant buzz has recently developed over the 
prospects for competition presented by VoIP, with the Financial Times dubbing it 
"America’s chance for a free market in telephony."188  FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell has described VoIP as potentially bringing a "degree of choice for 
consumers never before seen in the residential voice market."189  Although cable 
companies have provided limited telephone service for several years (with 
approximately three million subscribers as of June 30, 2003),190 VoIP promises to 
make that service much less costly to provide.  As a result, every significant 
cable company has announced a roll-out of VoIP to come within the next year.191 
 But it is not only the cable companies that are offering the technology; AT&T, 
SBC, and Qwest are all announcing new residential or business VoIP offerings.192 
 In fact, the established telephone companies are playing catch-up to a certain 
degree, as Internet-based telephony has long been available to those willing to 
initiate their calls from their computers193 and as new starts-ups such as Vonage 
                                                                                                                 
fixed residential or business markets.  Satellite services are not as fast and experience delays. See 
Speta, supra note 127, at 60 (discussing satellite technology ’s competition with cable television 
video service). 
 188. America’s Chance for a Free Market in Telephony, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at 19. 
 189. Michael K. Powell, Written Statement on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Before 
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. 6 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://hraun 
foss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-244231A1.pdf. 
 190. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH . DIV., supra note 152, at 2 tbl. 5 (reporting number of 
end-user switched access lines). 
 191. See, e.g., Peter Grant & Shawn Young, Time Warner Cable Expands Net-Phone Plan, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003, at A19 (discussing Time Warner’s plans to use the Internet to 
provide telephone service); Matt Richtel, Time Warner Deal Raises Ante in Cable’s Bid for 
Phone Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A1 ("In addition to Time Warner Cable, the cable 
giants Comcast, Cox Communications and Cablevision have started deployment of Internet 
phone services, with plans to expand those services in 2004."). 
 192. See, e.g., AT&T to Expand VoIP Service, WASH . POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at E02 ("AT&T 
said it plans to sell Internet-based phone service to residential customers in the first quarter of 
next year to keep pace with competitors that are rolling out the service.  A similar offering of 
voice-over-Internet protocol service for businesses, available since 1997, will be expanded."); 
Technology Briefing:  Telecommunications:  SBC to Sell Internet Calling Service to Businesses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at C2 (publicizing SBC’s efforts to sell Internet calling and data 
services); Shawn Young, ‘Naked DSL:’  Qwest to Offer Web Service Separate from Phone, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at D1 (reviewing Qwest’s plans to offer DSL to its customers). 
 193. See Jonathan Moules, Online Upstarts Target the Titans, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, 
at 9 ("Internet protocol (IP) telephony, or the transmission of voice, fax and instant messaging 
over networks that use the internet’s ‘packet-switching’ technology, is not new.  However, for 
home users, it has been largely a hobbyist’s pursuit for those with the time and patience to 
connect calls over personal computers."). 
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deploy new boxes that attach to broadband connections and allow a consumer to 
have a traditional telephone handset.194 
The development means that "[t]he issue is now front and center—after a 
decade of fits and starts—because Internet telephony finally appears ready to go 
mainstream."195  If VoIP is successful, it would certainly increase the competitive 
pressure facing local telephone companies in voice markets.  To a certain extent, 
the level of competition will be constrained by the level of competition in 
broadband Internet services.  Because VoIP must be provided over broadband, 
the price of that service includes the price of the broadband line.  But, even if 
competition among Internet access networks is imperfect,196 the availability of 
Internet telephony increases the level of competition with traditional voice 
telephone companies. 
D.  Or (Maybe) Less Competition 
The optimistic view of coming competition in the local telecommunications 
market may, however, tell only half of the story.  The optimistic view is that 
technological developments and the passage of time will inevitably increase 
competition among communications platforms.  Competitive telecommunications 
markets do not, however, always stay that way, and technological advance might 
result in lower levels of effective competition as well as greater.  As a historical 
matter, in the early days of telephone service, competing local companies existed 
in many cities, until AT&T invented the "killer application" of long-distance 
(which was protected by patents) and refused to share it with its rivals.197  
Similarly, broadcast television was an (imperfectly) competitive market, with 
three networks and sometimes independent stations competing in most local 
markets.198  The advent of cable, however, with vastly superior distribution 
technology because of the number of channels it supplied, introduced a monopoly 
element into video markets.199 
Relevant to the emerging digital broadband world, some commentators and 
the FCC have expressed concern that the development of more sophisticated 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See Glenn Fleishman, An Internet Extension to Your Telephone Twin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
28, 2003, at G3 (explaining how the SIP phone works). 
 195. Yuki Noguchi, Identity Crisis; Internet Services Challenge Definition of "Phone 
Company" , WASH . POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at E01. 
 196. See supra notes 148–67 and accompanying text (evaluating competition in Internet 
access markets). 
 197. Robinson, supra note 72, at 7–8. 
 198. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 441–43. 
 199. Id. 
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interactive television services could diminish whatever ability digital broadcast and 
satellite have to compete with cable television systems.  Interactive television 
(ITV) requires sufficient downstream capacity to provide a high-quality video 
stream and an efficient upstream channel to return the user’s selections.200  Only 
cable systems have both of these characteristics, and, indeed, the cable 
companies themselves seem to see interactive services as the logical next step in 
trying to win the market back from the satellite companies.201  If this scenario 
occurs, even the current level of competition in video and Internet may take a 
step backwards.  As the FCC put it in a 2001 notice of inquiry into interactive 
television services (which is, of course, still pending):  "If it turns out that only 
one delivery platform in each geographic area has the capability to provide the 
most attractive ITV services package, and if the platform provider is vertically 
integrated with an ITV service provider, then there would be the potential for 
anticompetitive behavior."202  These concerns may or may not materialize.  It is 
relatively easy to envision the alternatives to the cable companies cornering the 
market on interactive television, and the telephone companies are beginning to 
work closely with satellite providers to market bundles of voice, video, and high-
speed Internet services to compete with cable companies.203  Broadband 
terrestrial wireless platforms could also provide interactive packet video.  The 
installation of substantially more fiber optics in local telecommunications 
networks would permit VDSL services that too would provide interactive 
video.204  Also, a new set-top box could combine DSL servic e with satellite video 
to provide ITV equivalency.  But, again, many of these alternatives are not in the 
offing. 
Wireless services is another area in which technological and market 
developments could roll back the current level of competition.205  Wireless 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services over 
Cable, Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321, ¶ 6 (2001) (characterizing ITV service). 
 201. See Dustin Goot, Video May Kill the Satellite’s Star, WIRED NEWS, 
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,56729,00.html (Dec. 6, 2002) ("Broadband Plus, 
formerly the Western Cable Show, opened this week with a call to arms from the chairman of 
the California Cable and Telecommunications Association:  Cable companies must ‘stop the 
bleeding that’s going to DBS (satellite).’") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 202. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 200, ¶ 1; see also Hernan Galperin & François Bar, The 
Regulation of Interactive Television in the United States and the European Union, 55 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 61, 74 (2002) ("The lack of a credible competitor to discipline cable operators opens 
several avenues for discriminatory behavior in favor of affiliated programmers and ITV service 
producers."). 
 203. See, e.g., SBC To Sell TV Packages, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2004, at C2 (discussing SBC’s 
bundling plans). 
 204. See Speta, supra note 127, at 54 (noting that fiber optics would allow DSL services). 
 205. The new technology actually creates a new market, one in which there are fewer 
companies providing service.  This new market may or may not eliminate the old market, but if 
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telephony to date has been one of the truly competitive telecommunications 
markets.206  Some consolidation has begun, and with AT&T Wireless merging 
with Cingular, more is coming.207  But multi-media services and interactive 
services are coming to wireless telephones as well, and the experience in Japan 
with NTT DoCoMo’s i-Mode service shows that a company that first brings a 
new service to market may be able to build an internal network effect that locks 
customers into the service, decreasing competition among the platforms.208 
Neither of these scenarios is certain of course, and traditional regulatory 
tools may suffice to handle them if they develop (though of course competition 
would be a superior result to new regulation).  Moreover, it is important to 
evaluate carefully the types of anticompetitive behavior that arise in any 
monopolistic market.  In monopoly, prices are higher and output is constrained, 
which certainly harms consumers as a theoretical matter.  But a static monopoly 
may only reflect sequential competition for the market, rather than a durable 
monopoly harming consumers.209  Moreover, only in certain types of markets 
will the monopolist have an incentive to leverage or to otherwise discriminate 
against producers in related markets.  It is these scenarios that present greater 
threats to innovation and to free communications values and therefore warrant 
special attention. 
V.  Learning the Lesson:  Setting a New Agenda for Local Competition 
If Congress had considered the precedents of airline, trucking, and railroad 
deregulation from the perspective of what market characteristics had preceded 
deregulation, the 1996 Act might have pursued a different course for introducing 
competition into local telecommunications markets.  Given that Congress 
apparently did not believe that competitors would duplicate the essential elements 
of the incumbents’ networks, this line of reasoning should have led to the 
                                                                                                                 
the new technology encompasses or supplants the old, it may. 
 206. See supra notes 178–96 and accompanying text (describing competition in wireless 
telephony). 
 207. See Dan Thanh Dang, Wireless Customers Could Dial up Better Service if Companies 
Merge but Loss of Competition Might Bring Higher Costs , BALT. SUN, Jan. 22, 2004, at 1A 
(analyzing possible mergers in the wireless industry).  This consolidation has as much to do 
with the nearly-complete transition from a local to national wireless telephone market.  And 
antitrust seems likely enough to ensure that consolidation does not threaten competition 
(though, as is discussed later, spectrum reform would do even more). 
 208. See Speta, supra note 80, at 208–10 (describing a first-mover’s ability to limit later 
competition). 
 209. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 10–15 (discussing competition for the 
market). 
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conclusion that complete intramodal competition (the airline and trucking model) 
would not in fact develop, or at least would not develop soon.  The unbundling 
provisions take as their premise that, unlike independent trucking companies and 
airlines that provide their own end-to-end networks, new entrants into 
telecommunications markets will rely upon elements owned by the incumbent 
who maintains a monopoly over a part of the network.  In short, the 1996 Act 
reveals a concern that true intramodal competition could not develop.  This 
conclusion, combined with the lesson learned from transportation deregulation, 
means Congress should have done more to promote the development of 
intermodal competition—competition to the incumbent telephone companies (and 
the incumbent cable companies) from providers who would use fundamentally 
different network technologies. 
Lest I be thought too harsh on Congress, let me be clear that there is much 
that is good in the 1996 Act, and indeed, some features of the Act do advance 
intermodal competition.  The lifting of legal barriers to entry into 
telecommunications markets and the explicit provisions requiring interconnection 
were undoubtedly necessary to help competition and, in these regards, were 
similar to all of the earlier, successful deregulatory efforts.210  Many members of 
Congress expressed hope that wireless and cable companies would compete with 
wireline telephone companies.211  I am not even particularly critical of the 
unbundling requirements, for they are an at least somewhat effective way to 
introduce a limited form of competition into local markets and, as implemented by 
the FCC, a very effective way to limit the incumbents’ ability to monopoly-price 
in important markets.212  In this regard, too, I think that the federalization of 
much of local telecommunications regulation is a good result of the 1996 Act.213 
Rather, I think that the 1996 Act could have done much more to increase the 
possibility of true facilities-based competition (especially intermodal), and I think 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (explaining how the Act drew on prior 
deregulatory statutes). 
 211. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (quoting Senators McCain and Dorgan). 
 212. Indeed, this may be their most important characteristic, and the effective price 
controls over DSL service may be the principal limit on the pricing by the cable and incumbent 
telephone companies for high-speed Internet access service. 
 213. This result may not have been Congress’s intent, see Weiser, supra note 140, at 1720–
23 (discussing the prospects of agency lawmaking), but the Supreme Court has held that the 
inclusion of the local competition provisions in Title II of the Act essentially gave the FCC 
regulatory control over many of the most significant aspects of local markets, such as 
interconnection and element pricing.  See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377–86 
(1999) (discussing the extent of the FCC’s authority).  Of course, the FCC still does not have 
control over local retail rates for basic telephone services.  I return to the topic of increasing 
federal control over certain aspects of telecommunications regulation infra notes 313–15 and 
accompanying text. 
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that Congress should now consider making these additions to the 
Communications Act.  Indeed, the current developments described in Part IV 
suggest that serious intermodal competition may be in the offing.  Reform of 
wireless policy is the largest missed opportunity for developing intermodal 
competition, and a number of proposals, ranging from the uncontroversial to the 
radical, are gaining currency.  The FCC is acting where it can to advance 
spectrum reform, but legislative direction and confirmation of FCC plans would, 
as in the case of transportation deregulation, accelerate the process and ensure 
that reforms are safe from judicial challenge.  This Part, therefore, reviews a 
number of telecommunications reform proposals that are being discussed and 
some that are not (but should be) and places them within the general agenda of 
promoting facilities-based and intermodal competition.214 
Indeed, my principal aim is to attempt a new, comprehensive agenda for 
telecommunications policy based on the promotion of true facilities-based 
competition and, in particular, intermodal competition.  As should become 
increasingly clear, however, I regard the important development for 
telecommunications competition to be facilities-based competition among 
carriers—whether that competition is intra- or intermodal.  Only true facilities-
based competition will eliminate the nearly intractable problems of interconnection 
pricing and of bottleneck infrastructure providers attempting to leverage their 
carrier services into other markets.  The imperative of intermodal or facilities-
based competition is already recognized in some circles.215  This Part extends the 
general imperative to an agenda and to specific policy proposals. 
These proposals can be grouped into helpful categories.  First, 
communications regulation should focus on eliminating legal and economic 
barriers to entry where it can.  Regulation completely prohibiting entry for 
economic reasons has largely passed from the scene, and as noted in telephone 
and cable markets, federal law already forbids legal exclusions.  But, in wireless, 
aspects of the current regime actually do create legal barriers to entry. Moreover, 
legal choices can also change the economics of a particular industry by making 
services more or less expensive to bring to market.  Thus, a second priority for a 
new communications agenda is to seriously consider ways in which legal reform 
could decrease the costs of bringing services to market.  In a variety of areas, 
including wireless policy, right of way management, and local franchising, legal 
reform could have this effect.  Third, the communications law itself should be 
                                                                                                                 
 214. For examples of proposals addressing the reform of the unbundling regime, see 
Hausman & Sidak, supra note 126; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131.  I set these to the side until 
the end of this Part. 
 215. See Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest:  A Case Study in 
Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH . L. 307, 343 (2003) 
(discussing wireless as providing particularly effective competition in rural areas). 
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reformed to take account of the accelerating pace and diversity of service 
deployment.  VoIP, for all its prospects, has already endured significant 
regulatory uncertainty, and significant FCC proceedings are just commencing.  
The statute should be changed to ensure that the regulatory response to new 
services is dictated by their economic character and not by their resemblance to 
more familiar services.  The FCC is already trying to do this, but it operates 
within the confines of the current statute. 
These changes—some radical and some less so—will have consequences, 
of course, and will require a rethinking of other aspects of telecommunications 
law.  As an initial matter, a more competitive telecommunications marketplace 
justifies increased government investment in basic telecommunications research.  
Some have called for the government itself to build the broadband networks of 
the future; I think that private enterprise, funded by universal service subsidies 
where necessary, has proved itself more reliable and presents fewer potentially 
anticompetitive problems.  Second, universal service will require a new approach. 
 One of the main concerns with leaving VoIP unregulated is the potential damage 
to the revenues raised (today, only from telephone companies) for universal 
service.  If universal service funds must be raised through an industry-specific 
tax, instead of being provided from the general federal revenue, then taxing 
customer access to networks is the only competitively neutral manner in which to 
raise funds.  This does mean taxing Internet access, but it hardly seems 
necessary to continue to subsidize the Internet by treating it special, as compared 
to telecommunications.  Finally, this new regulatory approach raises the question 
of what to do about the unbundling rules.  If they are not working and if 
intermodal competition is likely to take off, then it might seem obvious that they 
should be repealed.  Although I am generally optimistic about the chances of 
increased competition in local markets, I am not yet convinced.  Mandatory 
unbundling should itself continue, but the pricing rules should be changed to 
reflect the increased risks of a developing competitive environment. 
A.  Wireless Policy 
A fairly widespread consensus already exists, at least in academic and 
regulatory circles, that significant spectrum reform is necessary, although there is 
significantly less consensus about what shape the reform should take.  
Commentators have noted spectrum reform as a significant missed opportunity in 
the 1996 Act,216 but most of this commentary focuses on the need to reallocate 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First 
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spectrum from low-value to higher value uses, such as the need for additional cell 
phone service, or on the manner in which administrative spectrum allocation has 
protected incumbents against new entry into wireless services.217  In other 
words, this commentary focuses on matters internal to spectrum policy without 
integrating it into the larger telecommunications competition picture.  Perhaps 
tellingly, the FCC’s reorganization after the 1996 Act to emphasize market 
competition left it with two different telecommunications bureaus—the Wireline 
Competition Bureau and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau—a regulatory 
separation that continues today.218  The agenda I suggest views wireline and 
wireless competition not as separate matters, but as overlapping parts of a larger 
telecommunications market.  The important, developing possibility for wireless 
services is the manner in which they can provide competition for existing wireline 
services, such as telephone, Internet, and cable television service.219 
The FCC has taken some important steps to increase available spectrum, by 
relocating a limited number of services to higher spectrum bands, by authorizing 
so-called flexible use spectrum bands, and by increasing the amount of spectrum 
in which low-power devices may operate without licenses.220  The FCC has also 
begun to authorize more exotic solutions, such as limited ultra-wideband devices, 
which can (sometimes) operate on already-allocated frequencies without 
additional interference.221  The FCC also commissioned a task force to review 
                                                                                                                 
Act did shockingly little to disturb age-old regulatory arrangements in radio and television 
broadcasting."); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 157 ("The new Act does very little to reform 
broadcasting law and policy in helpful ways.  Censorship is not repealed, but rather is extended. 
The horrors of spectrum allocation for television are not ameliorated, but compounded."). 
 217. E.g., Hazlett, supra note 216, at 907–08 (focusing on new entry into broadcast-type 
services); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 157–58 (exploring how consumers might protect 
themselves from a cable monopoly). 
 218. See FCC, ABOUT THE FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 13, 
2004) (listing bureaus) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 219. Of course, wireless permits mobile communications, and the markets therefore cannot 
completely overlap.  See Speta, supra note 120, at 797 n.244 (examining wireline and wireless 
technology competition). 
 220. See FCC, Spectrum Policy Task Force, Report, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 7–12 
(2002) [hereinafter Task Force Report] (summarizing these developments), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf; see also Ellen P. 
Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DEIGO L. REV. 269, 287–88 (2004) 
(discussing the FCC’s creation of a common pool of unlicensed frequencies).  Goodman stated: 
Consistent with the intangible, unpropertied qualities of spectrum, the FCC has set 
aside some frequencies as a common pool resource in the form of unlicensed 
spectrum.  Rather than granting exclusive or even group rights to such frequencies, 
the FCC has opened the bands for low-power transmissions by operators or 
members of the public without mandating licensing or coordination. 
Id. 
 221. See Revision of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission 
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spectrum policy; its report called for a radical overhaul of the regulatory 
regime.222 
Nevertheless, the FCC likely cannot, on its own, make any significant 
amount of additional spectrum available.  The largest single user of spectrum is 
the federal government itself, principally controlled by the departments of 
commerce and defense.223  Attempts at interagency consultation have not resulted 
in significant spectrum transfers from any part of the federal government to the 
FCC so that the FCC could make it available to the public.224 Moreover, any 
global change in the method of spectrum allocation, so that spectrum could be 
made available for uses that are in greater demand, would require trenching on 
some powerful incumbents.  As Thomas Hazlett and others have extensively 
noted, those incumbent interests have, to date, prevented any real change in 
spectrum policy.225 
Reform of spectrum policy, in my view, has several important components. 
 First, at a minimum, spectrum policy ought to be reformed to reduce the manner 
in which current policy continues to act as a legal barrier to entry—by requiring 
companies proposing innovative services to receive explicit government approval 
to offer them.  Second, spectrum policy should focus on making significant 
amounts of new spectrum available.  Third, the most substantial amount of this 
new spectrum should be made available by auctioning genuine property rights in 
the spectrum, while maintaining and increasing the number of unlicensed bands. 
1.  Eliminating Legal Barriers to Entry into Spectrum Markets 
Most of the currently useable spectrum continues to be restricted to use by 
particular kinds of services.  This, of course, is the historic command and control 
method of spectrum allocation adopted by the Radio Act of 1927 and continued 
into the Communications Act of 1934, where licenses were granted to specific 
companies (who could not transfer the licenses without regulatory approval), to 
                                                                                                                 
Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 18 
F.C.C.R. 3857, ¶¶ 7–152 (2003) (considering petitions regarding ultra-wideband systems). 
 222. See generally Task Force Report, supra note 220. 
 223. See JANICE OBUCHOWSKI, NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO . ADMIN., U.S. SPECTRUM 
M ANAGEMENT POLICY :  AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE  23 (1991) (addressing concerns about 
access to federal spectrum). 
 224. See Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 9–11 (evaluating spectrum use and reform 
considerations). 
 225. See Hazlett, supra note 216, at 907–12 (discussing how incumbent broadcasters 
stymied proposed reform in the 1996 Act); Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity:  Idle 
Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 11–20 (2002) (discussing lobbying 
and legislation overturning FCC’s attempts to authorize low power FM stations). 
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offer specific services, on specific frequencies, at specific powers, and in 
specific  locations.226  Today, some spectrum licenses permit so-called "flexible 
uses," whereby the licensee is authorized to provide a wide range of services.227  
And the FCC has made available increasing amounts of spectrum for "unlicensed" 
use that permits anyone operating within broad parameters to provide new 
services.228 
Nevertheless, truly new services that do not fit comfortably within the 
unlicensed bands229 or the few flexible use bands still need to petition the FCC to 
create new license categories or to amend old ones.  It is simply not possible for 
a new entrant to buy a cell phone or radio station license and convert its use to a 
new technology—and over 90% of commercially viable spectrum is still tied up in 
limited use licenses.230  Subject to the debate over whether broadcast television 
serves an important universal service function (on which more discussed below) 
spectrum licenses should be granted without restriction as to the service that the 
licensee will provide.  In the past, restricting services to particular bands may 
have served the important function of coordinating equipment companies with 
service companies—for example, by ensuring that radio manufacturers would 
know which channels their equipment must be prepared to receive.  With radios 
becoming more flexible and with internal processors becoming cheaper, such a 
coordination function may be less important.  New devices may be able to pick 
up services on any frequency, using a wide variety of protocols.231 
2.  Making More Spectrum Available 
                                                                                                                 
 226. For an overview of this regulatory structure, see BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 
9–34. 
 227. See, e.g., Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands and Revisions to 
Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, First Report and Order , 15 F.C.C.R. 8634, ¶ 4 (2000) 
[hereinafter Service Rules] ("Because the record indicates a wide range of possible technical 
approaches to serving the expanding demand for wireless services, we have sought to establish 
an open regulatory framework with the potential to accommodate both existing and future 
technologies."); Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 10–12 (summarizing other proceedings). 
 228. See id. at 54 (encouraging the additional designation of spectrum for unlicensed use). 
 229. The unlicensed bands are either very high frequency or require very low power 
transmission, which limits the types of applications that can be accommodated.  See, e.g., id. at 
55 (discussing difficulty of wireless ISPs meeting power limits in unlicensed spectra). 
 230. See EVAN KWEREL & JOHN WILLIAMS, FCC, A PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID TRANSITION TO 
M ARKET ALLOCATION OF SPECTRUM:  OPP WORKING PAPER NO. 38, at 1, http://www.fcc.gov/ 
osp/workingp/html (Nov. 2002) ("Currently, only about seven percent of the most valuable 
spectrum (in 300 MHz-3000 MHz range) is available for market allocation, i.e., is flexibly 
allocated and exclusively and exhaustively licensed.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 231. See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. &  
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The consensus in favor of spectrum reform is driven in large part by 
agreement that significant demand exists for additional spectrum.  The FCC’s 
report declares:  "Increasing demand for spectrum-based services and devices are 
straining longstanding, and outmoded, spectrum policies."232  For example, 
analysts suggest that one major reason behind the Cingular takeover of AT&T 
Wireless was that neither company had sufficient spectrum, standing alone, to 
provide adequate service quality to increasing numbers of customers.233  A 
variety of new services, ranging from increasing WiFi (or WiFi-like hotspots) to 
fixed wireless high-speed Internet could come to market with additional 
spectrum.234 
The current prospects for additional spectrum to be made available for 
flexible, market-driven uses are uncertain at best.  In 2000 and 2002, the FCC 
reallocated certain of the largely unused UHF television channels (52–69) to new, 
flexible use licenses.235  But, 60% of the remaining, most viable spectrum is 
currently allocated to other government uses and, therefore, is not within the 
FCC’s jurisdiction to retask.236  Some of that spectrum is allocated to defense, 
public safety, and other public necessities and could not be reallocated in all 
events, but much of the government spectrum is only lightly used.237  Of course, 
some commentators argue that the spectrum currently used by the government 
should be privatized as well, such that the government would have to purchase, 
or acquire by eminent domain, any spectrum that it needs for public uses—just as 
it must acquire land and buildings.238  They generally recognize that this solution 
will be difficult to adopt politically, unless governments as a whole gain revenues 
by granting them the ability to sell the spectrum they currently use.239  Apart 
                                                                                                                 
TECH . 25, 75 (2002) (comparing the security features of open and closed networks). 
 232. Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 11. 
 233. See Dang, supra note 207 (reporting on AT&T Wireless’s attempts to find a buyer). 
 234. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 102 (noting that "MSOs are 
currently undertaking significant cable system upgrades, including digital build-outs"). 
 235. See Service Rules, supra note 227,  ¶ 4 (reallocating channels).  See generally 
Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698-746 MHz Spectrum Band (Television Channels 52–
59), Report and Order , 17 F.C.C.R. 1022 (2002). 
 236. KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 230, at 28 ("Restructuring spectrum not under 
exclusive FCC jurisdiction will be particularly difficult, requiring concurrence by the NTIA and 
potentially other government agencies now operating in those bands. . . . Deleting government 
and shared bands reduces the spectrum total by approximately 60%."). 
 237. See Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 11 (reiterating the need to consider national 
security and public safety when making spectrum use proposals). 
 238. E.g., KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 228, at 29 ("[W]e think that government users 
should acquire spectrum at market prices the same way they acquire other inputs such as oil, 
real estate and computer equipment."). 
 239. See id. ("[I]n the transition to a market system, government spectrum users are likely 
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from political impediments, this proposal is undoubtedly the most efficient, for it 
replaces the current regime, in which governments do not have significant 
incentives to economize on the use of their spectrum, with one in which 
governments at least implicitly feel the opportunity costs of those uses.240  The 
Congress should act to retask spectrum from government to private uses and to 
permit the FCC to make the spectrum available for any use. 
Broadcast television is a particularly ripe area for spectrum reform, to 
increase its availability for other uses.  Today, the need to make available 
additional spectrum is one of the principal motivators behind the FCC’s desire to 
accelerate the transition to digital television.241  When television stations have 
converted to digital transmission and 85% of consumers have adopted digital 
receivers, then the television stations must surrender their former analog licenses, 
which occupy some of the most technically desirable spectrum.  The original 
1995 legislation that confirmed the mandatory transition from analog to digital 
television initially required that the analog licenses be surrendered in 2006, but a 
1997 amendment added the specific adoption thresholds.242  Currently, 75% of 
television stations are broadcasting at least one digital signal,243 but no one 
believes that sufficient numbers of consumers will have purchased digital 
receivers such that the licenses will be surrendered in 2006.244 
At a minimum, Congress should legislate a firm deadline for the DTV 
transition.  Ken Ferree, the chief of the FCC’s media bureau, recently advanced a 
proposal that would essentially force television companies to surrender their 
analog licenses in 2009.  The broadcasters did not respond favorably, to say the 
                                                                                                                 
to be net sellers of spectrum, creating an initial cash surplus above the cost of replacing their 
current wireless communications services.").  Kwerel & Williams do not offer any statistical or 
economic analysis to support their intuition, and given the current difficulties in state and federal 
budgets, it seems unlikely that government will be willing to risk it. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See FCC, DIGITAL TELEVISION FACT SHEET, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/ 
digitaltv.html (last modified July 15, 2003) ("Converting to DTV will also free up parts of the 
scarce and valuable broadcast airwaves, allowing those portions of the airwaves to be used for 
other important services, such as advanced wireless and public safety services.") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 242. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(B) (2000) (extending the date beyond 2006 if necessary). 
 243. See DTV Build-Out:  Requests for Extension of the Digital Television Construction 
Deadline; Commercial Television Stations Comply with May 1, 2002 Deadline, Order , 18 
F.C.C.R. 22,705, ¶¶ 3–6 (2003) (examining the current DTV licenses). 
 244. See Edmund Sanders, Trinity Broadcasting Seeks FCC’s Forgiveness on Digital 
Deadline by Threatening Sanctions Against Delinquent Stations, the Agency is Trying to Speed up 
the Slow Rollout to DTV, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at C1 ("Congress has set a target date of 
2006 to complete the switch to digital television, though few expect that schedule will be met."). 
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least.245  Congressional action would circumvent a long regulatory and court 
battle and move this spectrum into better uses. 
Notwithstanding the broadcast industry’s efforts to deploy digital TV and 
the FCC’s efforts to encourage the transition, the need for additional spectrum 
raises the question of why over-the-air television transmission remains sensible at 
all.  Today, nearly 90% of all television households receive video service from 
cable or DBS providers,246 and the transition to digital is unlikely to make 
broadcast TV a significantly more effective competitor.  Even if all of the 
spectrum currently allocated to these licenses were used for television service, 
broadcast would still provide only about one-quarter as many channels as cable or 
DBS.  More importantly, the FCC, with Congress’s approval, has decided that 
digital television license holders need only provide a single television channel on 
each license, instead of the four or five channels each license could 
accommodate.247  Under this rule, the licensees may use the balance of their 
spectrum allocation for nonbroadcast services.248  This freedom for broadcasters 
could be reversed, which might increase the number of broadcast channels, but 
the FCC’s decision was based precisely on the market demand for such data 
services,249 and the vigor with which the broadcasters have sought must-carry 
rights for digital television suggests (at least weakly) their continued concern that 
the broadcast medium, standing alone, will not be competitive.250  Admittedly, 
DTV will provide better quality reception than analog broadcasting, and this 
increase in quality will make broadcasting more competitive with cable and 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See Ted Hearn, Ferree Plan No Picnic for Cable, Either; MSOs May Have as Many 
Problems with DTV Plan as Broadcasters, M ULTICHANNEL NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004, at 79, LEXIS, 
Multichannel News File ("The Ferree plan [for a firm give-back of analog licenses in 2009] has 
been controversial from the start, especially with broadcasters."). 
 246. See supra notes 167–77 and accompanying text (discussing competition in video 
markets). 
 247. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television 
Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, ¶ 28 (1997) (holding that each 
television broadcaster need only provide one channel of digital television service); id. ¶ 32 
(expecting that television stations will provide nonbroadcast services over the remainder of the 
spectrum). 
 248. Id. ¶¶ 4–7 (asserting the benefits of spectrum recovery). 
 249. Id. ¶ 29 ("[W]e recognize the benefit of permitting broadcasters the opportunity to 
develop additional revenue streams from innovative digital services."). 
 250. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, First Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, ¶ 1 (2001) (concluding tentatively 
against, but calling for additional comment on, must-carry for digital television signals).  
Broadcasters would seek must-carry rights even if broadcast is competitive because such rights 
would maximize their competitive position, especially in the program supply market. 
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satellite, but most analysts believe that few customers will move back to receiving 
over-the-air broadcasts exclusively.251 
Thinking about broadcasting from the perspective of total communications 
competition suggests that television broadcast should be eliminated entirely (or 
more accurately in my view, that the market ought to be permitted to eliminate it 
entirely).  Economist Thomas Hazlett, long a critic of spectrum allocation policy, 
has made this argument, and the efficiency of other platforms to provide video 
cannot reasonably be doubted.252  Subject to a universal service policy, such a 
result seems tolerable.253 
3.  Propertizing the Spectrum 
Assuming that incumbent interests could be overcome and Congress 
authorized the FCC to make significant changes in spectrum policy, there remains 
the question of direction of the spectrum reform.  Many commentators, building 
on the seminal work of Ronald Coase,254 suggest complete propertization of the 
spectrum—allowing private ownership and free trading, as well as private 
definition of the types of service that will be offered on each slice.255  Others 
advocate a "commons" approach, whereby any device meeting certain technical 
characteristics is allowed to operate.  In a commons model, the spectrum is not 
owned, and interference is prevented ex ante through the specification of 
appropriate hardware and operating protocols, instead of through ownership of 
noninterference rights.256  These approaches share a common goal of permitting 
                                                                                                                 
 251. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 103 (relating, but not endorsing, 
these views). 
 252. See Hazlett, supra note 216, at 935–40 (expressing criticisms of the current system). 
 253. See infra notes 398–414 and accompanying text (asserting the need for a universal 
service policy). 
 254. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959). 
 255. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, 
the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s "Big Joke":  An Essay on 
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 335 (2001); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, 
Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53 
(1999); Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum:  Why It’s Important 
and How to Begin, 9 M EDIA L. & POL’Y 19 (2000). 
 256. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 241 (2001) (encouraging regulation that will maintain the "commons" nature 
of spectrum); Benkler, supra note 231, at 75 (advocating the creation of "a commons of 
sufficient magnitude and stability to allow a credible investment effort . . . in building the tools 
that can take advantage of an ownerless wireless infrastructure").  For a good summary of the 
debate, see generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between 
Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003). 
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the introduction of new uses and services without administrative approval, but 
they differ radically in the implementation.  The two approaches can be combined 
to a limited degree by, for example, propertizing some spectrum bands and 
opening others to commons use257 or creating property rights to spectrum that 
are always subject to use by any other device that does not interfere with the 
incumbent.258  But their essential outlines are fundamentally opposed. 
The need for the development of intermodal competition to the traditional 
wireline services provides some guidance in selecting among the various 
spectrum reform proposals.  On the one hand, a propertized spectrum makes it 
easier for a service provider to provide a new service.  A provider that owns 
spectrum rights can more easily internalize all of the coordination problems that a 
new service may entail, such as equipment standards, operating protocols, and 
interconnection with other networks.  Even more importantly, a spectrum owner 
captures all of the returns from monitoring spectrum use.  Both owned and 
unowned spectrum have the problem of unauthorized users.  The commons 
model critically depends upon all devices using the commons conforming to 
certain technical characteristics that limit their interference with one another.259 
While equipment certification processes can ensure compliance by most users, 
other users will have the incentive to cheat on the implementation of these 
protocols or to modify the commercially available equipment to increase its power 
or effectiveness.260  The analogy to Internet hackers and spammers is obvious.  
In a commons, however, no party can internalize returns from policing the users 
of the commons to limit cheating; it is a classic free-rider problem. Government 
enforcement can deter cheating, but private spectrum owners will efficiently 
police their own spectrum, for they bear all of the costs from unauthorized uses 
and garner all of the benefits from eliminating those uses. 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Both Benkler and Lessig make this proposal in their most recent works.  See Benkler, 
supra note 231, at 83 ("What we need is a relatively large-scale experiment in both markets."); 
LESSIG, supra note 256, at 242 ("We should be setting aside broad swaths of spectrum as a 
commons, intermixed with spectrum as property."). 
 258. See generally Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum Management:  
Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS:  
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 193 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & 
Steven S. Wildman eds., 2003) (asserting that a property rights market-based regime can increase 
efficiency and decrease costs). 
 259. Benkler, supra note 231, at 79–80. 
 260. See Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without Licenses:  
Opportunities and Dangers, in INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET:  SELECTED PAPERS FROM 
THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE  49 (Gregory L. Rosston & 
David Waterman eds., 1997) (discussing possibility of equipment cheating on usage rules in 
unlicensed bands). 
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On the other hand, spectrum commons eliminates one barrier to entry into a 
market entirely—the need to acquire spectrum rights on which to operate a 
service.  Commons might permit equipment companies to introduce 
communications services without themselves becoming or partnering with more 
traditional communications companies—a further introduction of supplier 
diversity into communications markets.  And open spectrum commons might 
further diversify the types of infrastructure deployed in at least some 
communications markets.  Commons advocates focus on technological solutions 
that tend to be quite different from those employed by current spectrum 
owners—that is, the use of low-powered, high-processing power devices that are 
programmed, essentially, not to interfere with one another or with other uses.261 
On balance, I think that the imperative to introduce intermodal competition 
to wireline services suggests the propertization of significant sections of the 
existing spectrum.  Property rights simply provide more efficient coordination 
and policing incentives.  And as to voice and other delay-sensitive services, the 
low-power distributed services envisioned by commons advocates are not likely 
to provide the quality of service that makes them reasonable competitors to 
wireline services.  The currently preferred architecture for these services relies 
too heavily on multiple hops between devices and an Internet-like routing 
structure that has proved inadequate in the context of the wireline Internet for 
these types of services.262  Although some of these issues are the subject of 
continuing innovation, the expectation is that they are fairly far down the road.263 
 Moreover, I am not convinced that propertizing the spectrum would eliminate, or 
even significantly decrease, the deployment of such new devices and services, 
although I do think that Congress and the FCC should significantly expand the 
spectrum available for unlicensed uses.264  Even if spectrum were propertized, 
equipment manufacturers, or coalitions of manufacturers formed through the 
standards-setting process, could purchase spectrum and act as, or hire, band 
                                                                                                                 
 261. This description is only half accurate, for one of the important features of these 
devices is that their high processing power permits them to better filter among multiple received 
signals.  In other words, while they do interfere less by virtue of their low power and use of 
specific protocols, they also do not experience interference at the same level of sensitivity as 
more typical wireless devices. 
 262. See Benkler, supra note 231, at 38–47 (describing network and technical 
characteristics of open wireless networks); see also Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, 
Rethinking the Design of the Internet:  The End-to-End Arguments vs.  The Brave New World, in 
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION:  THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 91, 94 (Benjamin M. 
Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001) (describing how the Internet’s first in time routing 
structure is not optimal for delay-sensitive services); Speta, supra note 47, at 1561 (reviewing 
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS’ analysis of network architecture). 
 263. Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 23–24. 
 264. See Speta, supra note 47, at 1562 (reviewing Lessig’s view of Spectrum rights). 
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managers.265  If enough spectrum were made available to the market, acquiring 
operating rights would not be a significant burden.266 
4.  Addressing Media Concentration 
Some of the proposals above are open to the criticism that they will further 
feed the trend towards media concentration, both on a vertical and horizontal 
basis.  Many have been critical of the 1996 Act’s eliminating the pre-existing 
ownership caps on radio licenses, which resulted in substantial consolidation in 
the radio market.267  The FCC’s proposals to liberalize ownership and cross-
ownership rules touching television markets created a firestorm of protest that 
has not subsided.  FCC Commissioner Michael Copps has been eloquent in 
arguing that media concentration threatens "fundamental values and democratic 
virtues—things like localism, diversity, competition and maintaining the 
multiplicity of voices and choices that undergird our precious marketplace of 
ideas and that sustain American democracy."268  He is far from alone.269 
                                                                                                                 
 265. But see Benkler, supra note 231, at 65 n.47 (objecting to band managers on the 
grounds that "collective action problems are similar to those associated with gathering the 
property rights necessary for a highway or public park").  But competing equipment 
manufacturers routinely overcome those collective action problems in standards setting 
processes, which often include the aggregation and exchange of intellectual property.  See, e.g., 
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1889, 1903–07 (2002) (studying the IP policies of forty-three standard-setting 
organizations).  The formation of the mesh network that Benkler envisions itself requires 
significant coordination that would be subject to collective action problems.  These networks 
only work if equipment standards are carefully coordinated, and an individual manufacturer 
would have an incentive to cheat.  Moreover, an effective service probably requires robust and 
reliable, coordinated interconnection points to other networks.  Benkler also asserts that "if the 
spectrum used for open wireless networks is owned by some segment of the equipment makers, 
the owners are likely to have the opportunity and incentive to make entry by non-owning 
competitors difficult."  Benkler, supra note 231, at 65 n.47.  But there is no reference to why, if 
enough spectrum were available, this would be the case or even why the manufacturers would 
have any incentive to try.  See Speta, supra note 47, at 1577–78 (asserting that regulation should 
be tied to an economic theory of preventive rational foreclosure); Speta, supra note 114, at 1010 
(arguing that even infrastructure monopolists will not discriminate against new services). 
 266. See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 258, at 214–15 (discussing the effects of 
increasing available spectrum). 
 267. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56, 110 
(requiring the elimination of "any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast 
stations which may be owned or controlled by one entity nationally"). 
 268. Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Statement at USC Media Consolidation Forum 2 
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
233924A1.pdf.  See generally Michael J. Copps, The "Vast Wasteland" Revisited:  Headed for 
More of the Same?, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 473 (2003) [hereinafter Copps, The "Vast Wasteland" 
Revisited] (arguing that there is more cause for concern over the content of television programs 
now than there was in 1961). 
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Although fewer than 15% of people currently watch television over the 
broadcast airwaves, the combination of broadcast licenses with must-carry rules 
ensures that broadcasters are a substantial, independent source of programming 
on cable systems.  Unless other aspects of communications reform yielded 
increased competition to cable and satellite companies, eliminating or further 
diminishing broadcasters increases the risk that cable and satellite companies 
would have increased control over media delivery.  The big television networks 
may persist as sources of shows for cable because, despite their declining 
viewership, they still provide much of the most popular programming.270  But a 
number of independent broadcasters depend upon must-carry, and must-carry’s 
granting all broadcasters a fallback access right shifts the economic balance 
toward broadcasters in their negotiations with cable companies. 
There is, of course, a significant debate over the definition of "media" 
markets—whether only traditional video services should be included within the 
market or whether the market must also include books, magazines and 
newspapers, the Internet, radio, video rental stores, and any other means by 
which a person might send or receive a message.  Judge Posner raised the issue 
over ten years ago in just these terms, and the D.C. Circuit’s recent skepticism 
toward ownership limits has been based in part on its view that the FCC has not 
adequately defined the scope of competing services.271  The FCC has tried to 
account for this in its recent media concentration rules;272 but the Third Circuit 
specifically found fault with its attempt to develop a new media-diversity index 
that took account of "all" media.273 
I believe, however, that policies that permit and encourage the entry of new 
facilities-based carriers, combined with antitrust scrutiny of mergers and 
structural limits on cable or satellite companies where market power persists, is a 
superior alternative to creating broadcast licenses simply to control cable 
companies.  Antitrust scrutiny in particular should be more vigorous.  After the 
                                                                                                                 
 269. See generally Kerri Smith, The FCC Under Attack, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. 19. 
 270. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 26 (reporting that broadcast 
networks continued to have 49% of viewers during prime time and 45% of viewers during the 
day time). 
 271. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (summarizing the court’s 2004 
decision). 
 272. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 
¶¶ 111–28 (2003) (discussing significant advances in media, compression, and Internet 
technology), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
 273. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402–12 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(remanding this aspect of the FCC’s rules). 
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1996 Act, consolidation in radio occurred with minimal antitrust scrutiny,274 and 
many have argued that the biggest companies now exert market power.275  
Broadcast radio is currently without a significant intermodal competitor.  Even the 
biggest of the new satellite radio services, of which there are only two, is 
affiliated with Clear Channel, the largest terrestrial radio company.276  Wireline 
services, such as Internet radio, provide competition which is limited by their lack 
of mobility.  If satellite radio does not develop as an intermodal competitor and 
concern over market power continues, then other policies could encourage 
competition.  The allocation of new digital radio licenses should not proceed in 
the same manner as the allocation of digital television licenses—with new 
operating authority being allocated only to incumbents—but rather by markets.277 
 Moreover, level competition policy, which I discuss more fully in the next 
subpart, suggests that developing Internet radio solutions should not be subject to 
different intellectual property burdens—that is, higher licensing fees—than 
broadcasters.278 
                                                                                                                 
 274. See, e.g., Copps, The "Vast Wasteland" Revisited, supra note 268, at 475 (noting that 
"[t]here are thirty-four percent fewer radio station owners than there were before protections 
were loosened"); Anastasia Bednarski, Note, From Diversity to Duplication:  Mega-Mergers 
and the Failure of the Marketplace Model Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 55 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 273, 280 (2003) (summarizing the liberals’ and the conservatives’ perspectives on a 
marketplace model of radio regulation). 
 275. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, De-Regulation of the Air Waves:  Is Antitrust Enough?, 
17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 71–74 (2003) (analyzing radio mergers from an antitrust 
perspective); Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, Comment, The Game of Radiopoly:  An Antitrust 
Perspective of Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 481–83 (2000) 
(discussing arguments). 
 276. See Ben Charny, Satellite Network Gets Insurance Static, CNET  NEWS.COM, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1033_3-5061174.html (Aug. 7, 2003) (reporting 700,000 current 
subscribers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  XM Radio, the largest of the 
new services, see id., describes Clear Channel as a strategic investor and partner.  XM  Satellite 
Radio, Strategic Partners, http://www.xmradio.com/corporate_info/strategic_partners_category. 
jsp?category=investment (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  Clear Channel has owned as much as 19% of XM.  See generally Gregory L. White & 
John Lippman, Media:  Satellite Radio Gets a Lift from Ford and GM, WALL ST. J., June 16, 
1999, at B1. 
 277. See generally Digital Audio Broadcasting Systems and Their Impact on the Terrestrial 
Radio Broadcast Service, First Report and Order , 17 F.C.C.R. 19,990 (2002) (explaining how 
digital radio is to be introduced by incumbent broadcasters). 
 278. The Digital Millenium Copyright Act required webcasters to pay royalties on their 
play of music recordings, while broadcast radio is exempt from royalty payments.  See generally 
Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, as Soon as We Figure 
Out the Copyright Law:  The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 1 (2001).  These differentials are justified on intellectual property grounds—that 
webcast music is more likely to be pirated than the lower-fidelity broadcast radio.  See id. at 4–5 
(discussing the recording process).  The debate, however, has not focused on the competition 
dimension, which puts new, intermodal competitors at a disadvantage to incumbents. 
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Structural regulation of cable or DBS, by requiring them to provide 
unaffiliated programming for example, is more difficult, for it faces heightened 
judicial review under the First Amendment.  It was only by five-to-four margins 
that the Supreme Court found must-carry consistent with the First Amendment, 
and that was on the grounds that the regulation was not content-based but rather 
was designed to preserve free broadcasting for those who could not afford pay 
services.279  The Supreme Court has otherwise found that cable operators are 
entitled to full First Amendment rights in their selection of programming,280 and 
the D.C. Circuit precedents strongly suggest that structural limitations on cable 
operators (such as vertical, horizontal, and cross-ownership limits) will be subject 
to First Amendment scrutiny.281  In a controversial decision, one federal district 
court struck down cable open access regulation on the grounds that it violated the 
First Amendment.282 
Nevertheless, so long as it is based upon well-founded concerns for 
monopoly power and the use of that monopoly power to control access to 
information, regulation that even-handedly grants access rights to content 
providers or that limits certain ownership concentrations would probably be 
sustained.  The courts have never held that the First Amendment forbade the 
imposition of common carrier requirements on telephone companies, under which 
those companies were required to provide service to anyone that requested it (no 
matter what the content of their conversations).283  To be sure, the courts have 
sometimes held that common carrier rules only apply to those companies that 
have already decided to do business with all comers,284 and it might be possible to 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224–25 (1997) (5–4) (deferring to 
congressional determinations of economically preferred interests); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630–34 (1994) (5–4) (describing the legislative history of the must-carry 
provisions). 
 280. See Turner , 512 U.S. at 628–30 (reviewing the development of cable programming). 
 281. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045–47 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(addressing the First Amendment to cable broadcast cross ownership rules); Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (implying that the First Amendment 
may place restraints on horizontal and vertical concentration limits). 
 282. See Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 698 (S.D. Fla. 
2000) (striking down local open access ordinance); see also William E. Lee, Cable Modem 
Service and the First Amendment:  Adventures in a "Doctrinal Wasteland,"  16 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH . 125, 147–57 (2002) (criticizing decision).  See generally Yochai Benkler, Through the 
Looking Glass:  Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP . PROBS., Winter 2003, at 173. 
 283. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (establishing the duty to provide service); § 202(a) 
(requiring service provision on a non-discriminatory basis). 
 284. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(identifying the two-part test to determine common carriage); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. 
Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("What appears to be essential to the 
quasi-public character implicit in the common carrier concept is that the carrier ‘undertakes to 
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argue that the nondiscrimination requirement is therefore only an antifraud rule.  
"[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud."285  But Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent in the first must-carry case, representing four justices who would have 
struck down the rules as inconsistent with the First Amendment, suggests that 
even-handed access requirements would, in these Justices’ view, be more likely 
to survive. 
Congress might also conceivably obligate cable operators to act as common 
carriers for some of their channels, with those channels being open to all 
through some sort of lottery system or time-sharing arrangement.  Setting 
aside any possible Takings Clause issues, it stands to reason that if 
Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common 
carriers, it can ask the same of cable companies; such an approach would 
not suffer from the defect of preferring one speaker to another.286 
At bottom, I am in favor of interconnection rules that require providers of 
network services to deliver the content of unaffiliated entities, but a cautious 
approach to other forms of structural regulation must prevail.  In many cases, 
structural regulation of distribution monopolies will be unnecessary, for even a 
monopolist will have the incentive to distribute content that its customers want to 
receive.287  Nevertheless, the statute should grant the regulator authority to make 
structural rules (on an even-handed basis) where economic theory and available 
evidence suggest that there is a need for control,288 such as occurred 
(successfully) with the 1992 rules that required cable companies to stop 
withholding the content that was necessary for DBS to come to market.289 
B.  Decreasing Economic Barriers to Entry 
Although federal legislation has already eliminated state and local 
governments’ ability explicitly to franchise only a single telecommunications or 
                                                                                                                 
carry for all people indifferently.’"); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 
601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same). 
 285. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003). 
 286. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 684 (1994) (5–4) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 287. See generally Speta, supra note 127 (making this argument in the context of cable open 
access regulations). 
 288. For a good summary of the current economics applicable to the question of strategic 
foreclosure, see Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies:  Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 
HARV. J.L & TECH . 85, 95–102 (2003). 
 289. See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text (discussing cable regulation). 
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cable provider,290 Congress and the FCC could take additional steps to change the 
economic barriers to entry into communications markets.291  The 1996 Act 
federalized significant parts of local telecommunications regulation that was 
previously within state or local jurisdiction; nevertheless, certain aspects of state 
and local regulation remain that could profitably be eliminated.  Additionally, some 
current regulation puts new entrants at an economic disadvantage relative to 
incumbent providers.  This subpart discusses several steps that could decrease 
barriers to entry, and it addresses the related argument, advanced by incumbents 
and others, that "parity" ought to be a guiding regulatory principle. 
1.  Decreasing the Economic Costs of State and Local Telecommunications 
Regulation 
Some local regulation continues to create economic barriers both to entry 
and to a level competitive playing field among platforms.  These regulations ought 
to be reformed, either by the federalization of the entire area or by establishing 
federal standards that ensure that competition can develop.  For example, 
although states and local government may not explicitly restrict entry into 
communications services through limited franchising, they retain substantial 
authority over rights of way and tower siting, and any new entrant, except 
satellite carriers, will need access either to rights of way for wireline placement or 
to towers for radio placements.292  As to rights of way, states and municipalities 
have sometimes imposed burdensome disclosure, planning, and permitting 
conditions on access, and worse, many courts have granted them authority to 
charge fees that are a percentage of a carrier’s revenues (instead of a function of 
                                                                                                                 
 290. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (preempting state and local rules that "prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting" the ability of any entity to provide telecommunications services); 
§ 332(d)(3) (forbidding state and local franchising of commercial mobile services carriers); 
§ 541(a) (forbidding exclusive municipal franchising of cable operators);  Final Decision, supra 
note 75, ¶ 147 (forbidding state and local regulation of consumer premises equipment); Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory 
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, ¶¶ 34–69 (2002) [hereinafter 
High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling] (defining Internet access as an interstate information 
access service within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 291. General spectrum reform is an important way to decrease barriers to entry in its own 
right.  See supra notes 252–56 and accompanying text (examining opposing perspectives on 
spectrum reform). 
 292. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000) (preserving local control over right of way); § 332(c)(7) 
(same); Speta, supra note 120, at 764–70 (discussing right of way).  See generally David W. 
Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack:  The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb To Prevent the 
Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP . L. 469 (1998) (discussing tower siting). 
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the cost of right of way).  Both of these features increase the costs of entry.293  
Moreover, because the incumbent wireline carrier and all wireless carriers 
generally operate without paying for right of way, it tips the competitive balance 
against new wireline services.294 
As to tower siting, the current federal rules on tower siting are inadequate in 
two regards.  By contrast to right of way, the difficulty of municipal pricing for 
access is not present because a wireless carrier is likely to have sufficient 
alternatives that the municipality will not be able to charge an above-economic -
cost rate.  Unlike streets, which are uniquely suited as corridors for the 
installation of wireline facilities and which are owned exclusively by 
municipalities, private property is generally substitutable for public property as a 
location for wireless towers.   
The issue, rather, is cities’ use of zoning regulations to exclude towers that 
city leaders or residents consider unsightly.295  The current federal law essentially 
permits municipalities to exclude any second or third towers in places in which 
any current wireless carrier is providing service,296 and this decreases the 
possibility of intramodal competition among wireless carriers.  Municipalities 
should be permitted to force companies to share towers where such sharing is 
feasible, and a federal statute confirming access to towers which is similar to the 
current statute that confirms access to utility poles would decrease some of the 
economic costs of entry facing a new wireless carrier.297  Indeed, such a statute 
                                                                                                                 
 293. See Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes, and Cable Open Access:  
Where the Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 23, 44–45 (2001) (reviewing some court decisions regarding municipalities’ fees); 
Speta, supra note 120, at 772 (addressing the exclusive franchise rights granted for over eighty 
years).  Those defending municipalities’ pricing right of way use above cost do not dispute that 
it raises the costs of entry into telecommunications markets.  See generally William Malone, 
Municipalities’ Right to Full Compensation for Telecommunications Providers’ Uses of the 
Public Rights-of-Way, 107 DICK. L. REV. 623 (2003) (analyzing the municipality’s role in 
telecommunications regulation). 
 294. See Speta, supra note 120, at 770–75 (examining the procompetition nature of the 
1996 Act).  As I discuss, the right of way fee should capture the true economic costs of right of 
way use, including both hard costs such as the costs to repair the streets and softer costs such as 
traffic congestion costs.  A too low rent—that is, one below economic cost—distorts the 
competitive balance in the market as well.  Id. at 770. 
 295. See generally Robert B. Foster & Mitchell A. Carrel, Towers of Babble:  The 
Continuing Struggle over Wireless Siting Issues Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 31 
URB. LAW. 849 (1999). 
 296. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000) (preserving local zoning authority); see also Foster & 
Carrel, supra note 294, at 852 (discussing § 704’s prohibition of regulation which effectively 
prevents personal wireless service). 
 297. See 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000) (establishing federal utility pole access requirements); see 
also § 251(b)(4) (requiring all local exchange carriers "to afford access to the poles, ducts, 
conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecommunications 
services on rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224"); Implementation 
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would probably eliminate the need for municipalities to force sharing.298  But, 
where sharing is not feasible, federal law should not permit the exclusion of 
multiple towers on a per se basis. 
The current federal tower siting regime is also inadequate because it applies 
only to towers used for "personal wireless services,"299 which include 
commercial cell phone service, private wireless service networks (such as 
dispatch services), and "common carrier wireless exchange access services."300  
Thus, although the statute covers fixed services that substitute for plain old 
telephone service, the section (at least arguably) does not cover fixed wireless 
Internet access services.301  A statute sensitive to intermodal competition and the 
deployment of new services through new technologies generally would not base 
rights or obligations on either the type of service offered or the technology used, 
a theme to which I will return shortly.302  Surely the protocols used by the radios 
atop the towers bear slightly if at all upon the aesthetic  and other local siting 
concerns. 
It is tempting, given the foregoing, to conclude that all currently local 
decisions over rights of way and tower siting should be entirely federalized to 
ensure that competition values are given the appropriate weight.  But that solution 
is impractical.  The sheer number of such decisions is probably beyond the 
capacity of the FCC and the federal courts to manage.  Moreover, the point of 
devolving such decisionmaking is to give appropriate consideration to localized 
differences.  The optimal solution is to set federal rules for those matters in 
                                                                                                                 
of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order , 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 
¶ 2 (1998) ("The purpose of Section 224 of the Communications Act is to ensure that the 
deployment of communications networks and the development of competition are not impeded 
by private ownership and control of the scarce infrastructure and rights-of-way that many 
communications providers must use in order to reach customers."), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. 
Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002). 
 298. Voluntary tower sharing does limit the municipalities’ power in this regard, and there 
is some evidence that the established carriers cooperate with one another due to their mutual 
need for access to each others’ towers.  Cf. Lynn Hanley, Note, Wireless Communications and 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996:  An Experiment in Federalism, 12 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
48, 59–60 (1999) (discussing forced sharing attempts by certain municipalities). 
 299.  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000). 
 300. Id. § 332(c)(7)(C). 
 301. This answer is uncertain because, as discussed infra notes 368–73 and accompanying 
text, there is still no settled regulatory category for Internet services.  The FCC’s preferred 
classification—that of information services—would probably mean that they are not "common 
carrier" services. 
 302. See infra notes 375–85 and accompanying text (describing the inequities of not 
regulating VoIP like every other telecommunications service). 
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which there is little need for local variation.303  For example, federal law already 
prohibits municipalities from barring wireless towers on the basis of health 
concerns.304  Whether RF radiation is linked with cancer or other health concerns 
is not a matter on which local decisionmakers have any advantage.  For similar 
reasons, although there may be diversity among municipalities in their need to 
raise revenues through right of way charges, the tradeoff between those revenues 
and telecommunications competition should be resolved on a consistent basis.305  
Moreover, even where the ultimate decision is made at the local level on the basis 
of genuinely local factors, the Congress or the FCC can provide substantial 
guidance by developing model local statutes, best practices, or other guidelines 
that courts can look to in reviewing local decisions.306  If municipalities were 
required to justify their decisions, then the normal processes and costs of 
administrative review by the courts would provide incentives to follow federal 
guidelines.307 
                                                                                                                 
 303. Some have argued that economic competition among cities will provide sufficient 
limits on municipal zoning decisions, in particular that municipal competition for businesses (tax 
base) and residents will yield the socially optimal amount of regulation.  See Vicki Been, "Exit" 
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:  Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506–28 (1991) (arguing that competition will prevent governments from 
overregulating).  I have elsewhere argued that there is no reason to believe that this type of 
competition will yield efficient right of way and tower siting decisions.  See Speta, supra note 
120, at 800–02 (asserting a need for a federal rule).  Additionally, many commentators 
consistently express the concern that state and local regulators do not sufficiently value 
competition in telecommunications markets.  This was certainly one of Congress’s concerns in 
debating the 1996 Act.  See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (quoting legislators and 
their concerns). 
 304. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2000) (prohibiting local regulation of tower siting 
"on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such 
facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions"). 
 305. This proposition runs, of course, into the general objection that state and local control 
can facilitate experimentation.  Apart from whether claims of experimentation are simply masks 
for economic protectionism through incumbent capture of local decisionmakers, federalizing the 
decisionmaking is not inconsistent with experimentation or variation.  Such variation should be 
on the basis of objective economic (or other) differences, and not based on any unexpressed 
different tolerance for competition. 
 306. In other words, where local variation is unimportant, the rule should be federal.  Where 
there is need for local variation or a need for local decisionmaking because of true diversity of 
underlying facts, there should be federal standards to be implemented by state adjudicators.  To 
a large extent, this extends the model of federalism that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
Congress used in the 1996 Act’s local competition provisions.  See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. 
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 370–75 (1999) (describing the effect of federal law on local standards); 
Weiser, supra note 140, at 1720–23 (explaining challenges to agency lawmaking). 
 307. This highlights one further continuing issue under the wireless tower siting rules:  the 
extent to which municipalities must build a written record and provide a written justification for 
their decisions.  Despite a federal statutory requirement of a written decision, a significant 
number of court decisions have essentially held that a municipality need not comply with basic 
administrative law procedures.  See Mitchell A. Carrel & Robert B. Foster, Railroad Tracks by 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
1128 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004) 
Although it was focused only on the unbundling regime, and therefore on the 
introduction of intramodal competition, the FCC’s recent third attempt to devise 
unbundling rules erred in failing to set adequate federal rules to direct the states in 
making important decisions under the Act.  Without a doubt, the FCC moved in 
this direction because it was prodded by the D.C. Circuit to introduce more 
variation into its unbundling rules, to take account of differences in numbers of 
competitors and of economic conditions in different markets.308  But nothing in 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision required the FCC to leave the field to the states as 
much as it did.  The FCC’s 576-page opinion sets some minimum unbundling 
requirements and gives the states some guidance in determining which additional 
network elements must be unbundled.309  But the FCC’s decision does not set 
standards or even provide quantitative guidance for addressing most of the 
unbundling decisions.  The D.C. Circuit was undoubtedly correct that unbundling 
rules might vary based on market (although I do not think the D.C. Circuit was 
correct to reverse the FCC’s earlier, uniform rules),310 but the Chicago, New 
York, and Houston markets probably have more in common than the Chicago, 
Springfield, and Cairo, Illinois, markets.311  In other words, the unbundling rules 
are not like the case of tower siting, where local decisionmakers are needed to 
take into account local characteristics that cannot be captured in objective market 
data.  Everything about the relevant market variations can be reflected in market 
data, which can form the basis of a decision as to unbundling and pricing. 
2.  Decreasing Costs Embedded in Federal Regulation 
                                                                                                                 
Walden Pond:  The Ongoing Struggle Between Towns and Providers Under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 33 URB. LAW. 781, 785 (2001) (summarizing various court 
decisions).  
 308. See generally Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
18 F.C.C.R. 19,020 (2003) [hereinafter Section 251 Unbundling Obligations], vacated U.S. 
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  The FCC’s decision would also have 
taken some of the judicial review out of the hands of the D.C. Circuit which has questioned the 
FCC’s implementation of the Act quite strongly. 
 309. Id. 
 310. In particular, the judgment about the appropriate level of "granularity" (as everyone 
now describes the level of local variation) involves a balance between administrative costs and 
errors on two dimensions—insufficient granularity can have economic costs, but excessive 
granularity and poor administrative procedures can create costs as well.  The FCC’s prior orders 
attempted a balance of these policies, to which the D.C. Circuit did not seem to give sufficient 
deference. 
 311. According to the 2000 Census, the respective populations of these three cities are:  
2,900,000; 111,000; and 3,600.  2000 Census Population Compared to 1990:  Illinois 
Municipalities, http://illinoisgis.ito.state.il.us/census2000/censusData/2000/docs/munipop.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Congress and the FCC should also reform current federal regulation to 
eliminate legal rules that unnecessarily raise the costs of companies entering 
communications markets.  Although wholesale spectrum reform is the largest 
area in which this could be accomplished, Congress and the FCC could also 
adopt rules that all current spectrum users may introduce noninterfering 
secondary uses without administrative permission.  The FCC has gone some 
lengths in this direction,312 but confirming the general principle would allow the 
introduction of additional competing services.  For example, the TV spectrum, if 
political barriers prevent it from being reclaimed wholesale, could support 
additional, lower-power services, perhaps even the types of services that 
commons advocates envision.  A second-best solution to reallocating the entire 
spectrum, both politically and technically, might be to give the incumbents the 
(tradeable) rights to introduce noninterfering uses.  Politically, vesting these rights 
in the incumbents provides them economic incentives both to reduce interference 
in their existing uses and to facilitate new entry.313  Technically, vesting the rights 
in the incumbent may make the problem of resolving interference disputes more 
tractable.314 
3.  Beginning the End of "Regulatory Apartheid" 
                                                                                                                 
 312. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 220, at 339 (explaining the interference determination 
process). 
 313. Advocates of a "big bang" auction of spectrum sometimes structure the auction so that 
payments go to the existing license holders, in order to help secure their political acquiescence in 
the new regime.  See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 255, at 542–43 (explaining why incumbent 
licenses support the spectrum allocation regime).  Tom Merrill has generalized the point, noting 
that in any transition from an administratively controlled regime to one based on markets, some 
payout (payoff) to those incumbents with an interest in the administrative scheme has been 
necessary.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 275, 290–94. 
 314. Commons advocates and others advocate a rule which permits any person, whether or 
not the license holder, to introduce noninterfering uses.  The proposal here is a smaller step that 
might be easier to manage, both politically and technically.  As to the latter, Ellen Goodman has 
made the case that neither the property rights advocates nor the commons advocates, both of 
whom rely upon noninterference as the touch-stone of operating permission, have given much 
thought to how interference disputes will be resolved.  Indeed, she makes the case that resolving 
such disputes will be quite difficult, especially as the number of users increases.  See Goodman, 
supra note 220, at 375–79, 402–03 (discussing spectrum etiquette, interference control, and 
conflict resolution).  If incumbents are given the interference rights, they have an internal 
incentive to resolve interference before transferring any underlying rights.  They maximize their 
returns by doing so. 
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Peter Huber called the Communications Act "regulatory apartheid,"315 
referring to the way the Act had and still has separate titles and regulatory rules 
for telephone (Title II), broadcast (Title III), and cable (Title VI).  Remarkably, 
the 1996 Act did little to eliminate these categories, despite the sometimes 
expressed hope that different types of carriers would compete with one another. 
Instead, the 1996 Act added another category by codifying a definition of 
"information services"316 mirroring the FCC’s old definition of "enhanced 
services,"317 although the Act provided very little in the way of specifics as to 
how information services should or should not be regulated.318  New services 
therefore confront regulatory uncertainty—uncertainty borne of determining 
which definition will apply and what rules will flow from that. 
This is not a new problem in communications law, but the prospects for 
intermodal competition make it a more pressing one.  In the case of the FCC’s 
Computer Inquiries, in which the agency invented the "enhanced services" 
category to ensure that computing services were not themselves regulated,319 
these new services used telecommunications as an essential component of their 
services, but they were not in competition with traditional telephone service.  
Instead, they were dependent on the telephone network, and the competitive 
concern was that the telephone companies either would discriminate against them 
in favor of their own enhanced service offerings or would extract significant 
monopoly rents for providing service.320 
Today, the definition of a service can have serious consequences for 
competition.  Cable modem service is the prime mature example.  Although the 
service has been in use since the mid-1990s, there is still no definitive statement 
about how it is, or is not, regulated under the Communications Act.  Some 
academic commentators argued for it to be considered an information service 
because the FCC had previously classified Internet services as information 
                                                                                                                 
 315. Hazlett, supra note 130, at 220. 
 316. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000) (defining "information service"). 
 317. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (describing the FCC’s definitional 
moves). 
 318. Other than the definition, the Act contains only six further references to information 
services.  See 47 U.S.C. § 228 (2000) (regulating "pay per call" services); § 230 (granting certain 
copyright and defamation immunities to information services providers and others); § 254(b)(2), 
(3) (calling for certain universal service commitments to information services); § 257(a) (requiring 
an FCC proceeding to examine barriers to entry for entrepreneurs into telecommunications and 
information services markets); § 272(f)(2) (requiring BOCs to offer long-distance information 
services through separate subsidiaries for four years after receiving operating authority). 
 319. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the first of the Computer 
Inquiries). 
 320. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (summarizing the FCC’s various acts of 
redefinition). 
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services; as such, it would not be subject to common carrier regulation or to local 
franchising rules.321  Others argued that it should be considered a "cable service" 
because it was offered by cable companies and because the definition of "cable 
service" included "interactive services."322  As a cable service, it would be subject 
to local taxation, but no regulator (state or federal) would be permitted to impose 
common carrier rules.323  In the first appellate case to consider local regulation of 
cable modem service, the parties litigated the case on the stipulation that the 
service was a cable service, but the Ninth Circuit rejected that assumption and 
held that cable modem services were "telecommunications services," which 
would make them subject to all of the Communications Act’s Title II burdens.324 
 When the FCC finally decided it was time to issue an opinion, it defined cable 
modem services as "information services,"325 but the Ninth Circuit, adhering to its 
earlier precedents, reversed that decision.326  Further proceedings are ongoing, 
ten years in.327 
The classification of cable modem service has direct regulatory 
consequences for that service, but the decision also affects other services, 
regulated under other categories, that compete with it.  Today, cable modem 
service competes with DSL and, to a limited extent, satellite Internet services.328  
The hope is that fixed wireless broadband services will soon be added to the 
mix.329  Incumbent telephone companies are subject to the 1996 Act’s unbundling 
                                                                                                                 
 321. See Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 16 
BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 677, 696–713 (2001) (analyzing cases which govern the regulation of 
broadband Internet access). 
 322. See Speta, supra note 114, at 989–90 (explaining how some provisions of the Act 
appear to inhibit open access regulation). 
 323. Id. 
 324. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding an 
intention that cable modem service be regulated as a telecommunication service). 
 325. See High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling, supra note 290, ¶¶ 34–69 (ruling that 
cable modem services are interstate information services). 
 326. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for 
cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 27, 2004) (No. 04-281) (concluding "that cable broadband service was not a 
‘cable service’ but instead was part ‘telecommunications service’ and part ‘information 
service.’"). 
 327. See, e.g., IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, ¶ 43 
(2004) (calling for, among other things, comment on:  "What effect, if any, do judicial 
decisions—including but not necessarily limited to those issued in Brand X Internet Services v. 
FCC and Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm’n—have on the Commission’s 
discretion to classify IP-enabled services?"). 
 328. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text (discussing competition in local high-
speed Internet access markets). 
 329. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (examining the struggle to successfully 
provide fixed wireless platforms). 
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regime, which means that they must lease local telephone wires to other 
companies for the competing provision of DSL service—a requirement that 
would not apply to cable companies unless cable modem service was also a 
"telecommunications service."  Satellite Internet services and fixed wireless 
services would, under the FCC’s classifications, be "information services" and 
outside of Title II and unbundling rules as well.330  There may be good reasons 
for different regulatory treatment (which are discussed more in the next section), 
but these services are precisely the same from a consumer’s perspective and 
basing them in different regulations only as an exercise in applying outmoded 
regulatory categories simply makes no sense. 
A new Communications Act would attempt to eliminate regulatory apartheid 
and time-wasting battles over whether identical services offered by different 
technologies will be regulated in the same or different manners.  A new Act 
would focus on economic realities of service, such as whether certain providers 
had market power and the appropriate responses to such market power.  In a 
new Act, the FCC’s role would be diminished.  In my view, and that of others, 
the principal role for the agency would be to assure interconnection among 
carriers and to serve as an expert body resolving spectrum interference 
disputes.331 
For a system with eighty years of history with technology dependent rules, a 
new Act along these lines is difficult to fully imagine.  A number of helpful 
precedents exist.  The first is antitrust law as it has been re-envisioned by the law 
and economics movement.332  The most notable example of this is Frank 
Easterbrook’s proposal for a series of "screens" to govern antitrust cases, the 
first of which is a required showing of the defendants’ market power.333  
Professor Philip Weiser has proposed that the FCC regulate all Internet services 
                                                                                                                 
 330. See Speta, supra note 127, at 70–71 (summarizing regulatory treatment of these 
services). 
 331. See Kearney, supra note 125, at 1198 ("Telecommunications will . . . benefit from 
having a regulator that can adjudicate interconnection disputes . . . [and] some . . . 
superintend[ence of] at least some spectrum related matters."). 
 332. See Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation:  Competition for and 
in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1404–05 (2003) (noting the evolution of 
analysis in antitrust law).  McChesney states: 
Traditionally in antitrust, each sort of "contract, combination, or conspiracy" or 
allegedly "monopolizing" practice has been treated as requiring a separate mode of 
analysis . . . .  Increasingly, however, the disparate strands of antitrust law have 
coalesced [following economics] and have moved away from this needless 
taxonomy, with its different cases and analyses for different contracts or practices. 
Id. 
 333. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 17 (1984). 
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by developing a new body of communications law for these services and that it 
employ principles consistent with antitrust law.334 
A second example is the European Union’s recent attempt to harmonize 
telecommunications laws through a series of Directives that extend across 
telecommunications markets.  A comprehensive treatment of those Directives is 
beyond the scope of this Article,335 and we are still relatively early in their 
implementation by the European Union’s Member States.  Nevertheless, they do 
provide an example of a regulatory approach that attempts to address markets on 
a technology-neutral basis.  For example, the so-called "Framework Directive,"336 
which anchors all of the more specific telecommunications directives, premises 
most economic regulation upon a finding that an entity has "significant market 
power."337  The prescribed approach to determine significant market power has 
the steps of market definition (by considering demand and supply substitutability) 
and of ability to raise prices through restricting output without incurring 
significant loss of sales of revenues that echo the United States merger guidelines 
and antitrust economics generally.338  A series of subsidiary directives—on 
access, interconnection, and universal service—likewise adopt a technology 
neutral approach to regulation.339  The European Union Directives seem more 
                                                                                                                 
 334. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 41, 66 (2003) ("outlin[ing] how the FCC can rely on its Title I authority to employ a 
reactive, antitrust-like model of regulation for the emerging broadband market").  Weiser’s is the 
best proposal for a comprehensive strategy for the FCC to address Internet services under the 
current Communications Act, and it, therefore, may be politically more feasible than a wholesale 
revision of the statute (an issue addressed infra notes 384–85 and accompanying text).  See 
James B. Speta, FCC Authority To Regulate the Internet:  Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 15 (2003), for my own view that the FCC does not have authority under Title I of the 
Act to accomplish all that Weiser proposes, and that there are reasons to limit the FCC’s 
regulatory authority.   
 335. For descriptions of the regulatory regimes established, see, for example, L. J. H. F. 
GARZANITI , TELECOMMUNICATIONS, BROADCASTING AND THE INTERNET:  EU COMPETITION LAW 
AND REGULATION, ch. 1 (2d ed. 2003); EC COMPETITION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 
(Christian Koenig et al. eds., 2002). 
 336. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7, 2002 
on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 
2002 O.J. (L108) 33 [hereinafter Framework Directive]. 
 337. Id. at art. 14(2). 
 338. See generally id. (determining when an undertaking has "significant market power"); 
Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power 
Under the Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services, 2002 O.J. (C165) 6 [hereinafter Commission Guidelines]; Jens-Daniel Braun & Ralf 
Capito, The Framework Directive, in EC COMPETITION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 309, 
312–13 (Christian Koenig et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the significant market power concept). 
 339. See generally Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
7 March 2002 on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and 
Associated Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L108) 7;  Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and 
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concerned with the possibilities of monopoly leveraging than do American 
regulation and antitrust law, and other substantial differences would need to be 
worked out.340  As a starting point, however, they are undeniably ahead of the 
current American regulatory regime. 
What I would like to see borrowed from the Directives is their overall 
approach.  Regulation in the telecommunications field should be directed to all 
electronic communications, instead of to particular services defined only on the 
basis of the underlying platform technology.  Substantive regulatory authority 
should be limited to circumstances in which the relevant parties have market 
power that threatens consumers, and the regulatory tools should be limited to the 
minimum necessary to control that power.  The Directives provide a substantial 
toolkit to the regulators in individual countries.  But, as long as competition 
continues to develop along the lines hoped for, regulation limited to 
interconnection rules and to preventing the strategic use of monopoly power 
should provide all of the protection that the market requires.341 
4.  Addressing Regulatory Parity 
Congress and the FCC should ensure that regulation does not create costs 
for new entrants that are not borne by incumbents.  For example, municipalities 
have the authority to charge franchise fees to cable operators, capped at 5% of 
                                                                                                                 
of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to 
Voice Telephony and on Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive 
Environment, 1998 O.J. (L101) 24. 
 340. The Framework Directive states: 
Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it may also 
be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related market, where the 
links between the two markets are such as to allow the market power held in one 
market to be leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the market 
power of the undertaking.   
Framework Directive, supra note 336, at art. 14(3).  The Commission states that "[t]his is often 
the case in the telecommunications sector, where an operator often has a dominant position on 
the infrastructure market and a significant presence on the downstream, services market."  
Commission Guidelines , supra note 338, ¶ 84.  In the United States, monopoly leveraging as the 
basis for communications access rules is receiving very little traction.  See Farrell & Weiser, 
supra note 288, at 133–34 (proposing a more "anti-trust like" perspective on rethinking the 
reasons for the FCC’s rules); see also James B. Speta, Vertical Regulation in Digital Television: 
Explaining Why the United States Has No Access Directive, in REGULATING ACCESS TO DIGITAL 
TELEVISION TECHNICAL BOTTLENECKS, VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED M ARKETS AND NEW FORMS OF 
M EDIA CONCENTRATION 69, 76 (European Audiovisual Observatory 2004) (noting the debate 
between the "Chicago school" and the "post-Chicago" school regarding monopoly leveraging). 
 341. See supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text (evaluating interconnection rules in 
light of monopoly concerns). 
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revenues by federal law.342  Many municipalities have imposed this tax on cable 
operators’ high-speed Internet access service, and the FCC has not yet stopped 
this practice.343  Telephone companies are not subject to such franchise fees for 
DSL service, and so cable would be at a 5% cost disadvantage.344  Similarly, 
whatever the appropriate pricing rules are for right of way, it should not be the 
case that states and municipalities are permitted to charge new 
telecommunications carriers right of way fees that are essentially taxes on 
revenues while permitting incumbents free use of streets.  Yet, this is precisely 
the result the Sixth Circuit approved345 and the FCC acquiesced in until recently.  
Another example is the permission to incumbent television broadcasters to use 
part of their digital licenses for nonbroadcast services such as data,346 while other 
new entrants to those services will have to acquire spectrum rights at auction (if 
any such rights are made available).347 
Of course, the story can work in reverse:  Regulation can give the upper 
hand to new entrants as above-cost long-distance access charges did to voice 
over IP services.  The FCC eventually limited VoIP’s advantage by informally 
expressing the view that phone-to-phone VoIP providers should pay the same 
access charges as traditional telephony services and then by substantially 
reducing access charges.348  But computer-to-computer voice communications 
continue to be exempt from access charges and from direct contributions to 
universal service, and as is more fully described in the next section, this informal 
regime is breaking down.  Similarly, the FCC long justified its decision not to 
require enhanced service providers and ISPs to pay access charges as a means of 
                                                                                                                 
 342. See 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2000) (limiting franchise fees). 
 343. The FCC has called for comment on the issue and issued its tentative view that this is 
the correct result, but it has not yet issued rules.  See High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling, 
supra note 289, ¶¶ 106–08 (discussing "franchise fees previously paid pursuant to Section 
622"). 
 344. Of course, cable Internet service has approximately two-thirds of the high-speed 
Internet access market, see FCC, supra note 161, at tbl. 1 (showing change in percentage of high-
speed line ownership), and my portraying the powerful cable companies as disadvantaged new 
entrants therefore does not quite fit the bill. 
 345. TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining 
that statutory revisions did not affect pre-existing franchise rights). 
 346. See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text (discussing changes in spectrum 
licensing). 
 347. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000) (requiring the auction of all spectrum rights except 
broadcast and satellite services). 
 348. See JASON OXMAN, FCC, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET:  OPP 
WORKING PAPER NO. 31, at 22, http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html (July 1999) (arguing that 
everyone who uses the telephone network should pay the same charges) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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helping a nascent industry develop.349  More recently, although I think it unfair to 
blame regulators, dial-up ISPs took advantage of regulatory arbitrage to receive 
above-cost termination payments from incumbents—to the tune of millions of 
dollars.350 
These examples lead to the more general question, which currently goes 
under the catch-name "regulatory parity," of whether all providers of a particular 
service must be subject to the same regulatory rules.  For example, incumbent 
local exchange carriers make much of the fact that they are required to provide 
unbundled network elements to competing DSL providers who may then market 
unaffiliated Internet services, while the cable companies are not subject to any 
regulatory requirement that permits other ISPs direct access to cable 
customers.351  Similarly, the FCC continues the ISP exemption from access 
charges and universal service taxes.352  If competition is the end goal and 
converging services provided by multiple platforms the expected market structure 
as some commentators argue, then communications regulation ought to strictly 
apply principles of regulatory parity to ensure that competition is on equal 
footing.353 
Regulatory parity is certainly an important touchstone in ensuring that the 
market is served by the most efficient providers and efficient technologies,354 but 
applying it in any given instance can be elusive, particularly when regulatory 
policy must serve multiple goals.  For example, William Rogerson has defended 
the disparity between the unbundling rules and the absence of cable open access 
                                                                                                                 
 349. See id. at 10 ("The Commission determined that the participation of common carriers 
in the data processing market would benefit consumers by offering them innovative new services 
at lower prices."). 
 350. It is unfair to blame regulators because it appears that the incumbents created the 
situation for themselves by insisting that local traffic exchange be made on a paid (and above-
cost) basis instead of a bill and keep basis, which is what created the opportunity for ISPs (who 
only receive telephone calls) to receive substantial payments. 
 351. See, e.g., Nirali Patel, Comment, FCC Broadband Policy:  More Power for the Bell 
Monopolies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 393, 417–19 (2003) (discussing the regulatory parity debate). 
 352. See, e.g., OXMAN, supra note 348, at 24 (advocating the continued nonregulation of IP-
bound services). 
 353. This is the focus of Dan Spulber and Christopher Yoo’s extended defense of "market-
based" prices for access rights.  See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, at 895–900, 1023–24 
(discussing the economic effects of regulation).  I disagree with their proposal.  See infra Part 
V.F and note 426 (criticizing their proposal).  See generally Rob Frieden, Regulatory 
Opportunism in Telecommunications:  The Unlevel Competitive Playing Field, 10 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 81 (2001); Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive 
Telecommunications, 8 INFO . ECON. & POL’Y 3 (1996). 
 354. See, e.g., Speta, supra note 120, at 795–96 (examining the benefits of efficiency); see 
also William J. Baumol et al., Parity Pricing and Its Critics:  A Necessary Condition for 
Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 169 
(1997) (addressing the need for regulatory parity in the solid waste management industry). 
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by pointing to the different underlying technologies.  Because DSL service 
requires a much more minimal change to the carrier’s network than does 
introducing cable modem service, the risk of regulation interfering with cable 
company investment incentives is much greater than the risk of its interfering 
with incumbent telephone companies’ incentives.355  Where regulatory policy is 
attempting simultaneously to test the prospect of intermodal competition (cable 
companies) and to balance the risk of its not developing with an experiment in 
wholesaling and intramodal competition (telephone company unbundling), such an 
argument can justify differential regulatory treatment.  Similarly, as Ashutosh 
Bhagwat has discussed, after the Bell breakup, the FCC successfully applied a 
variety of regulatory policies that helped the new entrants get a foothold in the 
long-distance market—most notably the rule that local companies could not give 
AT&T lower access prices even where AT&T’s more efficient access structure 
yielded relevantly lower costs to the local companies.356  Bhagwat makes the case 
that without these regulatory assists, AT&T’s scale would have enabled it to 
prevent the development of facilities-based competition among long-distance 
companies.357 
The danger, of course, with any explicit "transition" assist is that it creates a 
regulatory process in which the new entrants have a continuing 
political/economic interest.358  Gains that regulation creates through earlier 
competition than would develop without regulatory assistance may be lost if 
regulation continues to tip the playing field longer than necessary.359  The FCC 
certainly continued its heavy-handed regulation of AT&T’s long-distance service 
long after AT&T lost market power in that market.360  And even regulators 
committed to eliminating regulation when it has served its purpose may not be 
                                                                                                                 
 355. William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle 
of Regulating  Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and 
Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 145 (discussing the underlying technology). 
 356. See Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 1483–84 (examining AT&T’s heavier regulatory and 
financial burden). 
 357. See id. at 1483–89 (critiquing the regulation of AT&T and subsequent analysis). 
 358. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine:  Applications in 
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries , 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252 
(1999) ("[R]egulation must accord rights of participation and policy review to anyone 
substantially affected by its policies, which invites strategies and tactics that, at best, retard the 
competitive process and, with depressing frequency, invite cartelization."). 
 359. An optimal regulation permits efficient entry but does not induce inefficient entry.  
See Baumol, supra note 354, at 147–49 (providing a "parity-pricing solution" for the problem of 
inefficiency in access pricing for facilities needed for competitors). 
 360. See Jim Chen, Standing in the Shadows of Giants:  The Role of Intergenerational 
Equity in Telecommunications Reform, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 953 (2000). 
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able to develop information adequate to know when the stopping point has been 
reached.361 
The following general principles seem to emerge.  Regulation that burdens 
new entrants should be more suspect than regulation that burdens incumbents, 
and regulation that absolutely forbids entry into a communications market is 
presumptively impermissible.  Pure interconnection regulation is justified, even 
though its intent is explicitly to assist new entrants.  Where a network is 
necessary for a communications service, an interconnection rule will almost 
always be necessary362 to test whether monopoly is due to demand or supply side 
effects and to preserve the social utility of the communications networks.  (Of 
course, on its face an interconnection rule does not violate regulatory neutrality, 
for it applies to new carriers as well as old).  Other regulation that burdens 
incumbents should be more suspect where it only assists new entrants, and 
especially where it does so without a sunset or other reasonably definite 
mechanism for reevaluating its continuation.  Regulation that burdens incumbents 
to serve another goal, such as limiting market power, testing alternative market 
structures, providing universal service, or advancing other noneconomic goals 
(such as free expression) would be more tolerable.  It will always do to weigh the 
costs and benefits of those other goals versus the likely efficiency compromises, 
but asking for more either oversimplifies the difficulty of policymaking in these 
areas or exaggerates the precision with which limited policy tools can be wielded. 
                                                                                                                 
 361. Some data is easy to come by, and a significant number of active competitors in the 
market presents an easy case to imagine.  But, where markets are monopolized or oligopolistic, 
the question of whether the players have relevant market power is of course much more 
difficult. 
 362. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing generally why structural 
regulation of monopolies will be unnecessary).  The exception is where the new entrant’s new 
network is so superior that all of the incumbent’s customers (or at least a critical mass) expect 
that a sufficient number of others will switch to the new entrant.  See Michael L. Katz & Carl 
Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 
825 (1986) (evaluating the effects of sponsorship on the standardization of technology); 
Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 6–15 (discussing interaction between network effects and 
competition for the market more generally).  What is difficult, perhaps intractable on an ex ante 
basis, is determining whether a given market with network effects will exhibit inertia or "quick" 
tipping.  The working assumption has been that, at least in wireline communications markets, 
the combination of network effects and economies of scale, scope, and density make an 
interconnection rule necessary.  See supra notes 150–66 (evaluating the limited competition in 
wireline communications); Speta, supra note 127, at 81–82 (examining "common carrier duties to 
confront direct network externality").  But with pure wireless networks (that is, where 
interconnection with a wireline incumbent is not necessary to maintain the network nature of the 
service), the market might be less likely to become entrenched.  See id. at 83–84 (discussing 
lower economies of scale for deployment of wireless networks). 
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C.  VoIP as a Case Study 
As noted above, VoIP may provide a new source of genuine competition to 
incumbent local telephone companies.  But VoIP is also a perfect case study in 
the regulatory uncertainties that face a new service.  As Senator McCain said in 
introducing a recent hearing on VoIP:   
In many ways, VoIP is a microcosm of the broad array of 
telecommunications regulatory issues that have been debated since 
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including the role of state 
regulators, the legal classification of services, universal service, access 
charges, emergency services and access by people with disabilities.363 
In this section, I describe these issues in the VoIP context and discuss the 
optimal regulatory structure for VoIP services. 
To do so, however, requires a bit more technical background about VoIP.364 
 As the name suggests, it is a voice service run over the Internet protocol, which 
means that it transmits voices over Internet networks in the same fashion in 
which e-mail, webpages, music, or instant messaging transits the Internet.  In 
fact, a close technical analogy is simply to think of it as instant messaging that 
uses voices instead of text.  VoIP can be provided over any moderately high-
speed Internet connection as long as the user has the appropriate software and 
hardware.  As a result, VoIP can actually be provided in a number of 
configurations.  It can be provided through a computer running a simple 
application to which the user has attached a microphone and a speaker; it can also 
be provided through a special VoIP phone that looks and feels like a traditional 
phone, that itself connects to the Internet, and that does not require an additional 
computer to operate.  Some VoIP providers will install a box in a person’s home 
that connects a high-speed Internet connection to the consumer’s in-home 
telephone wires, so that regular telephones may be used in existing telephone 
jacks.365 
Some VoIP services, such as ICQ’s voic e-chat feature or the currently 
popular Skype, which was created by the same programmers who created the 
Kazaa software, are only computer-to-computer services and only link to 
members of the same network—that is, both parties must be running the same 
                                                                                                                 
 363. Hearing Before the S. Commerce, Sci. & Transp. Comm., 108th Cong. (Feb. 24, 
2004), LEXIS, News Service file [hereinafter S. Hr’g] (Senator John McCain). 
 364. See generally FCC, Voice Over Internet Protocol, at http://www.fcc.gov/voip (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 365. See S. Hr’g, supra note 363 (Glenn A. Britt, Time Warner Cable) ("Our customers can 
use their existing phones and existing phone jacks and they can even keep their same telephone 
numbers."). 
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software and both must be connected to the Internet when the session begins.366 
Other VoIP services, such as Net-2-Phone, have long provided links to the public 
telephone network, permitting Internet users to connect through their computers 
to any telephone number.367  The current generation of voice services—the ones 
that are expected to provide competition to the local telephone incumbents—
provide traditional telephone numbers to users and permit them both to call and to 
receive calls from any other person with a telephone number. 
This short description should make obvious that VoIP raises a difficult 
classification issue under the Communications Act.368  On the one hand, the 
service is identical to traditional telephone service—it connects two parties, in real 
time, and transmits their voices to one another.  As such, it would appear at first 
blush to be a telecommunications service.  On the other hand, VoIP is carried 
over Internet access connections and largely over Internet backbones, and the 
FCC has long described Internet and Internet-based services as "information 
services."369 
Over the past several years, the FCC has taken the position that "phone-to-
phone" VoIP is a telecommunications service, while "computer-to-phone" or 
"computer-to-computer" VoIP is an information service.370  More recently, the 
FCC has held that a VoIP service that does not interconnect with the public 
telephone network is not "telecommunications," even though the service is 
designed to use a telephone-like device and connects voices in real time.371  
Rather, the FCC declared it to be "an unregulated information service subject to 
federal jurisdiction."372  Crucial to the FCC’s decision, however, was the fact that 
the provider did not itself provide any transmission service.  Rather, users had to 
have their own broadband Internet access; the provider simply provided the core 
of a peer-to-peer service, matching up users through a central directory.373 
                                                                                                                 
 366. See Jon Van, Computer-Based Calls Source of Net Concern, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 
2003, at C1 (expressing some people’s concern that VoIP will hurt phone companies like 
Napster hurt record companies). 
 367. Id. 
 368. See S. Hr’g, supra note 363 (Sen. McCain) ("The FCC is forced to shoehorn a newly 
emerging technology into Congress’ 1996 vision of communications regulation and to classify as 
either fish or fowl that which may be neither."). 
 369. See OXMAN, supra note 348, at 22–24 (discussing information services definition). 
 370. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 
11501, ¶¶ 21–54 (1998) (providing background for statutory definitions). 
 371. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com’s Free World Dialup is Neither 
Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order , 19 
F.C.C.R. 3307, ¶ 7 (2004) [hereinafter pulver.com Declaratory Ruling] (examining pulver.com’s 
perspective on its service definition). 
 372. Id. ¶ 8. 
 373. See id. ¶¶ 10–13 (explaining why pulver.com is an information service rather than a 
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The FCC’s decisions have been largely driven by a desire to avoid regulation 
of Internet-based services.  In the very first sentence of his separate statement in 
the pulver.com decision, Chairman Powell simply states:  "Today we affirm our 
commitment—and fulfill our statutory obligation—to keep the Internet free from 
unnecessary government regulation."374  But it is clear that decisions like this 
stretch the Act’s definitions and may, ultimately, result in different kinds of VoIP 
services being regulated differently. 
Indeed, the Act’s definition of "telecommunications"—"the transmission, 
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s 
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and 
received"375—would seem to cover many Internet services.  That a service uses 
protocols other than the protocols traditionally associated with telephone service 
does not affect the service’s definition as telecommunications, as the FCC itself 
has long held.376  Other Internet services, such as e-mail, that transmit 
information from one user to another without changing that information at all 
have escaped classification as "telecommunications" only because they are stored 
in a server that is intermediate between the sender and the receiver until such time 
as the receiver logs on to retrieve his or her e-mail.377  But VoIP transmissions 
are not delayed in this manner. 
The FCC’s current decision simply does not address the two more 
important manifestations of VoIP service, namely those services that are provided 
together with the underlying transmission (as when the Internet access provider 
is also the VoIP provider) and those services that interconnect with the public 
telephone network.  Many cable modem companies are proposing to provide 
VoIP services,378 and modern VoIP service is envisioned to provide connectivity 
                                                                                                                 
telecommunications service). 
 374. Id. at 3326 (separate statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell). 
 375. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000). 
 376. See Final Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 96 (stating that "basic"—now 
"telecommunications"—services are those that provide "pure transmission capability over a 
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer 
supplied information"); id. ¶ 95 (asserting that the use of packet switching and error control 
techniques "that facilitate economical, reliable movement of [such] information do[] not alter the 
nature of the basic service"); Application of AT&T for Authority Under Section 214 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Install and Operate Packet Switches at Specified 
Telephone Company Locations in the United States, Memorandum Opinion, Order, and 
Authorization, 94 F.C.C.2d 48, ¶¶ 15–20 (1983) (holding that X.25 packet switching networks 
provided basic services because they transmitted user-supplied information without changing 
the content of that information). 
 377. See generally Weinberg, supra note 84, at 227–30 (discussing FCC’s precedents in 
this regard). 
 378. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text (presenting plans to unveil VoIP 
services). 
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to and from all telephone numbers.  To accomplish the latter, VoIP providers 
need to install equipment that converts VoIP calls into protocols that are 
acknowledged by the voice telephone network—and they need to do this whether 
or not they provide the Internet access and Internet transit portions of the 
service.  Each of these types of services, because it provides an element of 
transmission, would then be within common carrier and other regulation.  At the 
Senate Commerce Committee’s recent hearing on VoIP, several witnesses 
advocated bringing VoIP within the traditional regulatory regime to ensure that 
states and local governments would be able to continue to tax and otherwise 
regulate these services.379 
If VoIP is not regulated as telecommunications, but is left unregulated as an 
Internet (information) service, then many of the issues discussed above arise. 
The first and perhaps most important is that of competitive neutrality.  Traditional 
telecommunications services are not only regulated, but they are subject to a 
variety of taxes at the state, local, and federal levels.  Exempting VoIP puts it at a 
cost advantage, but one that is a feature of the regulatory structure and not of the 
superiority of the underlying technology.  This is not economically efficient.380  
The second issue is jurisdictional.  If VoIP is not telecommunications, it may be 
subject to regulation at the state and local level, where the prospect of multiple 
and varying regulation may (by contrast to telephony) put it at a competitive 
disadvantage.381  The FCC currently intends to exercise its so-called ancillary 
jurisdiction over information services to preempt state regulation,382 but the 
FCC’s authority in this regard is unsettled.383 
Third, if VoIP is not regulated as a telecommunications service, other 
important social objectives may be implicated.  For example, and as is discussed 
more in subpart E, if VoIP begins to take significant market share from traditional 
telecommunications services, then revenues raised for universal service and for 
other purposes through telecommunications taxes will decrease. Additionally, 
VoIP providers will not be required to provide 911 service (although most VoIP 
                                                                                                                 
 379. See S. Hr’g, supra note 363 (statements of Senator Lamar Alexander and Stan Wise, 
Chairman, Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’ns). 
 380. See Speta, supra note 120, at 795–96 (discussing the costs of economic inefficiency). 
 381. See Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 293, at 63 (reviewing the Broward County 
legislation); see also supra notes 291–93 and accompanying text (describing problems with local 
regulation regarding tower siting and rights of way). 
 382. See pulver.com Declaratory Ruling, supra note 371, ¶ 15 ("We determine, consistent 
with our precedent regarding information services, that FWD is an unregulated information 
service and any state regulations that seek to treat FWD as a telecommunications service or 
otherwise subject it to public-utility type regulation would almost certainly pose a conflict with 
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 383. See Speta, supra note 334, at 16–19 (arguing that the FCC lacks jurisdiction to 
develop comprehensive regulation of Internet services). 
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services that are designed to substitute for traditional telephone service provide 
some kind of 911 access), wiretapping capabilities, or access for those with 
disabilities.384 
A rational statute would not make the regulatory decision depend upon the 
metaphysics of classifying VoIP as telecommunications or not.  And a rational 
statute would not tip the competitive playing field among services that are 
identical from the consumer’s perspective.  VoIP, of course, is a new entrant, 
and so under the general outlines discussed above,385 the lack of regulatory parity 
may not be of immediate concern.  But, if the predictions for its success begin to 
materialize, then a new regulatory framework should be adopted. 
The difficult issue for current telecommunications policy, however, is that 
the appropriate response to the success of VoIP is not necessarily to subject it to 
regulation to bring it into parity with telephone regulation, but rather to lift the 
regulation and regulatory costs to which telephone service is subject.  To take the 
easier issues first, it seems to me that VoIP providers that interconnect with the 
voice telephone network ought to be required to provide 911 service and access 
for people with disabilities.  By interconnecting with the traditional network, these 
services declare their "publicness" in an important regard, and current policy 
requires consistent access to emergency services and for disabled persons.  
Similarly, if public policy otherwise demands that law enforcement has the ability 
to tap voice telephone calls, then VoIP providers should be required to build this 
into their service. 
The foregoing regulatory trigger—that the VoIP service interconnects with 
the public telephone network—is itself, however, at least potentially an 
anachronism.  Not tomorrow and not in the next few years, but a time may arrive 
when "voice-only" is not the service that unites all Americans.  When that day 
comes, these policies will need to be tied to access or to whatever that generation 
of network turns out to be.386 
If VoIP becomes a real competitor to voice telephone service, then the 
regulation currently designed to control the rates of voice service will need 
reform.  Currently, traditional long-distance carriers pay higher rates to the local 
                                                                                                                 
 384. See FCC, VoIP/Internet Voice Fact Sheet, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/ 
voip.pdf (last visited June 14, 2004) (addressing some of the drawbacks of VoIP) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  The FCC has recently proposed rules that would require 
all VoIP providers to ensure that law enforcement agencies can tap VoIP calls.  Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, FCC 04-187 (Aug. 9, 2004), available at 
http:www.hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-187A1.pdf. 
 385. See supra notes 351–61 and accompanying text (examining various aspects of 
regulatory parity). 
 386. See Speta, supra note 127, at 81–82 (suggesting interconnection policy based upon the 
need for a single network to provide service). 
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telephone companies for the origination and termination of telephone calls than 
VoIP providers would pay because VoIP terminations into the local network 
would be considered local telephone calls, not long-distance.  This lack of 
competitive neutrality is largely indefensible.  More radically, competition in local 
markets would eliminate the justification for retail rate regulation.  The extent of 
this reform, however, will depend upon the nature of the broadband market as 
this competition takes hold.  VoIP, of course, depends upon an underlying access 
service; it does not itself provide a connection into a home.  VoIP changes the 
competitive playing field between facilities-based carriers, because VoIP is an 
application that may make cable broadband (or wireless or whatever platform 
utilizes it) more attractive to consumers vis-á-vis a traditional voice telephone line. 
D.  Government Subsidies 
Some commentators and industry officials have gone further in suggesting 
that government assist the development of new communications services by 
advocating government financing or building new communications networks.  
Many municipalities are developing their own broadband networks, either because 
no broadband service is available or the municipality perceives there to be 
insufficient competition.387  And some groups have called for substantial federal 
deployment of new "fiber to the home" networks.388  Entry or explicit financing 
by governments would introduce new providers into the markets even more 
surely than would the simple steps of lifting barriers to entry and a bit of 
regulatory hospitality. 
In the main, these proposals do not situate the government as the only 
communications provider in a market; indeed, no one seems to think the old 
European model of a Post, Telephone, and Telegraph monopoly is a good idea. 
Rather, these proposals are made with the rhetoric of competition.  However, 
creating a government stake in a particular provider of service threatens two 
kinds of inefficiencies.  First, the government provider might be cross-subsidized 
from general revenues or by lighter regulatory treatment and might gain an 
inefficient advantage over others.389  Second, if not subsidized, the municipal 
                                                                                                                 
 387. See Kathryn A. Tongue, Municipal Entry into the Broadband Cable Market:  
Recognizing the Inequities Inherent in Allowing Publicly Owned Cable Systems to Compete 
Directly Against Private Providers, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1103–05 (2001) (discussing trend). 
 388. See, e.g., TECHNET, A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE :  UNIVERSAL AVAILABILITY OF 
BROADBAND BY 2010, at 7, http://www.tchnet.org/news/newsreleases/2002-01-15.64.pdf (last 
visited May 29, 2004) (calling on network providers to invest billions in infrastructure upgrades 
and increased bandwidth capacities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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telecommunications company might lose money, creating the politically 
unpalatable prospect that city officials are losing taxpayer money and prompting 
them to take regulatory measures against their competitors.390  For these reasons, 
and because of the possibility of profligate municipal spending, some states have 
adopted legislation forbidding municipalities to enter telecommunications markets. 
 The Supreme Court upheld these laws.391  Despite my general call for the lifting 
of legal barriers to entry, I do not think these state laws violate the imperative to 
develop new competition in telecommunications markets.  The commonly heard 
expression from antitrust law, that it is designed for "the protection of 
competition, not competitors,"392 seems applicable here.  A law that forbids entry 
by one narrowly defined entity may or may not be justified (although the 
arguments about avoiding anticompetitive subsidy and protecting the public fisc 
seem quite important).  But excluding one potential entrant should not, itself, 
damage competition in an otherwise structurally competitive market. 
Nevertheless, while government itself probably should not get into the 
telecommunications carrier business, government could accelerate the process of 
intermodal competition in the more customary manner of providing funds for 
basic research and development.  Government-funded research, especially 
military, provided some of the essential Internet and wireless technologies now in 
commercial service.393  But, the level of funding such basic research has not kept 
pace with the growth of the communications sector,394 nor has it focused 
explicitly on funding research into technologies on the basis of their potential to 
provide intermodal competition.  Indeed, a presidential commission has concluded 
that military funding of communications research, while still significant, now 
focuses exclusively on near-term war fighting projects and not on the types of 
basic research that previously inspired the Internet.395 
                                                                                                                 
 390. Id. at 1125. 
 391. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S.Ct. 1555, 1559 (2004) (construing § 253’s "any 
entity" to not include municipalities).  Section 253 forbids any state law that "prohibits . . . any 
entity" from providing telecommunications services.  47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000). 
 392. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
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Competitive markets, in fact, likely increase the need for government 
funding.  The Bell System’s ability to subsidize basic research with its monopoly 
profits is well known,396 and some economic work argues that competitive 
industries invest less in basic (as opposed to applied) research and 
development.397 
E.  A Note on Universal Service 
Competitive telecommunications markets need a new universal service 
policy.  Although airline and railroad deregulation attempted to ease the transition 
to competition and to provide some funds to continue service on lightly traveled 
routes, both transitions have resulted in the loss of service to a substantial number 
of communities.398  By contrast, universal service has long been a goal in 
telecommunications regulation; indeed, universal service to some extent provided 
the argument that resulted in the comprehensive regulation of what was, at its 
outset, a competitive local telecommunications market.399  The 1996 Act did not 
decrease the commitment to universal telecommunications service;400 in many 
regards, it increased its scope by including Internet access for many entities as 
part of universal service.401 
The 1996 Act’s stated goals with respect to universal service are compatible 
with the agenda to facilitate intermodal telecommunications competition.  The Act 
itself states that "[a]ll providers of telecommunications services should make an 
equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement 
of universal service."402  In practice, however, distortions have been introduced, 
because "providers of telecommunications services" has been limited to traditional 
wireline and wireless telephony services.403  Thus, if VoIP is successfully kept 
                                                                                                                 
 396. See generally A. Michael Noll, Bell System R&D Activities:  The Impact of Divestiture, 
11 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 161 (1987) (evaluating Bell’s research and development activities). 
 397. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 136, at 232–35 (discussing this literature). 
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out of the telecommunications category, it will not pay universal service fees, just 
as the providers of instant messaging (which already is a limited substitute for 
voice calls) do not.  The most vocal advocates of VoIP regulation tout concern 
for universal service funds as the principal ground for such regulation.404 
The long-run goal for universal service should be a funding mechanism—
from both the collection and distribution sides—that is entirely competition-
neutral.  As many have argued, the least distorting mechanism would be a system 
funded through the general federal revenues.405  This has long been considered 
politically impossible, and so some specific tax on communications service will 
probably continue.  But taxing VoIP will prove difficult because the essential 
components of VoIP service can be provided overseas.406  One alternative would 
be to embed the universal service tax in the allocation of telephone numbers, 
although, if the charge were passed through on a "per-number" basis, it would 
raise the costs of service for the lightest users.  Perhaps more promising would 
be to require any entity that receives telephone numbers to pay a universal service 
fee based upon the percentage of their revenues likely derived from voice service. 
 Because the entire point of VoIP is that the traffic appears to be the same as 
other Internet traffic, the FCC would have to engage in some sort of sampling or 
other estimation to determine a baseline voice percentage as to which the 
universal service charge would apply.  These difficulties might be enough to push 
the political process toward the more competitively neutral "tax and spend" 
structure.  In all events, the imperative is to continually revisit the universal 
service mechanism as the unpredictable path of telecommunications innovation 
continues and to adjust the collection and payment mechanisms to eliminate 
competitive imbalances. 
A better result would seem to be a tax on all services that provide access to 
electronic communications, including all of those services currently known as 
telecommunications transmission and those known as information services 
transmission.  This means taxing Internet access, which has been forbidden from 
time to time by the so-called Internet tax freedom acts.407  Taxing the Internet 
                                                                                                                 
telecommunications regulations prior to technology convergence). 
 404. See supra note 384 and accompanying text (describing possible problems with not 
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TECH . 619 (2002) (providing background on legislation). 
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does run counter to the prevailing impulse to leave the Internet free from 
regulation.  But taxing Internet access on an even basis with the taxes placed on 
telecommunications services becomes necessary for competitive neutrality when 
those services compete with one another—as VoIP and other developments 
promise.  Exempting Internet access services from taxation seemed valuable in 
their infancy, but it is hard to argue today that the likes of AOL, Microsoft, 
Earthlink, and others continue to need an implicit subsidy.408 
The more important point from the perspective of introducing new 
competition into telecommunications markets is that regulatory policies which are 
actually universal service policies should be identified as such and evaluated for 
their effectiveness as such.  To return to the example of television broadcast 
spectrum, the must-carry rules that put broadcast content on cable systems were 
defended on the basis of "preserving free broadcasting" for those who received 
television in that manner—in other words, to provide universal service to 
video.409  Judged from that perspective, the policy just does not make sense.  
Although there remain some 15% of television households that do not subscribe 
to cable or DBS, many of those nonsubscribers are in higher income brackets and 
might subscribe if there were no broadcast.410  What is needed is an analysis that 
compares the number of subscribers to free television that depend upon it to the 
value of the spectrum for other uses.  I suspect that it would be more efficient to 
fund a universal service program for cable or DBS.  This would be wrenching to 
the broadcast industry, to be sure, but the competitive gains could be quite 
significant. 
Similarly, one of the arguments advanced in favor of cable open access rules 
is that competition among ISPs would ensure users greater free speech 
possibilities than if the cable companies had exclusive control of the ISPs.411  
This is not precisely a universal service argument, although it is similar in that the 
regulation is designed to advance a noneconomic good.412  If cable company 
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http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art17
DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1149 
restrictions on user speech are considered problematic, however, then the 
relevant comparison is between open access policy and an explicit rule, á la 
common carrier regulation, that forbids the cable companies to interfere with user 
speech.  This rule might be more susceptible to a First Amendment challenge,413 
but it would focus the discussion on the respective technical and economic 
advantages of the proposal.  From a purely economic perspective, the conversion 
of cable systems to common carriers would meet the speech goal in the same 
manner, without the technical costs of changing the cable systems to 
accommodate additional ISPs.414  This might not satisfy the advocates of open 
access rules, but the debate could then proceed on other grounds. 
F.  A Return to the Unbundling and Pricing Puzzle 
I have already identified the 1996 Act’s unbundling regime as highly 
contentious, and indeed, its difficulties are part of the premise for a new focus on 
intermodal competition.  This new paradigm, if implemented successfully, will 
have implications for the network sharing regime, and despite my desire largely to 
steer clear of the current controversies over unbundling, this topic now requires a 
few comments.  The FCC has adopted, and the courts have approved, a forward-
looking cost methodology known as TELRIC for those parts of the incumbents’ 
network that it is forced to share.415  TELRIC, as I have noted, is successful at 
squeezing the incumbent’s monopoly profits out of the prices charged for local 
loops and other essential network elements.  The regulations therefore permit a 
certain level of retail competition, and TELRIC limits monopoly profits at the 
wholesale level much as rate regulation historically controlled them at the retail 
level.  For this reason, unbundling and TELRIC pricing make the most sense if 
one views the natural monopoly characteristics of the local loop and other 
elements of the local network as relatively stable.  
Adopting facilities-based, intermodal competition to the local incumbents as 
the legislative and regulatory priority does not necessarily require abandoning the 
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unbundling regime or TELRIC, but it does require some modification.  The 
extreme, current criticisms of TELRIC as inadequate compensation (to the point 
of being a constitutional taking) are wide of the mark.416  The FCC’s TELRIC 
rules do require that interconnection and unbundling prices be set so as to make a 
fair contribution to the maintenance of the incumbent’s local network.417  
TELRIC is therefore not marginal pricing in the sense that the incumbent cannot 
recover its fixed costs or the contribution that the foregone provision of a certain 
retail service would make to the joint and common costs of the incumbent’s 
network.  Moreover, the FCC, prodded by the courts,418 has eliminated those 
applications of TELRIC most likely to upset a level playing field by limiting the 
number of elements that must be unbundled under that scheme.  In fact, under 
the current rules, the FCC has limited the elements presumptively required to be 
unbundled to local loops419 which, because of their sunk cost characteristics, are 
the least likely to be duplicated by new entrants.420 
Nevertheless, an affirmative attempt to develop new platforms will require 
intensifying the vigilance that the FCC adverts to in its third-generation 
unbundling rules—that mandatory unbundling should be lifted when the market 
demonstrates that one or more entities actually have bypassed the incumbent’s 
facilities with substitute facilities.421  More importantly, it requires sensitivity to 
                                                                                                                 
 416. See, for example, Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, for the argument that TELRIC 
constitutes a taking.  For a rebuttal, see Baumol & Merrill, supra note 132.  The Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that TELRIC methodology offends the Takings Clause in Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 533 U.S. 467 (2002). 
 417. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 519 (2002). 
 418. In its initial rules implementing the local competition provision of the 1996 Act, the 
FCC required all elements to be unbundled and made available to CLECs.  The Supreme Court 
reversed this aspect of the rules in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).  In 
its second set of rules, the FCC limited the list of elements to be unbundled to seven, but the 
D.C. Circuit found that this nationwide list did not adequately account for likely local variations 
in conditions of competition in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422–24 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 419. See Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, ¶¶ 197–342 (analyzing loop 
deployment, types, and unbundling proposals). 
 420. See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 126, at 462–63 (noting that items with sunk costs, 
as opposed to fixed costs, are less likely to be duplicated). 
 421. See Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, ¶ 178 (evaluating arguments 
supporting and detracting from mandatory unbundling); see also 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000) 
(requiring the forbearance from regulation when competition develops).  This analysis requires, 
of course, an assessment familiar from antitrust law of the demand and supply substitutability 
of the goods on all dimensions.  For example, while cable-based VoIP and cell phones are 
technical substitutes for local loops, it is not clear that they are yet in precisely the same 
economic market as traditional voice.  The quality of those services is lower; they are often not 
compatible with the same range of vertical services such as call-waiting, caller ID, and voicemail; 
and they may not have independent power in emergency situations. 
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the possibility that bypass, even if not currently feasible, will arrive in the (nearer) 
future.  To the extent that unbundling is necessary at any particular time because 
the local loop (or some other facility) is then a natural monopoly facility, the 
TELRIC unbundling price must be based upon a projection of the useful life of 
that facility.  As the FCC has long acknowledged but only just begun to 
implement, the depreciation rate should include not only the expected life of the 
facility based on wear and tear but also the expected useful life of the facility 
based on the prospect that it will be rendered obsolete by a new bypass 
technology.422 
This possibility of developing bypass has led a number of commentators to 
argue that TELRIC should be replaced entirely by the efficient component pricing 
rule, global price caps, or another rule that permits the incumbent greater leeway 
in recovering from new entrants contributions to the incumbents’ fixed and joint 
and common costs.423  But, as William Rogerson has pointed out, keeping 
unbundling prices lower and thereby "artificially handicapping incumbents in the 
most profitable areas of their territories is actually a reasonably good way of 
encouraging . . . entry."424 
Thus, for the same reasons that I am willing to tolerate a degree of 
regulatory asymmetry when that asymmetry benefits new challengers to 
incumbent carriers,425 I do not think that a regulatory policy designed to further 
the possibility of bypass must necessarily abandon TELRIC at the outset.  When 
and if the hoped-for facilities-based competition begins to develop, TELRIC can 
then be revised.426  And when it develops completely, then the pricing problem 
will, mercifully, go away. 
                                                                                                                 
 422. See Local Competition Provisions, supra note 127, ¶ 686 (claiming that "properly 
designed accounting depreciation schedules should account for expected declines in the value of 
capital goods"); Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, ¶¶ 685–91 (analyzing 
depreciation rate components). 
 423. The ECPR was developed by William Baumol and Robert Willig, and it sets the 
unbundling price at the incumbent’s retail price less the incremental avoided costs (that is, the 
incremental costs of that part of the service that the new entrant will supply) of providing the 
service.  See generally Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN 
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979) (discussing technical network 
access prices); Baumol et al., supra note 354.  Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole advocate a 
global price cap, by which the incumbent maintains the freedom to price access and final goods 
subject only to a price cap weighted by the relative provision of both wholesale and retail goods. 
See LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 131, at 170 (examining the benefits of a global price cap). 
 424. William P. Rogerson, New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunications Regulation, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2000) (reviewing LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 131). 
 425. See supra notes 354–61 and accompanying text (justifying regulatory disparity in 
certain circumstances). 
 426. In this regard, one’s regulatory prescription flows from how one reads the evidence 
concerning current competition and (an even less objective matter) what one thinks will happen 
with competition in the near term (not to mention how near one thinks the near term is).  
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VI.  Conclusion:  Not a Political Pipedream 
It does not seem necessary or appropriate, after setting out this proposal at 
such length, to conclude with a rote summary of the foregoing.  What does seem 
necessary, by contrast, is at least a few words on why this radical proposal to 
rewrite telecommunications law—a task the Congress thought it successfully 
accomplished less than a decade ago—is anything other than an academic’s 
pipedream.427 
The answer is again supplied by some of the earlier deregulatory successes 
in transportation and long-distance.  Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk have 
made a study of some of these deregulatory episodes,428 and their conclusions 
suggest that a window for further telecommunications reform may now be 
opening.  In particular, they studied airline and trucking deregulation as well as 
the early stages of telecommunications deregulation, and they identified a number 
of economic and political forces as important.  First, they note that, prior to 
deregulation, "[e]lite opinion converged in support of reform."429  Second, they 
note that "[o]fficeholders in positions of leadership took initiatives."430  Third, 
they note the importance of economic analysis that justified legislative action.431  
To Derthick and Quick’s factors should be added the important force that 
industrial users of utility services have sometimes added to pushing for legislative 
reforms.432 
                                                                                                                 
Christopher Yoo and Daniel Spulber advocate eliminating TELRIC pricing right now.  See 
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, at 1019–21 (arguing against compelled access to broadband 
networks and then basing prices only on direct cost).  I think they read the evidence of 
competition far too optimistically and see competition that has, in fact, yet to develop.  As 
explained above in Part IV.A, there is reason for optimism, but the current evidence reveals only 
limited competition. 
 427. Excuse the pun. 
 428. See generally DERTHICK & QUIRK , supra note 45. 
 429. Id. at 238. 
 430. Id. at 239. 
 431. See id. at 246 ("As vividly and impressively as possible, our cases demonstrate the 
role that disinterested economic analysis can play in the formation of public policy.  If 
economists had not made the case for procompetitive deregulation, it would not have 
occurred."). 
 432. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1395–96 (addressing another important force 
in deregulation).  Kearney and Merrill state: 
In addition to struggles among rival producer groups, there is also evidence that 
powerful consumer groups have played a greater role in more recent reform 
initiatives.  It is always instructive to consider who are the winners and who are the 
losers from major policy changes.  With respect to changes in telecommunications 
(both long distance and presumably local exchange service), electricity, and gas, the 
big winners appear to be large commercial and industrial users of these services. 
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Each of these factors is emerging.  In a very recent hearing prompted by 
VoIP, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain stated his preference 
for overhauling the Telecommunications Act and stated unequivocally that he was 
not alone in the Senate: 
In many ways, VoIP is a microcosm of the broad array of 
telecommunications regulatory issues that have been debated since 
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . .  We began the 108th 
Congress with a hearing on the state of competition in the industry and I 
reminded the public, the FCC Commissioners and my colleagues then of my 
long held beliefs that the 1996 act is a fundamentally flawed piece of 
legislation.  Since then, some of my colleagues have joined me in expressing 
the need for Congress to take a serious look at reforming the act.433 
At the same hearing, FCC Chairman Powell agreed:   
[W]hether it’s now or in the near future, it is my responsibility as your 
expert agency to tell you, I think the days are numbered on the way we’re 
doing this under the current statute.  I do believe there is going to have to 
be a statute in the future that recognizes these dramatic technical changes 
and gets us out of the buckets of the ‘96 Act.434 
Senator Lautenberg agreed with one of the principal proposals in this paper:  "I’d 
urge some day that a whole bunch of wordsmiths get together and simplify the 
language and the structure and have a better understanding of it, because it seems 
to me at times we’re fighting for definitions."435  It may be that a reprise of the 
Kennedy hearings—which built political momentum for airline deregulation436—
can occur for local telecommunications. 
Economists and legal commentators strongly support reform of the 
communications laws, as detailed above, and companies that have experienced 
lower long-distance prices can be expected to advocate for further legislation that 
promotes competition.  With these groups in agreement and the seeming energy 
both of important Senators and of the FCC Chairman, it is possible that a window 
of legislative opportunity is available.  Economists and other commentators need 
to marshal evidence of the success of markets in telecommunications—such as 
the evidence of how the intrastate airline markets or the unregulated agricultural 
commodities markets, each behaving competitively, helped spur reform in those 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 433. S. Hr’g, supra note 363. 
 434. Id.  
 435. Id.  
 436. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing the 1975 "Kennedy 
hearings"). 
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areas.437  Such evidence should be at hand, for competition in long-distance and 
other telecommunications and cable markets has succeeded.438  Prompting this 
legislative action is important because the FCC is bound to the current definitions 
of the Act and because its actions are going to be challenged and subjected to 
judicial review.  In passing the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Congress faced 
the question of what more there was to do after CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn had 
already instituted much of the deregulatory agenda.  The answer was clear: 
[A] revised act is needed to insure that a future CAB’s do not undo the 
work of the present CAB and reimpose strict regulation.  And even with 
respect to the present Board, its programs have not been subjected to 
complete judicial review, and it is not clear that the courts will conclude that 
existing law allows these programs.  Moreover, the different elements of the 
Board’s reform programs are interrelated . . . and a court decision overruling 
any single CAB policy could set back the entire CAB program.439 
The FCC has been doing heroic work trying to keep up with a market changing in 
Internet time, but legislative confirmation and assistance is now necessary. 
I have not provided all of the pieces to implementing this agenda, but the 
framework for the future seems clear.  New competition will need more than the 
lifting of legal prohibitions on entry; it will need a comprehensive review of the 
economics of regulations that may deter entry as an economic matter.  Only then 
can there be a test of whether communications markets can become more fully 
competitive as a structural matter, and only then will a "deregulation" in the model 
of trains, trucks, and planes yield competition’s benefits. 
                                                                                                                 
 437. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (describing airline deregulation). 
 438. See supra notes 150–77 and accompanying text (addressing competition between 
wireline and video service providers). 
 439. Air Service Improvement Act of 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1211, at 4 (1978). 
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